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The objective of this research is to present a model that utilizes social and learning 
mechanisms to first explore the underlying dynamics of opinion formation and 
propagation, and then applies those mechanisms to an application of freight mode 
choice to investigate the effect that opinions have on choice set considerations, 
attribute perceptions, and the market adoption of a new rail freight service.  Primary 
contributions of this research include the explicit modeling of social and learning 
mechanisms and their effects on opinion formation and propagation, the evolution of 
these opinions over time, and an exploration of the role that opinion dynamics have in 
choice processes.  Research findings will offer insight to the process of evolving 
attitudes, perceptions, and opinions and the effects on individuals’ judgment and 
decision making.  It will also offer insight to the effects of attribute distortion on 
decision making. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Role of Opinions in the Choice Process 
Current travel demand models employ a random utility maximization (RUM) 
framework to represent choices made by tripmakers.  Within this RUM framework, it 
is assumed that each individual is a rational, fully-informed decision maker that 
chooses an alternative that maximizes his utility.  It is further assumed that the analyst 
knows what elements of the choice set (i.e., alternatives) are available to each 
decision maker.  However, both economics and psychology studies have shown 
irrational decision making in the reversal of preferences, that decisions may not be 
based on correct information or based on limited information (e.g., systematic 
distortion of attributes, quality of information, see for example Tversky, 1981; 
Sammer et al., 2006), and that decisions are made without knowing the true 
probabilities of other alternatives, and thus the consequences of the decision are also 
unknown (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).  Other transportation studies have shown 
that ignoring these realisms leads to biased parameter estimates (see for example, 
Williams and Ortuzar, 1982; Basar and Bhat, 2003; Vythoulkas and Koutsopoulos, 
2003; Swait, 2001; Cantillo and Ortuzar, 2005; Cantillo et al., 2006). 
 
These limitations are exacerbated when trying to forecast future market shares 
when a new service is introduced.  The current research practice is to elicit stated 
preference (SP) responses from current users to capture attitudes towards a new 
service, and then combine those responses with revealed choices, or revealed 
preferences (RP) to estimate a mixed RP/SP choice model.  However, since the new 
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service does not exist, there is no RP data (e.g., level of service attributes, 
performance measures) on the new service, and thus the entire forecast relies on the 
robustness of the RP data on existing services and the SP data collected from survey 
experiments.  These SP exercises may not capture correctly the likelihood or 
willingness to shift to the new service due to a lack of real consequences and benefits.  
While much consideration and research has focused on constructing these SP 
experiments (e.g., in psychology experiments, payoffs and losses are commonly used 
as real benefits and consequences to decision making), it is difficult to capture 
behavior under real situations.  Further, due to individuals’ tendency to be over-
optimistic about their future (Sjoberg and Biel, 1983), and the tendency to respond 
positively to an innovation that has potential to improve the status quo, the projected 
use of the new service tends to be over-inflated (Ben-Akiva and Morikawa, 1990). 
 
Research has tried to incorporate concepts of limited attribute information, 
choice set generation, and intentions into comprehensive choice models that account 
for attitudes, perceptions, and preferences (see for example, Ben-Akiva et al., 1999; 
Walker and Ben-Akiva, 2002).  These models present a general behavioral 
framework using latent constructs for perceptions, which are the individual’s belief of 
an attribute value, attitudes, which reflect an individual’s needs or ideal (goal) 
situation, and preferences, which represent the desirability of an alternative.  
However, because these parameters are endogenously estimated and not directly 
observable, it is difficult to explicitly capture the dynamics of choice behavior due to 
fuzzy choice sets, attribute value distortions, and intentions. 
3
1.1 The Dynamics of Opinions and Choice 
Much of the research to date on the random utility model development has 
focused on the estimation procedure and the accuracy of the parameter estimates.  
Driving this research is the argument that accurate parameter estimates will yield the 
correct sensitivities to changes in the attributes due to policy changes or the 
introduction of a new service.  While unbiased parameters are essential to provide 
policy-makers with an accurate decision-making tool, little has been done to explore 
the dynamics of the process by which the market share adjusts to changes in the 
environment stemming from such policy decisions (e.g., decrease in travel time, 
increases in parking costs).  It is important to evaluate the process of these market 
shifts since it is not realistic to expect the entire population to become aware of 
changes in the attributes instantaneously.  Rather, individuals may learn about these 
changes through various social and interpersonal mechanisms over time, such as 
word-of-mouth, mass-media, direct experience, and belief learning.  From a policy 
standpoint, policy-makers would like to know how long and at what rate it would take 
for the market shares to reach a desired goal, or the effect a period of policy change 
has on the demand (e.g., road closures, seasonal pricing) (Lerman and Manski, 1982).  
It is also important to consider whether the information diffusion is ultimately 




Concerning the effect of information on choice, consumer and marketing 
science has made progress on exploring these dynamic processes through the study of 
opinion formation and propagation.  Recent advances in information and 
communication technology (ICT) have greatly enhanced the visibility and 
accessibility of market products.  Widespread use of e-mail and the internet facilitate 
the propagation of information to vast numbers of the population.  Despite the 
massive amount of information available, there is concern that it may have little or no 
effect on altering an individual’s opinion on the subject.  Most people have opinions 
on a variety of topics that have formed either from internal reasoning and logic, or 
from external interactions with others with views on this topic.  When introduced to 
new information or innovations in a certain product class, individuals associate the 
information with their current opinion on that class.  If the opinion on the topic is 
negative, it may be difficult for the new information to change the individual’s 
opinion to a positive one, and vice versa.  Intuitively, having a positive opinion 
towards a product will most likely increase the likelihood of adopting it.  This 
challenge to alter an individual’s opinion – thoughts and ideas – has been a focal 
point for both commercial and private sectors in marketing to uncover the 
mechanisms behind opinion formation.   
 
The formation of favorable and unfavorable opinions has been of great interest in 
problems of diffusion of innovation and technology adoption (Wu and Huberman, 
2005).  To draw a parallel to transportation, consider developments in intelligent 
transportation systems (ITS), traffic management centers, and real-time traffic 
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navigation global positioning systems (GPS) units and the information made available 
to users about current conditions on transportation facilities.  Information provided by 
these technological advances intends to direct system users to available facilities (in 
the case of congestion) or alternative services.  Yet, as in the marketing field, it is 
difficult to determine whether information provided is actually affecting an 
individual’s opinion, and ultimately his choice of an alternative. 
 
Opinions differs from attitudes and perceptions in that an opinion reflects an 
evaluation of a current situation, whereas attitudes may reflect needs, desires, and 
values, and perceptions reflect convictions of a proposition.  Attitudes and 
perceptions tend to form through belief learning and direct experience, while 
opinions, due to their lack of foundation since they are considered neither fact nor 
fiction, form through social mechanisms in addition to learning processes.  Most 
importantly, one can elicit an opinion, whereas attitudes are generally latent and 
unobservable.  The ability to observe opinions (i.e., elicit real responses) have made 
them the focus of marketing and consumer studies.  As in the case of attitude 
formation, researchers are interested in the underlying mechanisms and dynamics of 
opinion formation, how these opinions evolve over time, and how these opinions 
propagate through a population. 
 
Within the context of travel demand, however, there has been no known 
research that explicitly accounts for the role of opinions in a choice framework.  
Opinions research has shed some insight that a favorable opinion does not necessarily 
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result in an observed choice; rather, a favorable opinion towards an alternative may 
encourage an individual to try the alternative for a trial period.  Once the trial period 
is complete, the individual decides either to continue utilizing the alternative or go 
back to the previous alternative (Rogers, 2003; Garling, 1998).  The implied two-
phase process is also reflected in economic theory, e.g. Manski (1977), through the 
development of a two-stage choice framework that first selects the most important 
alternatives in a non-compensatory procedure (e.g., elimination by aspects, see 
Tversky, 1972), then evaluates the remaining set through compensatory rules.  These 
findings suggest that opinions may have a role in screening relevant alternatives for 
consideration in the final choice set.  If an individual has a significantly positive 
opinion (i.e., significantly different from neutral or some internal threshold) towards 
an alternative, the alternative is placed in the choice set for final consideration 
according to some decision rule.  If the opinion is negative, or less than some internal 
threshold, the alternative does not enter the choice set.  Such two-phase choice 
framework, which first articulates mechanisms for the choice set generation, then 
applies the choice mechanism, has been proposed in several transportation studies 
(see, for example, Ben-Akiva and Boccara, 1995; Swait and Ben-Akiva, 1987a; Swait 
and Ben-Akiva, 1987b), but these have not explicitly investigated the dynamics of 
opinions in choice set generation. 
 
Investigating opinion dynamics in the context of a choice framework may also 
offer insight into how information about the attributes, and more importantly the 
changes in the attributes, spreads amongst a population.  Since opinions are social and 
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environmentally contextual (i.e., subject to social interaction, awareness of the 
environment), the mechanisms behind their formation may also correlate with 
information exchange.  Exploring these information exchange mechanisms will offer 
insight into how individuals may react to changes in the level of service of a 
particular alternative, and more importantly, how over time the information about a 
new alternative or service may propagate through a population.  This research seeks 
to construct mathematical representations of these social and learning interactions to 
approximate opinion formation and propagation and information exchange within a 
population.  To extend this to a choice framework, this research intends to explore the 
relationships between opinions and information to choice set generation, perceptions 
of attribute information, and the market adoption of a new service. 
 
1.2 Objective of Research 
The objective of this research is to present a model that utilizes social and learning 
mechanisms to first explore the underlying dynamics of opinion formation and 
propagation, and then applies those mechanisms to an application of freight mode 
choice to investigate the effect that opinions have on choice set considerations, 
attribute perceptions, and the market adoption of a new rail freight service. 
 
To do this, an extensive review of the literature spanning current discrete 
choice model developments, social interactions and learning processes, to 
mathematical opinion formation models will identify major processes or heuristics 
governing these interactions and give insight to modeling approaches and techniques.  
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Using this information, the research formulates a conceptual opinion framework that 
accounts for information interaction and opinion formation and revision.  
Incorporated in this conceptual framework are elements of the utility maximizing 
choice framework currently used in transportation.  Within this framework are 
notions that govern the mechanisms behind choice set consideration and attribute 
information exchange.  A constant theme in the framework is the idea that thresholds 
govern individuals’ action; first, in considering whether to interact with the social or 
learning mechanism, and second, whether to give an alternative serious consideration 
in the choice set.  Following the two-stage choice paradigm developed by Manski 
(1977), the conceptual framework contains two main components; the first considers 
receptivity to social and learning mechanisms, while the second component 
represents the final consideration stage in the choice process.  Four classes of 
mechanisms are incorporated into the conceptual opinion framework: word-of-mouth, 
mass-media, belief learning, and direct experience.  Additionally, the framework 
considers the interrelation between social classes, personality types, and issues of 
trust and credibility. 
 
To implement the framework, the study proposes a simulation tool and 
associated experiments utilizing agent-based simulation of agents that interact with 
one another based on the mechanisms defined in the conceptual framework.  The four 
classes of mechanisms quantify the means through which agents choose to interact or 
communicate with each other, while an opinion revision component serves to 
measure the change in opinion.  A consideration mechanism is designed to place the 
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alternative with a positive threshold greater than a random internal threshold into a 
final consideration set, taken to be the choice set considered when making a decision.  
The simulation program allows the testing of different scenarios, such as the effect of 
different social classes or personality types, as well as the physical characteristics of 
the population, such as the number of agents, the number holding a certain opinion, 
and the number of interactions. 
 
As an application to current discrete choice models in transportation, this 
research synthesizes the opinion framework with a binary freight choice model 
calibrated for a mode choice study on a north-south corridor in Eastern Europe.  
Using the parameter coefficients estimated for level-of-service variables as an initial 
condition and the information about the experienced level-of-service variables 
observed from individuals, the opinion simulation framework intends to allow these 
agents to interact and evolve their opinions towards the two alternatives.  The 
research considers an opinion scenario where there is no a priori assumption about 
the opinions of the individuals (i.e., chosen alternative evokes a positive opinion that 
is above the threshold, non-chosen alternatives evoke an indifferent or negative 
opinion), and a outlines a scenario where survey data on the evaluation of the current 
systems could be incorporated as the initial values for opinions toward the chosen 
alternative.  The latter case allows for a correlation between opinions and the 
availability of information, in that there may be cases where individuals do not have a 
favorable opinion towards an alternative, but due to a lack of knowledge, perceives 
that alternative as the only feasible method of shipping freight goods.  After a time 
10 
 
period has expired, the base market shares obtained by the choice model will be 
compared to the market shares obtained through the opinion model. 
 
As this research is also interested in the interaction between opinions towards 
an alternative and corresponding attribute perception; as such, the opinion model 
incorporates systematic distortions in attribute values that depend on the individual’s 
opinion and memory capacity.  An extremely positive opinion may tend to exaggerate 
the benefits of the service or alternative, whereas an extremely negative opinion may 
tend to exaggerate the shortcomings of the service.  As per the psychology literature, 
individuals are not full-information decision makers, and so over time, depending on 
the opinion towards the alternative, attribute values may be exaggerated. 
 
To explore the role of opinions in the market adoption of a new transportation 
service, the research utilizes a generalized random utility approach that will 
approximate individuals’ sensitivities to the new service in addition to the current 
services.  The proposed “new” service is a rail freight service that intends to improve 
level-of-service performance measures.  To differentiate the new service, an error 
term is introduced and added to the systematic component of the utility equation for 
all alternatives.  Using Monte Carlo simulation techniques, a new value is drawn from 
the error distribution each time an individual receives new information about that 
alternative, but remains at the previous value otherwise.  This allows for the 
introduction of serial correlation and state dependence (i.e., the analyst can induce 
correlations in choice over time) through this process.  Following the random utility 
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framework, the alternative with the highest utility is chosen.  This process model 
allows for the evaluation of the path to market share equilibrium and gives insight to 
the forecasting capability of the logit model. 
 
1.3 Main Contributions 
The primary contributions of this research are the explicit modeling of social and 
learning mechanisms and their effects on opinion formation and propagation, the 
evolution of these opinions over time, and an exploration of the role that opinion 
dynamics have in choice processes.  This research offers insight to the processes of 
evolving attitudes, perceptions, and opinions and the effects on individuals’ judgment 
and decision making.  It will also offer insight to the effects of attribute distortion on 
decision making.  The added value of this research will hopefully inspire policy 
makers to consider social and environmental contexts into account when modeling 
individual choice. 
 
Concerning the word-of-mouth mechanism, results from the scenario testing 
could offer public agencies insight into different strategies of disseminating 
information about a new policy change or an innovation to a target group of 
individuals who are influential in forming a favorable opinion towards the innovation 
and in propagating their opinion to others.  The mass-media mechanism scenarios 
could offer insight to strategies to better match the consumers’ needs in order to 
evoke a response.  With the internet becoming a more prevalent marketplace for idea 
and opinion exchange, the belief learning mechanism may show policy makers how 
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important it is to be sensitive of the information published on the services of interest.  
Finally, the direct experience mechanism seeks to reveal users’ sensitivity to the 
variability in level-of-service attributes and emphasize to policy makers the need to 
reduce uncertainties and variances in the experience of the service.  Interaction of the 
different mechanisms may offer insight to developing strategies to shift users’ choice 
and give insight to strategies to developing long-term choice. 
 
A secondary contribution of this research is the development of the freight 
mode choice model for a freight corridor in Eastern Europe.  To the author’s 
knowledge, there have been few quantitative freight mode choice studies in the 
transportation literature, mainly due to the lack of data from logistics companies that 
regard such information as proprietary.  Combined with data on the evaluation of the 
system, this research offers insight to shippers’ sensitivities to current level-of-service 
attributes and projected future services through the mode choice model and the 
simulation experiment. 
 
1.4 Plan of Discussion 
This thesis is structured as follows.  After this introductory chapter, which explains 
the motivation and objective for this research, as well as the expected contributions, 
chapter 2 presents an extensive literature review of relevant research on choice 
modeling and opinion formation and propagation.  There are three components in the 
literature review.  The first investigates developments in choice models that account 
for choice set generation, information exchange and attribute distortion, and market 
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adoption in the context of RP-SP models.  The second component explores qualitative 
research on opinion formation including literature on opinion leaders, social 
diffusion, and diffusion mechanisms, and examines recent developments in 
mathematical formulations of opinion formation and propagation models, as well as 
information flow in social groups, group dynamics, and opinion diffusion.  To close 
chapter 2, the final section synthesizes research findings from the different fields of 
study and presents a general approach to the research problem. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology of this research and details a theoretical 
approach to modeling opinion formation and propagation.  Preliminary information 
on the implications of social and learning mechanisms are defined, followed by the 
role these mechanisms have in the opinion formation and propagation process.  A 
discussion on the formulation of the utility maximizing binary logit model is 
presented as the basis for the estimation of parameters of the attributes, which is then 
followed by the development of a conceptual framework that incorporates 
individuals’ choices, the social and learning mechanisms, an opinion revision process, 
an attribute revision process, and a choice consideration set.  The final section of 
chapter 3 details the implementation of the conceptual framework so that it may be 
made operational in a simulation experiment. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the simulation framework designed to explore empirical 
equations, heuristics, and mechanisms for opinion formation and propagation.  It first 
explains the simulation system features, and then discusses the general experimental 
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factors considered.  Scenarios to be implemented and tested in the simulation 
experiments are defined in this chapter.  Also considered are the performance 
measures and properties governing the simulation.  Chapter 5 then presents the 
simulation results from this exploration of the designed heuristics governing social 
and learning mechanisms. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the freight mode choice problem for a freight corridor in 
Eastern Europe.  Data used in the binary logit model is described, as well as data 
describing the evaluation of the transport system and data measuring the willingness 
to adopt a new service.  Chapter 7 then presents the estimation results for the binary 
logit model and also presents the results from the simulation experiments and 
compares the market shares over time to the base market shares predicted by the 
binary logit model. 
 
As a conclusion to the thesis, chapter 8 presents a summary of the 
contributions and discoveries.  It also evaluates the use of the findings from the 
research, as well as assesses the limitations and future avenues of research. 
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Chapter 2: Background Review and Synthesis 
Previous Research in Mode Choice Issues and Opinion Formation 
While there is little research on the explicit formulation of social and learning 
mechanisms, their effects on opinions, and the role that opinions play in a choice 
framework, there has been much investigation on the separate issues of clarifying the 
choice process, recognizing the evolution of choices, as well as research on social and 
learning mechanisms, and research on mathematical representations of opinion 
formation and propagation.  The challenge for this research is to review the large 
literature encompassing fields of psychology, sociology, econometrics, marketing 
science, applied mathematics, applied physics, public policy, communications, 
epidemiology, and transportation and synthesize the information for the purpose of 
this study.  This chapter is structured around two major sections: the first considers 
developments in choice models and the understanding of the choice process, while 
the second investigates developments in social and learning mechanisms and models 
of opinion formation and propagation.  The final section synthesizes the wealth of 
information and outlines the general lessons learned from previous research that can 
be applied to this study. 
 
2.1 Discrete Choice Models and Issues 
Choice plays a role in transportation decision making in route choice, mode choice, 
activity scheduling, driving decisions, departure time, auto ownership, and household 
location, among the major research topics found in the literature.  In general, given a 
set of transportation service alternatives (e.g., private car, bus, and light rail system 
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for mode choice, different paths in route choice, and differing neighborhoods for 
household location), researchers are interested in the underlying factors contributing 
to the choice of the individual.  Conventional methods to identify these factors and 
determine its impact on the aggregate system utilize mathematical models based on 
utility theory, which is founded on the principle that people maximize their utility 
value.  These models attempt to circumvent the limitations noted in the expected 
utility theory literature (see for example, Tversky, 1969; Grether & Plott, 1979; 
Ellsberg, 1961; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; Tversky et al., 1990; Tversky, 1967a; 
Tversky, 1967b) by randomizing utility and incorporating a random utility framework 
into the models.  Current state-of-the-art choice models are of the general class of 
random utility models (RUMs) that attempt to capture personal tastes and preferences 
in decision-making at a disaggregate level.  Recent advances in these models have 
made them more sophisticated and robust, enabling the examination of variations in 
personal tastes and preferences across the population (see for example, Ben-Akiva et 
al., 1999; Walker and Ben-Akiva, 2002). 
 
One of the most widely used RUM in discrete choice is the logit, due largely 
to the fact that the formula for the choice probabilities takes a closed form and the 
parameter estimates are relatively straightforward.  Luce (1959) derived the basic 
logit model in formulating constant utility.  Given that Luce’s choice axioms held, 
there was a “strict” utility model in which the probability of choosing an alternative i
was the utility of that alternative over the sum of all the alternatives in the choice set.  
Marschak (1960) showed that Luce’s axioms implied that the utility model was 
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consistent with utility maximization.  Research by Marley into the relation between 
the logit formulation and the distribution of the error term (the unobserved utility) 
proved that having an extreme value distribution leads to the logit formula (Train, 
2003).  However, it was the research of McFadden (1974) that proved the converse – 
that the logit model implied the error term is extreme value distributed. 
 
To derive the logit model, assume that the error term of the utility function is 
IID extreme value, also known as the Gumbel distribution or the Type I extreme 
value distribution.  Following the random utility approach argument that individuals 
are assumed to maximize utility, the objective function to maximize an individual’s 














where µ is a scale parameter that for the logit model, is set to 1.  The 
probability of an individual n choosing alternative i then becomes the formula written 
in equation 2.2. 
 ( ) ( )ijCjVViP ninjninjnn ≠∈∀+−≤= ,,Pr εε (2.2) 
Equation 2.2 states that the choice probability depends on the probability that 
the error term of all the alternatives not including the alternative under consideration 
is less than or equal to the difference in the systematic components of the alternative i
and the sum of all alternatives not including i plus the error term for alternative i.
This probability specification is the cumulative distribution for the error terms of all 
alternatives not including i. Thus the choice probability is the integral of the error 
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terms of all alternatives not including i evaluated at the right side of the less than or 
equal to sign in equation 2.2 over all values of the error term of i weighted by its 







































This is a J-dimensional integral that is fortunately tractable due to the 
assumption that the error terms are IID extreme value.  Algebraic manipulation of 
equation 2.3 yields a simple closed form expression shown in equation 2.4. 











eiP 1,10, (2.4) 
 While an attractive, tractable method of determining market share 
probabilities, the logit model has limitations in that it cannot account for random taste 
variations, it assumes proportional substitution patterns, and it cannot account for 
unobserved correlations across panel data or repeated choice samples.  Logit models 
can represent taste variations across a population that vary systematically with respect 
to the observed variables, but it cannot represent taste variations that vary with 
unobserved variables or vary purely randomly.  Introducing a term in the parameter 
coefficient to account for unobservable factors creates a new random term in the 
utility specification that is no longer IID.  The unobserved attributes (and their 
effects) enter each alternative, and as a result, the combined IID error term and new 
error term are correlated over alternatives.  This violates the fundamental assumption 
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that the error term in the utility specification follows the Gumbel distribution (Train, 
2003). 
 
Another limitation of the logit model is that it implies proportional 
substitution across alternatives.  As shown in equation 2.4, the sum of the 
probabilities across alternatives is always equal to 1.  When the attributes of an 
alternative improve, the utility of that alternative increases, and the probability of the 
alternative being chosen rises consequently.  This implies that the probability of 
choosing another alternative in the choice set decreases.  Researchers are concerned 
with how probabilities of other alternatives change with respect to an improvement in 
an attribute, or an introduction of a new alternative.  However, the logit model 
assumes that there is a constant ratio preserved between alternatives.  It also exhibits 
the IIA property in that for any two alternatives, the ratio of the logit probability is 
independent of the other alternatives in the choice set (Train, 2003). 
 
The logit model is also limited in that it cannot account for the correlation 
amongst unobserved factors in repeated choice situations.  If the unobserved factors 
affecting the individual’s choice are independent over repeated choices, then the logit 
model is suitable to capture panel effects in the same fashion it would capture 
variations in cross-sectional data.  Logit can account for state dependence, a factor 
that determines how an individual’s past choices influence the current choices, and 
can account for lagged responses to changes in attributes (Train, 2003).  However, 
assuming the errors are independent over repeated choices or over time is a strong 
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assumption.  If there are dynamics within the systematic or observable factors, it is 
likely there are also dynamics within the unobserved factors. 
 
Much research has been focused on overcoming the limitations of logit to 
better understand and analyze individual behavior and improve the accuracy of the 
parameter estimates for better forecasts.  More advanced RUMs have relaxed the logit 
assumptions.  The nested logit model relaxes the assumption of proportional 
substitution and allows for correlations across alternatives through the introduction of 
a nesting structure.  Probit and mixed-logit models have relaxed the limitation of 
random taste variations and unobserved correlations in repeated choice experiments 
by allowing flexible specification of the error terms (e.g., allowing for correlations 
across individuals as well as across alternatives) and allowing for random coefficients 
for the parameter estimates. 
 
Despite the advances to account for judgment and decision making within an 
economic framework, RUMs have been largely criticized by both economists and 
psychologists as to whether they adequately account for behavioral realisms in 
decision making.  RUMs mentioned in the previous paragraph do not account for 
latent factors such as attitudes and perceptions, availability constraints (i.e., which 
alternatives are available to an individual), different decision protocols, or stated 
preference information.  This led to the development of a generalized random utility 
model that relaxes the restrictions of previous RUMs through extensions that account 
for flexible disturbances, latent variables (e.g., the explicit representation of the 
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formation of attitudes and perceptions), latent classes (e.g., latent segmentation of 
taste variation, choice sets, and decision protocols), and combined revealed and stated 
preference data (Walker and Ben-Akiva, 2002). 
 
Other criticisms have focused on the decision process of RUMs.  Of interest to 
this research is the skepticism behind whether utility maximization is an 
approximation of individuals’ objectives (e.g., are individuals always profit-driven or 
do they consider social welfare), and more importantly, whether the compensatory 
trade-offs imposed by utility theory on all alternatives in the choice set is an accurate 
depiction of individuals’ decision process.  Additionally, individuals are rarely 
viewed to be fully informed or aware of the full set of alternatives the analyst 
specifies in the choice model specification, nor are they fully cognizant of the correct 
values for attributes of the alternatives.  These perceptions or beliefs may stem from 
experience, or interaction with information received from other individuals or a media 
conduit, and may lead to distortion of these values.  Researchers have attempted to 
address these concerns through the investigation of choice set generation, quality of 
attribute information, and sensitivity to attribute changes.  As this research is more 
concerned about the choice process and the evolution of choice rather than the 
estimation of choice parameters, the next three sections will focus on findings from 




2.1.1 Choice Set Generation 
Much of the research on choice set formation has stemmed from a seminal paper by 
Manski (1977) on the structure of random utility models.  That work presents a 
framework of choice theory, by which the generation of alternatives within a choice 
set forms as an outcome of a two-step recursive process.  In the first stage, exogenous 
forces pose a choice problem involving an individual and the associated choice set.  
Given that the choice set is well-defined, the individual chooses from a set of 
available alternatives.  Until this work, most of the research on choice theory had 
focused on the second stage of the choice process.  Manski formulates a probabilistic 
mechanism for the generation of the choice problem.  Formally, given a choice set 
space Γ, and decision maker space T, choice set C is a subset of the choice set space, 
and decision maker t, the choice problem is defined as a pair (C, t) drawn from the 
product space T×Γ according to some probability measure MΓT that is defined over 
the product space.  From this choice problem generating process, two probabilistic 
components, the decision maker generating process, MT, and the choice set generating 
process, MΓ, are derived.  This yields the following equation: 
( ) ( )tMtCMM TT |ΓΓ = (2.5) 
 In this formulation, the choice set generation is interpreted as an exogenous 
party or set of decision makers who control the availability of alternatives to each 
decision maker t. An example given in Manski (1977) is the college admissions 
process, where a set of students T have an A set of colleges to choose from.  
Admission administrators make the decision whether or not to admit a particular 
student, thereby making their college available to the student for final consideration.  
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The decision maker process is interpreted as a sampling strategy under the random 
utility framework (i.e., the analyst draws a sample from T and observes their choices), 
or a set of decision rules from which the individual draws under the psychological 
model of random utility (Manski, 1977). 
 
The interpretation of Manski’s two-stage choice paradigm has been adapted to 
reflect the stochasticity of an individual’s choice set (i.e., an analyst rarely knows the 
actual choice set from which an individual chooses an alternative), and to represent 
the limited information decision maker (i.e., an individual may not know about all the 
feasible alternatives, or may not seriously consider some known alternatives).  The 
latter interpretation is demonstrated in Swait and Ben-Akiva (1987a) where the 
choice set generation process is constructed as a random constraint in the choice set 
space.  Here, the choice set is a constrained subset of all possible alternatives that 
depend on socio-demographical, psychological, informational, societal, and cultural 
restrictions.  However, it is improbable that the analyst can properly specify 
deterministic constraints that describe the restrictions on an individual’s consideration 
set.  Thus Swait and Ben-Akiva formalize the concept of probabilistic constraints that 
has a deterministic component consisting of a constraint index set, a vector of 
parameters, a vector of characteristics of the individual, and attributes of the 
alternatives, and a random variable that is additive to the deterministic portion.  The 
alternative is considered available to the decision maker if all the constraints are 
satisfied.  This is specified as a binary random variable that is 1 if the relevant 
constraints are satisfied, 0 otherwise (Swait and Ben-Akiva, 1987a).  The 
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interpretation of this approach is that if the choice set element or alternative is greater 
than some threshold level (denoted by the random parameter) it is placed into a 
consideration set.  Since the analyst cannot observe the threshold, the inclusion or 
exclusion of an alternative becomes probabilistic. 
 
Operationalizing this theoretical framework proved computationally difficult 
given the large choice set space as the number of alternatives increased.  Much of the 
work attempting to model probabilistic choice set generation have implemented a 
constant consideration probability across individuals (Basar and Bhat, 2003).  One of 
the limitations of the work in Swait and Ben-Akiva (1987b) is that although they 
allow for the threshold to vary across individuals, the construction of a parameterized 
logit captivity (PLC) model restricts the evaluation to a model where the consumers 
are captive to single alternative, or to a model where they choose from the full set of 
alternatives.  Basar and Bhat (2003) formulate a parameterized choice set model that 
relaxes this restriction, and allows for individuals to choose from all possible choice 
set sizes.  Once the choice set is formed by the probabilistic mechanism, the second 
stage of the model estimates attribute parameters using the multinomial logit 
formulation.  This model allows for the evaluation of the effect of an attribute change 
on both the consideration set (i.e., the impact of placing an alternative into a choice 
set) and the choice (i.e., the impact on choosing an alternative, given the alternative is 




Basar and Bhat (2003) apply the probabilistic choice set multinomial logit 
model (PCMNL) to an airport choice problem.  An assumption of this formulation is 
that all airports are feasible for each traveler, however, not all airports may be 
considered by each traveler.  Given that Uqi is the consideration utility for airport i
and individual q, the alternative is included in the choice set if the consideration 
utility exceeds a threshold.  This threshold is assumed to be a random variable that is 
standard logistically distributed.  As in the Swait and Ben-Akiva (1987a) formulation, 
the probability of an alternative i appearing in the consideration is modeled as a 
binary process: 1 if the utility exceeds the threshold, 0 otherwise.  Estimation results 
of an MNL model and the PCMNL model show substantial differences in parameter 
values for the two most important attributes, access time and flight frequency.  
Individuals are much more sensitive to access time at the choice stage in the PCMNL 
model as the MNL model assumes that all airports are available to all individuals.  
While the comparison of trade-off values between access time and flight frequency 
between both models reveal the dominance of access time at the choice stage, the 
PCMNL model also shows that flight frequency is the dominating factor for the 
consideration set.  The added analytical power of the PCMNL has implications for 
marketing strategies to boost market share; for areas within close proximity of an 
airport, marketing campaigns would focus on improved access time (since given the 
proximity, an individual will most likely have that airport already in his choice set), 
while for those outside this area, the campaigns would focus on improved flight 




Where Basar and Bhat (2003) assume that all alternatives are feasible, though 
the individual may not know about them or consider them, this may not be an 
appropriate model specification for a choice problem where some of the alternatives 
are not feasible.  The PCMNL formulation also does not explicitly account for latent 
processes that govern an alternative’s availability.  Research by Ben-Akiva and 
Boccara (1995) attempts to explicitly capture individual perception of the availability 
of an alternative.  Using the basic model framework developed in Swait and Ben-
Akiva (1987a), they incorporate choice set generation response indicators related to 
the latent variables and latent constraints to enable the explicit analysis of latent 
psychological factors that would yield information on individual behavior not 
normally inferred from observed behavior alone (Ben-Akiva and Boccara, 1995).  
Such indicators are derived from survey questions concerning the availability of the 
alternative.  Realizing that these responses would not only have availability 
implications, but would also affect the desirability of the unchosen alternatives, they 
alter the constraint-based rule to include both the latent criteria Hn, and the latent 
utilities Un for a given alternative.  The rationale for this correlation is that individuals 
may indicate that an alternative is unavailable, when in reality, it is an unchosen 
alternative (i.e., it is feasible or available) with a low utility. 
 
Estimation results show that the probabilistic choice set (PCS) model has a 
better fit than the MNL model.  The model improves prediction power over the MNL 
model in situations where there is substantial heterogeneity of choice sets actually 
considered, and it contains information on the loyalty or captivity of individuals to 
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specific alternatives.  Such additional information will allow marketing and 
advertising to design better strategies that focus on specific consumer segments.  The 
implication of disregarding the availability of an alternative is reflected in the 
elasticities of the market shares; the elasticities may be over or understated in the 
absence of availability considerations (Ben-Akiva and Boccara, 1995). 
 
Given the large implication that choice set generation has on marketing 
strategies, research in marketing science has taken interest in investigating the 
formation of choice sets with hopes of understanding how certain marketing 
campaigns may affect individuals’ consideration of an alternative.  Much of the 
marketing literature concurs with the two-stage choice paradigm and defines the full 
set of alternatives to be the awareness or feasible set, and the choice set to be the 
consideration set of alternatives.  Gensch and Soofi (1995) use an information-
theoretic algorithm for estimating the consideration set.  They use information 
entropy as the uncertainty function over the choice sets and attribute ratings as a 
source of information for reducing uncertainty.  The algorithm estimates the choice 
using the maximum entropy principle, which maximizes the uncertainty inherent in 
the distribution for predicting the outcomes.  Maximum uncertainty occurs when all 
outcomes are equally likely.  The objective of the research is to partition the 
awareness set into two subsets that have a high level of entropy within the set, but 
low entropy between sets.  Alternatives with high probabilities are assumed to be in 
the consideration set, and low probability alternatives are in the non-consideration set.  
The authors argue that the consideration set includes the alternatives with only the 
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higher non-negligible probabilities, so the set is much more homogenous than the 
non-consideration set.  The key finding in this research is the predictive power of the 
logit model is concentrated in identifying the non-consideration set alternatives, or 
alternatives in the awareness set (Gensch and Soofi, 1995). 
 
Horowitz and Louviere (1995) argue that in the absence of direct observations 
of the choice process, there are many situations in which standard operational 
indicators of consideration provide no additional information than that provided in the 
utility function, and are really just reflections of individual preferences.  Modeling 
choice with a consideration stage, they say, may lead to a misspecified model that 
would produce inaccurate forecasts.  To demonstrate this, they test the hypothesis that 
an individual’s preferences towards all available alternatives can be described by a 
utility function that identifies both the consideration set and the choice against 
alternative models that model choice as a sequential, two-stage process.  The study 
operationalizes two definitions of consideration: the first corresponds to measurement 
that evoked brands, while the second corresponds to measurement that aided in 
recollection of brands.  Results suggest that the consideration stage may be a 
reflection of preferences, rather than the first stage in the two-stage choice process.  
Knowing the individual’s consideration set would not offer additional information to 
that provided in the utility function.  Given that an analyst knows the individual’s 
utility function, the consideration set could be perfectly predicted given the 
knowledge of their size.  However, Horowitz and Louviere recognize that utilities are 
latent, and that information about consideration sets could be used to improve 
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efficiency in estimation and prediction given that the model is properly specified 
(Horowitz and Louviere, 1995). 
 
There may be situations where individuals’ consideration sets contain only 
one alternative.  Lapersonne et al. (1995) argues that individuals construct their 
consideration set through a search process of alternatives in the awareness set and 
stop searching if a further search for feasible alternatives is perceived to be not cost-
effective.  Identifying the marketing factors and socio-demographic characteristics 
that lead to this situation has the potential to ensure a manufacturer has the ability to 
trigger further search processes from competitors (thus attracting new business) or to 
preclude active search of other brands by current customers (thus maintaining a loyal 
customer base).  Using a survey of consumer purchases of automobiles, they find that 
17% of the interviewees only considered the brand of their previous vehicle.  Of this 
fraction, 48% actually ended up purchasing that previous brand.  To investigate this 
phenomenon, Lapersonne et al. use a binary variable to indicate whether a consumer 
considered only his previous brand, and then analyze the variable using logistic 
regression. 
 
Estimation results showed that consumer satisfaction was the dominant factor 
in purchasing the automobile.  If an individual is very satisfied with his previous car 
(and dealer), the perceived benefit of collecting and analyzing data on other brands is 
trivial, and not worth the effort.  On the other hand, dissatisfied individuals see a very 
high benefit to investigating different brands or alternatives and are willing to incur 
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extra costs or efforts to attain the benefits.  Socio-demographic factors that increase 
the propensity to consider only one brand include old age, low income, and low 
education.  However, these explanatory variables are only proxies for latent effects 
hypothesized, such as a lower ability to process information, a lower propensity to 
explore unknown paths, a lower social ability, or a lower ability to control one’s life.  
Considering product experience, they find that people who have “broader” previous 
experiences with the class of products are more likely to consider several brands.  
Concerning risk and involvement, it is interesting to note that buyers who considered 
only their previous brand do not feel they are taking a high risk of making a wrong 
decision (Lapersonne et al., 1995). 
 
A number of managerial implications can be drawn from the Lapersonne et al. 
(1995) work.  Improving satisfaction with the current product and current distributor 
is essential to maintaining a loyal customer base.  Providing these loyal customers 
with positive and well-specified information on the brands sold by the distributor also 
helps to maintain customer loyalty.  To attract new customers, distributors should 
focus on providing potential markets with information that convinces those customers 
that the potential utility of its products are high enough to warrant an active search or 
merit consideration of the product (Lapersonne et al., 1995).  These implications raise 
interest on how direct marketing and segmentation and targeting strategies can affect 
an individual’s consideration set.  In light of the shift of marketing strategies to brand 
differentiation instead of the traditional brand placement in areas of highest demand, 
Allenby and Ginter (1995) investigate the effect of in-store displays and feature 
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advertising on consideration sets.  A critical issue for implementing the product 
differentiation strategy is to determine the extent to which advertising – marketing 
mechanisms – influence household consideration sets.  They hypothesize that 
consideration sets reflect more than just preferences, even in simple product choices.  
Using information on household purchases of canned tuna brands, they specify a 
heteroscedastic RUM that contains explanatory variables such as price, the presence 
of an in-store display, and another dummy variable that is one when the product is 
featured in a major advertisement.  The model allows for a flexible pattern of cross 
elasticities at the household level, allowing the analyst to describe patterns of price 
sensitivity among competing products.  Findings show that, by allowing for the price 
sensitivity to depend on the in-store display and feature activity, the marketing 
variables serve to decrease household price sensitivity.  The decrease is substantial 
for feature advertisements, which may suggest that households first identify their 
brand before going to the store and observing the array of prices.  In-store displays 
and feature advertisements also influence inter-brand competition.  These findings 
imply that effective management of these marketing mechanisms can offer an 
immediate, short-term reduction in price sensitivity, which is similar to long-term 
effects sought in product differentiation strategies (Allenby and Ginter, 1995). 
 
Mitra (1995) investigates the effect advertising has on the stability of 
consideration sets over multiple purchase occasions.  Using stability measures such as 
the number of brands considered at least once, the standard deviation of consideration 
set frequencies, and the average discordance in consideration set composition, she 
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examines the stability of consideration sets when individuals are subject to 
advertising.  She hypothesizes that advertising information affects consideration set 
stability by causing individuals to see larger differences among brands than would be 
without advertising.  More simply, advertising has an effect on differentiating product 
perceptions.  Findings show that differentiating advertising that contained diverse 
information on brand-attributes led to a greater dispersion of perceived brand utilities 
compared to no advertising conditions, and to a reminder advertising situation.  
Increasing gaps between brands lead to fewer brands in the consideration set.  
However, advertising by itself did not decrease the average consideration set size, 
suggesting that the effects of advertising on the composition of the consideration set 
is not captured by consideration set size (Mitra, 1995). 
 
While most of the decision theory literature has utilized RUMs or information 
theory to model choice behavior, alternative formulations of choice have been 
proposed.  Vythoulkas and Koutsopoulos (2003) incorporate concepts of fuzzy set 
theory and neural networks in a model of mode choice.  This alternative approach to 
RUMs uses fuzzy sets and linguistic prompts to model individual perceptions of the 
attributes, and uses approximate reasoning and fuzzy control to model the decision 
process.  In the fuzzy decision framework, individual perceptions are the inputs and 
modeled as fuzzy sets since they can capture the vagueness of perceptions associated 
with attributes of alternatives.  Here, individuals are assumed to make decisions based 
on simple rules rather than maximizing a complicated utility function.  Approximate 
reasoning reduces the number of rules, and the composition stage combines the fuzzy 
33 
 
preferences from all rules that were triggered and calculates the overall fuzzy 
preference of an alternative.  Finally, the preference is defuzzified, and a choice is 
revealed (Vythoulkas and Koutsopoulos, 2003). 
 
To test the effectiveness of the fuzzy logic approach to choice modeling, they 
apply the framework to a mode choice problem.  In the application, the main 
variables modeled were differences in travel time and costs by each alternative (rail 
and car), as well as an access-egress ratio for rail.  They then assign linguistic labels 
very low, low, moderate, high, and very high to the explanatory variables.  
Corresponding output labels, or individual preferences, are represented as not 
preferred, probably not preferred, indifferent, probably preferred, and preferred, for 
each alternative.  They used a deterministic rule-based procedure, as well as a 
probabilistic rule-based procedure to obtain the market shares, and compare those to a 
logit model for the same mode choice problem.  Findings show that the fuzzy model 
compares favorably to the logit model, suggesting that there is potential for neuro-
fuzzy models to model discrete choice problems in addition to modeling decisions 
made under time pressure (Vythoulkas and Koutsopoulos, 2003). 
 
2.1.2 Attribute Value Perception 
Utility is only one of several classes of decision rules studied in the decision theory 
literature.  As mentioned previously, critics of the utility decision rule disagree with 
the compensatory nature of the decision maker (i.e., individuals are cognizant of the 
trade-offs implied by different attributes).  Among the other prominent classes of 
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decision rules in the literature include dominance, satisfaction, and lexicographic 
rules.  Dominance and satisficing rules do not necessarily lead to choices, however, 
since it is rare to find an alternative that is dominant or satisfactory for all attributes.  
Lexicographic rules imply a choice by rank ordering the attributes by the level of 
importance and then eliminate the alternatives that do not yield the highest return for 
that attribute.  One of the widely cited decision rules in the decision theory literature 
is the elimination-by-aspects by Tversky (1972), which is a combination of both 
lexicographic and satisficing rules.  Here, the process begins with the most important 
attribute and eliminates the alternatives that do not meet a criterion.  If there is more 
than one alternative left, the process continues with the second most important 
attribute, until a unique choice is revealed (Tversky, 1972). 
 
The elimination-by-aspects model is better received by the decision theory 
community since it is a non-compensatory rule, thereby avoiding issues with 
individual perceptions of trade-offs between the attributes.  Many studies have 
attempted to operationalize elimination-by-aspects, but this task has proven to be 
difficult.  Within the realm of transportation and travel demand models, Williams and 
Ortuzar (1982) introduced the concept of a joint-compensatory, non-compensatory 
(hybrid) model, which is based on the importance of the attributes (i.e., the attribute 
rank order via the lexicographic decision rule) and a probabilistic choice component 
given the decision rule.  The model formulation reflects the critical tolerance 
principle that relates to the psychological concept of just noticeable differences 
(Williams and Ortuzar, 1982).  In this framework, alternatives are eliminated from 
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further consideration in the decision process if the difference between attribute values 
exceeds an individually defined threshold or critical tolerance.  The behavioral 
concept of the model is as follows.  Individuals first rank the attributes in order of 
importance.  Available or feasible alternatives are considered with reference to the 
most important attribute, and alternatives are eliminated if the threshold constraint for 
the attribute is violated.   This process continues for the second most important 
attribute and so on, until either a single alternative remains, or the list of attributes 
used to assess the alternatives is exhausted, leaving more than one alternative 
remaining.  In the case that the attribute rank list is exhausted, the decision between 
the remaining alternatives is made using a compensatory utility maximizing rule.  
Williams and Ortuzar argue that in the case where individuals fail to easily 
discriminate amongst alternatives using thresholds and a rank-ordered attribute list, 
they move to a more scrutinizing phase, where a compensatory rule is needed to 
distinguish the best alternative (Williams and Ortuzar, 1982). 
 
Swait (2001) attempts to incorporate this concept of attribute thresholds or 
cutoffs within a non-compensatory choice model framework.  Benefits (in terms of 
improved behavioral prediction) of incorporating these cutoffs are greater for 
decisions in which non-compensatory considerations are more prevalent, such as in 
the case of residential location or vehicle type choice.  Swait formulates a model that 
incorporates a wide variety of decision strategies (e.g., compensatory, conjunctive, 
disjunctive) without imposing them on the model, instead inferring the strategies from 
the observed outcomes.  This model is tested on an SP experiment considering 
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vehicle rental from rental car companies.  Results show that the specification of soft 
cutoffs (i.e., individuals may violate these constraints but the effect is a diminished 
return on the utility function) increase the statistical and explanatory power of utility 
models. 
 
Cantillo and Ortuzar (2005) loosely interpret the model proposed by Williams 
and Ortuzar (1982) in formulating a semi-compensatory discrete choice model that 
explicitly accounts for attribute thresholds of perception.  These thresholds represent 
acceptance levels of the attributes in the process of discrete choice, and could be 
random, systematically varying through the population, or a function of socio-
economic features and choice conditions.  The formulation they use allows for the 
estimation of the parameters of the threshold’s probability distribution.  Their model 
is able to consider correlations amongst thresholds, but findings from the estimation 
results show that the correlation effect is minimal.  When applying the model to real 
data, they find that specifying the thresholds as a function of socio-economic 
characteristics and choice conditions provides a better fit than a single distribution 
over the entire sample.  Estimation results also showed that in choice situations where 
thresholds do exist, the use of compensatory models such as the MNL or mixed logit 
can lead to errors in model estimation, and therefore provide erroneous subjective 
value of time (Cantillo and Ortuzar, 2005). 
 
A similar study by Cantillo et al. (2006) incorporated thresholds for 
perception in attribute values.  This work focused more on individuals’ sensitivity to 
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attribute changes, whereas in the previous study the focus was on the choice process.  
They argue that if thresholds are not accounted for, especially when policy changes to 
the attributes are small, it could lead to errors in prediction.  Here, the thresholds are 
implemented as the minimum perceptible change in attributes.  The model was 
applied to synthetic data as well as real data collected from a SP survey.  Results 
show that if perception thresholds exist, the use of models that do not incorporate 
thresholds leads to errors in estimation and prediction, although the magnitude of the 
error depends on the weight of an attribute in the utility function.  Data from the SP 
experiment provide support for the existence of thresholds in travel time, since a few 
seconds of added or loss time will probably not faze an individual (Cantillo et al., 
2006). 
 
Concepts of individuals’ sensitivity to attribute change reveal a different 
critique of choice models.  Choice models do not reflect the dynamic process by 
which travel demand adjusts to policy changes in the attributes.  This is due to the 
fact that change in behavior is not instantaneous; rather it takes a period of time 
before the demand equilibrates.  Another way to interpret this is that the population 
affected by these policy changes is not instantly made aware of the improved 
transportation level of service.  In one of the seminal papers that frames the 
motivation for this research, Lerman and Manski (1982) formulate a model that 
examines the demand dynamics that arise when information about changes in the 
transportation environment spread through the population.  Information flow is 
modeled by three distinct sources or mechanisms: direct observations from using the 
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alternatives, word-of-mouth communication through casual interaction with informed 
individuals, and various forms of media communication including news outlets and 
advertising.  Individuals constantly receive information from these three sources and 
consequently alter their perceptions and possibly alter their actual choices (Lerman 
and Manski, 1982). 
 
To implement the model, they assume that there is a once-and-for-all change 
in the transportation system and that individuals use their most recent information 
obtained from any of the three sources when making their decision.  The model 
considers two alternatives, i and j, and contains a sequence of discrete time periods 
and at time t = 0, a steady state prevails.  This means that the attribute values have 
remained stable and consistent long enough for decision makers to have perfect 
information.  At time t = 1 a once-and-for-all change occurs in the attributes of one or 
both alternatives.  This change could also be the introduction of a new alternative.  
Lerman and Manski specify three cases of aggregate effects that generate a change 
favoring one of the alternatives.  In one case, i and j both deteriorate, but j more so 
than i, while in the second case, i and j both improve, but i more so than j. The third 
case is when i improves and j deteriorates.  They evaluate the phases of the choice 
path (i.e., the path from the old steady state to the new one), monotonicity of the path, 
and the speed of adjustment (Lerman and Manski, 1982). 
 
Qualitative results drawn from the investigation of the choice path show that 
the analyst can infer little about the location of the new steady state from observation 
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of only one of two phases of the choice path (Lerman and Manski, 1982).  
Concerning monotonicity, the path to the new steady state need not be monotonic, 
even in the second phase of the choice path.  For choice situations where there is 
deterioration in service, the speed of adjustment is higher than in situations in which 
there is improvement in service.  They give the example that raising parking fees 
would be more effective (i.e., quicker, in terms of speed of response) in getting auto 
users to switch to bus than if the transit agency lowered bus fares.  Overall results 
demonstrate the existence of two phases in the path over time for the aggregate choice 
frequencies.  In the first phase, there may be choice reversals, but in the second phase, 
there are none.  For situations where the change favors an alternative, the second 
phase is shown to be monotonic (Lerman and Manski, 1982). 
 
Sammer et al. (2006) investigates how the quality of information about the 
attributes of the alternatives plays a role in decision making for a mode choice 
problem.  One of the key contributions was a measure of knowledge.  Here they 
developed four instruments to evaluate the level of knowledge of the individual being 
surveyed: a precise description of the trip, estimated door-to-door travel time, 
estimated range of or expected deviation from travel time, and estimated costs 
(Sammer et al., 2006).  Each response was rated on a scale, and then normalized by 
taking the arithmetic average.  To investigate the effectiveness of information 
technology, they apply the knowledge variable formulation to a mode choice case 
study in Austria, using the rating of the information and knowledge and the degree to 
which the information has penetrated the population.  Results show that the inclusion 
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of this knowledge and information status is statistically significant, supporting the 
argument that knowledge variables should be included in the model specification to 
increase its explanatory power (Sammer et al., 2006). 
 
2.1.3 Revealed Preference – Stated Preference Models 
The current state-of-the-art for estimating individuals’ sensitivities towards the 
attributes of a new alternative is to estimate a model using both RP data and SP data.  
Respondents to the SP survey are presented with a hypothetical situation in which a 
future service is introduced and are asked how they would modify their current 
choices in response to this change.  One of the first studies to estimate a joint model is 
by Ben-Akiva and Morikawa (1990).  They developed a framework with two 
components, the RP model, which is the traditional RUM, and a stated intention 
model that compares the utility of the current chosen alternative to the stated intention 
alternative.  To validate the application of this model, they administered two surveys: 
one before the addition of a new subway line, and the other a few months after the 
opening of the new line.  The main findings show that combining SP and RP data 
increased the accuracy of the parameter estimates of the model, that if scaled 
correctly, the SP data would yield the same coefficients as the RP model, the SP data 
contained more random noise than did the RP data, and that the threshold value for 
switching was negative, implying that individuals overstated their intention to switch 




One concern with RP-SP models is fitting the alternative specific constants 
(ASC) to properly forecast the market shares of new alternatives.  Cherchi and 
Ortuzar (2006) investigate methods to properly specify the ASC for such RP-SP 
models.  They develop four recommendations for specifying the ASC.  If the RP and 
SP alternatives are the same, the ASC should be adjusted to match the base market 
shares.  For cases where the SP data include new alternatives and if there is evidence 
that the data correctly predicts the market shares, then the ASC should be adjusted to 
match the SP market share for both existing and new alternatives.  When market 
shares to match are unknown, the analyst should rely on estimation results and use the 
ASC specification for the model that provides the best statistical fit.  If the SP design 
implies significant changes (e.g., alternatives sharing the same label represents new 
options) and it is difficult to distinguish those alternatives, then the best statistical 
model and analyst judgment is used (Cherchi and Ortuzar, 2006). 
 
2.2 Research on Opinion Dynamics 
While mathematical models of opinion formation and propagation are relatively new, 
the subject has been of long interest to social scientists, mainly sociologists, 
psychologists, and political scientists.  Early studies on public opinion and 
propaganda explored human factors and interactions from a qualitative perspective 
(see, for example, Dodd, 1958-1959; Dodd and Winthrop, 1953).  Economists, 
mathematicians, and physicists constructed mathematical representations of decisions 
to update opinion, group opinion consensus, and opinion diffusion using different 
assumptions.  While quantitative research has provided interesting simulated results, 
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they generally lack some real-world human factors, or mechanisms, through which 
opinions form and propagate (Wu and Huberman, 2005).  Thus, it is necessary to 
review both qualitative and quantitative research to understand the contribution and 
limitations of each, and subsequently attempt to reconcile inconsistencies or 
deficiencies in improving the mathematical model.  On the qualitative side, the 
review will focus on descriptions of the human mechanisms and human social factors 
through which opinions form and propagate.  For the quantitative section, the review 
investigates innovations in modeling techniques.  As there are similarities between 
opinion formation and propagation and traffic formation and propagation, especially 
in considering macro- and micro-level relationships, the review then focuses on 
models in traffic flow theory that potentially account for human mechanisms in 
opinion formation and propagation.  This is followed by a synthesis of the findings 
that will help set the basis for the model and simulation experiment proposed for this 
research. 
 
2.2.1 Factors Influencing Opinion Formation and Propagation 
Understanding how an individual’s opinion can form and then diffuse through a 
population is a central theme in investigating voter behavior and propaganda.  
Organizers of propaganda machines or political campaigns are eager to know how 
effectively their message or viewpoint (i.e., opinion) will spread amongst people.  In 
a study to test the effects of a World War II propaganda machine, Dodd investigated 
rules for the distribution of propaganda.  Measures of effectiveness included distance, 
extent (percentage of population), speed, and accuracy or consistency (Dodd, 1958-
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1959).  Using a combination of controlled experiments, empirical data, and expert 
judgment, Dodd found relationships between diffusion and spatial, temporal, 
population, activity, values, stimulation, and residual factors.   
 
For the spatial factors, the further the individual is from the opinion source, 
the less likely the individual is to hear about the opinion.  The percentage of opinion 
holders decreased at a rate dependent on an aggregate mode of travel (Dodd, 1958-
1959).  In general, the percentage of opinion holders is greatest when the source is in 
high-density areas such as urban zones.  Temporally, opinion diffusion can be 
characterized by growth curves, with exponential and logistic curves found to fit best.  
Population factors exhibited that small towns seem to interact more and gossip, thus 
increasing the propagation of opinions.  Younger people, children in particular, 
tended to collect the leaflets (propaganda source) with enthusiasm, which may 
indicate a propensity towards an open mind (Dodd, 1958-1959).  Within the activity 
context, Dodd defines a “potency” index which denotes the “first-time hearers per 
tellers” in a given time period.  The values and motivational factors examine how 
well the opinion matches individual values and preference rankings.  For stimulation 
factors, the percentage of opinion holders increased as the strength of stimulation 
increased, but there is mention of diminished returns or an increase in insensitivity 
(Dodd, 1958-1959). 
 
An earlier study by Dodd and Winthrop investigated some of the opinion 
interaction from a one-way interaction perspective.  Along with specifying many of 
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the same factors in the study above, they also investigate group network structure as 
an important aspect of opinion diffusion.   They considered three types of group 
structures: an “iadic” structure where every member is interrelated with each other; a 
ramified structure in which members are not related to the friends of their own friends 
(i.e., all of one member’s friends are strangers to each other); and a mixed ramified 
and partially iadic structure where members are partially interrelated with each other. 
Intrinsically, iadicity, or complete interrelatedness, means that everyone is acquainted 
with each other to a point where there are equal opportunities to share opinions (Dodd 
and Winthrop, 1953).   Through experiments with small groups, they find that the 
number of converters generally follow a specified distribution. 
 
What Dodd and Winthrop also implicitly mention is that the opinion source 
type has a role in the diffusion of opinions.  In an experiment involving boys at 
summer camp, they chose as sources three boys identified as a leader, an isolate, and 
a “middler”, respectively, as previously identified by a sociometric test administered 
prior to the experiment (Dodd and Winthrop, 1953).  This follows the school of 
thought that leader-type personalities tend to have a larger impact on the diffusion of 
opinions than follower-type personalities.  Research on opinion leaders focused on 
identifying socio-demographic factors, character traits, and social positions of these 
influential individuals (see for example, Weimann, 1991).  Wright and Cantor build 
upon this issue by offering the concept of the opinion seeker and the opinion avoider.  
Their research complemented opinion leaders and explore the dynamics between 
leaders, followers, and isolationists, as well as the interrelationships between 
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personality types, including leader-seekers, seeker-only characterizations (Wright and 
Cantor, 1967). 
 
Concepts of opinion leaders and opinion seekers played a significant role in 
the formulation of the diffusion of innovation theory developed by Rogers in 1962.  
Drawing on sociological notions of imitation and innovation interaction among 
individuals, Rogers characterized five classes of adopters: the innovators, the early 
adopters, the early majority, the late majority, and the laggards.  Innovators are the 
first 2.5% of a population to adopt an innovation, are generally very knowledgeable 
about the innovation subject, and have a higher propensity to take risks.  Early 
adopters, consisting of the next 13.5% of the population to adopt an innovation, are 
social (opinion) leaders who, through their social network, learn from the innovators.  
The early majority, the next 34.5% of the population, are potential adopters who look 
to the early adopters for new ideas or opinions.  The next 34.5% of the population to 
adopt is the late majority, and are generally conservatives, skeptics of innovations, or 
have a lower socio-economic status and are not as capable of taking risks.  Laggards 
are the last 16% of the population to adopt an innovation.  These people tend to be 
socially isolated, receive the information about the innovation from neighbors and 
friends, and are averse to losses incurred by risk taking (Wikipedia contributors, 
2006). 
 
Rogers (2003) defines the diffusion process as the communication of an 
innovation through various channels over time among members of a social system.  
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As such, there are four main elements to consider in the diffusion process: the 
innovation, the communication channels, the time, and the social system (Rogers, 
2005).  According to Rogers, the rate of adoption depends on five factors: relative 
advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability.  Relative 
advantage is the perceived or subjective advantage that the innovation has over the 
previous or status quo idea.  Compatibility is individual’s perception of the degree to 
which the innovation is consistent with an individual’s existing values, attitudes, 
experiences, and needs.  Complexity is an innovation’s degree of difficulty to 
comprehend and utilize.   Trialability is an indicator of the degree to which an 
innovation can be experimented with for a limited period.   Observability is the 
degree of the innovation’s visibility to others.  It follows that innovations with greater 
relative advantage, compatibility, trialability, observability and less complexity will 
have a faster adoption rate (Rogers, 2005).   An individual’s path to adoption consists 
of a five-step decision process that progresses from the initial knowledge of the 
innovation, to the formation of an attitude or opinion towards the innovation, to an 
initial decision to adopt or reject the innovation, to the implementation of the 
innovation, and finally, to long-term use or a confirmation of the innovation (Rogers, 
2005). 
 
Rogers also states that marketing and mass media channels tend to foster 
knowledge of the innovation while interpersonal or word-of-mouth channels facilitate 
forming attitudes and opinions of the innovation and consequently influences the 
initial decision to adopt.  Rogers’s innovation decision process also implies a learning 
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process from the initial adoption decision to the final decision of commitment to the 
innovation.  The majority of the population (early majority, late majority, and 
laggards) will form attitudes and opinions based on subjective evaluations of peers 
and neighbors who have already adopted the innovation (Rogers, 2005). 
 
Rogers’s work on the diffusion of innovations highlighted the need to study 
the mechanisms of interactions between the different social categories.  Subsequently, 
research has focused on clarifying the three mechanisms mentioned in Rogers’s work: 
word-of mouth, mass marketing, and personal observation or learning (trialability).  
The following sections will consider studies that examine the dynamics of these 
mechanisms and the effect on opinion formation and propagation. 
 
2.2.1.1 Word-of-mouth Mechanisms 
Communication of opinions has long been a research interest in public policy.  A 
study by Glock (1953) highlights the important factors to consider in understanding 
the complexity of oral communication dynamics and its interdependence on the role 
of mass media.  An increased media presence in a community facilitates an increased 
exposure of some individuals to mass media.  These individuals have a higher 
propensity to communicate with others in their social group and use their high 
exposure to develop an opinion leadership.  For communities where mass media is 
not accessible, opinion leadership forms around individuals who have traveled 




Feick and Price (1987) advanced the concept of opinion leaders by the 
introduction of the market maven, an individual who is an expert or is extremely 
knowledgeable and passionate about certain classes of market products.  These 
individuals are influential because of their general marketplace expertise, and have a 
high propensity to seek information about new products or new information.  Early 
knowledge of information and attention to details lead these people to early adoption.  
They distinguish between an opinion leader, whose expertise stems from involvement 
in a particular product class, an early adopter, whose expertise stems from personal 
purchases and product usage, and market mavens, whose expertise stems from 
personal interest in accumulating knowledge about the marketplace in general, and 
can therefore provide information across product classes (Feick and Price, 1987).  
This research introduced notions of different personality types among opinion leaders 
and early adopters and highlighted the need to determine the kind of information each 
type provided as well as the effectiveness of the information exchange. 
 
Utilizing the concept of the market maven, Gladwell (2002) introduced the 
concept of the law of the few that identifies three personality types essential to social 
epidemics: connectors, mavens, and salesmen.  Connectors are a class of opinion 
leaders who have a large social network that spans different classes, groups, and 
communities.  What distinguishes these connectors from individuals who know many 
people is that these individuals actively seek to make new connections regardless of 
social class or social type and will seek to connect people in their social network.  
Mavens follow the definition of Feick and Price (1987).  These individuals do not just 
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possess a wealth of knowledge and expertise on a particular market class, they also 
actively try to help others get the best deals on a certain product.  Further, while 
mavens generally hold their opinion given their expertise, they still actively seek 
feedback from other individuals to add to their wealth of information.  Finally, 
salesmen are a class of opinion leaders that are highly persuasive.  These individuals 
are not the stereotypical car salesman in that these salesmen have such charisma and 
presence that other individuals gravitate towards these people or attempt to mimic 
these people.  Thus, a salesman’s opinion is highly contagious since his personality 
draws people to mimic the same opinion (Gladwell, 2002). 
 
In general, these opinion leaders actively seek to communicate by word-of-
mouth with other individuals.  Mavens generally have extensive knowledge of a 
particular market class, and individuals who seek this type of opinion leader take their 
opinion seriously.  Thus, for a particular product, mavens have a high rate of 
effectiveness in altering an opinion seeker’s opinion.  Connectors tend to have a 
broader view of different market classes due to their high connectivity in a large 
social network.  Their rate of effectiveness may not be as high as a maven’s, but 
because they have a large social network at their disposal, they can gain information 
or opinions from several maven types, then spread their opinion amongst thousands 
of individuals.  Salesmen are so charismatic and persuasive that their effectiveness 
may be the highest out of the three types, provided the opinion seeker develops a 




2.2.1.2 Mass Media Mechanisms 
Effects of mass media on opinion formation and propagation have been studied since 
newspapers and other medium to spread propaganda in the early 1900s.  With the 
advent of the television in the 1950s, however, there was an exponential growth in 
individual exposure to marketing ads and campaigns.  Subsequently, there was 
heightened interest in how these individuals would use this information and how it 
would effect their opinions. 
 
Dimmick and Wang (2005) investigate how mass media medium diffuses 
through the population.  Their research suggests that a logistic growth equation is the 
underlying mechanism behind media diffusion.  A logistic curve is a good fit to the 
diffusion of media in the U.S. such as radio, television, cable, VCR, and personal 
computers.  They propose that the r and K parameters of the logistic equation 
represent anticipated gratification utilities and economic conditions, respectively.  
Using curve-fitting methods, they showed that the acceptance of the medium 
followed a logistic curve rather than a linear curve, but only for cases when the 
medium has been slow to accept for a period of time after its introduction.  Some 
event (e.g., the advent of the internet) created a spark in a sale of a particular medium 
(e.g., personal computers), which cause the penetration rate to follow the logistic 
curve.  For innovations with a quick adoption onset, they suggest an exponential 
curve would provide a better fit (Dimmick and Wang, 2005).   However, the 
conclusions were based on percent ownership of a particular medium, and not the 




One role of mass media is to inform an individual of the general public 
opinion.  This is prevalent in voting polls during election campaigns.  Joslyn (1997) 
looks at the effect that public opinion has on individual opinion.  Through survey 
instruments, findings support the notion that public opinion has a large influence on 
an individual’s opinion, but the magnitude, direction, and significance depends on the 
predisposition of the individual. Of more interest is the context effects in representing 
public opinion can alter opinions through concepts of assimilation, resistance, or 
synergy.  Assimilation is the scenario in which the individual opinion conforms to the 
external information source and takes on two variants: adaptation and acceptance.  
Resistance stems from the predisposition of the individual and occurs when the 
external information conflicts with internal beliefs or personal values.  Individuals 
respond in this scenario with a reaction or backlash where the individual opinion 
becomes even more negative, or they ignore the information altogether.  Finally, 
synergy occurs when external information complements or resonates internal values.  
Through a reinforcement effect, individuals’ opinions deepen and move towards the 
held predisposition (Joslyn, 1997). 
 
Following Rogers’ proposal that mass media was a vehicle for information 
collection, Krishnan and Smith (1998) investigated the role information source and 
time has on attitudes and confidence.  Two variables that may cause a decline in 
attitudes towards a specific brand are the source of information, specifically 
advertising or trial period, and the time of measurement.   Findings from the study 
show that the confidence of an individual’s attitude decreases over time for 
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individuals exposed to advertising, that attitudes toward a brand decreases over time 
for individuals exposed to trial periods, that a decrease in attitude confidence leads to 
an increase in inconsistencies in behavior based on the attitude, and that reactivating 
attitudes will prevent declines in both attitudes and attitude confidence (Krishnan and 
Smith, 1998).  These findings seem to imply that individuals become impervious to 
advertising over time. 
 
Based on such notions, Leskovec et al. (2006) investigated the dynamics of 
viral marketing.  Viral marketing utilizes existing social networks by encouraging 
consumers to share product information with their friends.  Using an online retailer’s 
incentivised viral marketing program, they were able to directly measure and model 
the effectiveness of recommendations.  A simple stochastic model attempted to 
explain the propagation of recommendations and information cascade sizes.  This 
research also investigated how user behavior varies within online communities that is 
defined by a recommendation network, established how the recommendation network 
grows over time, and determined how effective the network is from the perspective of 
the sender and receiver of the recommendations (Leskovec et al., 2006). 
 
Findings show that viral marketing contradicts epidemic models in that the 
probability of being infected (by a recommendation) decreases with repeated 
interaction.  The probability of purchasing a product increases with the first few 
recommendations received, but after a threshold, the probability drops to a constant 
and relatively low level, supporting the idea that individuals become impervious to 
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recommendations of their friends and resist buying items they do not need or want.  
Once past a certain threshold of the number of recommendations, the success per 
recommendation declines.  Characteristics of product reviews and the effectiveness of 
the recommendations were shown to vary by category and price, and it was shown the 
number of successful recommendations varies by product.  Finally, model results 
show that smaller and more tightly knit groups tend to be more conducive to viral 
marketing (Leskovec et al., 2006). 
 
2.2.1.3 Learning and Experience Mechanisms 
Evolving opinions due to experience or observation has long been of interest to 
psychologists, who model these learning effects through Bayesian updating rules.  In 
transportation, learning mechanisms have generally followed Bayesian statistics.  
Chen and Mahmassani (2004) investigate models of travel time perception and 
learning mechanisms.  In this study, perceived travel time and its variance were 
updated using a Bayesian updating mechanism, and an increase in variability of 
perceived travel time decreased the individual’s confidence.  Agent-based 
microsimulation was used to study the collective effects on day-to-day flows and how 
varying certain parameters affected the dynamics of travel time perception and 
learning.  Simulation results showed that individuals’ overall travel time perceptions 
strongly influenced the convergence of the traffic system.  Holding constant all other 
factors, as the inter-update period increases, the number of days until convergence 
initially decreases, but then increases.  However, the number of updates until 
convergence decreases.  Traffic systems with individuals who update every travel 
time experience will converge slower than a system with selective individuals.  
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Finally, results show that a premature end to the learning process produces larger 
variances in perceived travel times (Chen and Mahmassani, 2004). 
 
However, research has shown that individuals do not necessarily update 
probability estimates according to Bayes’ rule due to conservatism or overconfidence 
(see for example,).   Chen and Mahmassani (2006) address this by investigating 
reinforcement learning and belief learning and comparing results to Bayesian 
learning.  Under reinforcement learning, previous payoffs “reinforce” the selection of 
alternatives once the alternative is selected (for complete discussion, see Erev et al., 
1999).  Belief learning assumes that individuals create and update beliefs about the 
choices of other individuals, and that choices are made based on these beliefs (for 
complete discussion, see Crawford, 1995).  Simulated results show that for 
reinforcement learning mechanisms, convergence is difficult to achieve compared to 
Bayesian learning since there are no assumptions that individuals perceive less 
dispersion in travel times across the population as time progresses and more 
experiences gained.  While reinforcement learning explains the integration of travel 
times experienced, its limitation is that it does not explain how uncertainty changes 
over time.  Belief learning also does not explain how individuals update uncertainty, 
because it considers the experiences of all users, the system tends to converge faster 
compared to reinforcement learning, but still slower than Bayesian learning (Chen 




Brenner (1997) investigated learning and experience mechanisms in modeling 
interactions between decision makers when exchanging information.  The use of a 
variation-imitation-decision (VID) model draws from cognitive psychology concepts 
of dissonance, satisficing, and learning.  It assumes individuals learn from their 
experiences, are motivated to change behavior if they are unsatisfied with the current 
situation, and are able to imitate successful strategies of others (Brenner, 1997).  In 
the simulated experiments, the population of individuals search for satisfactory 
strategies without any initial information.  Results show that it is important for an 
exchange of information to occur to find a satisfactory solution quickly.  It supports 
previous empirical findings that the rate of learning increases, then converges with the 
number of individuals involved.  Additionally, the findings suggest that groups 
evolve and stabilize once they determine a satisfactory strategy.  This may 
demonstrate why two different innovations with no strong externalities may establish 
clientele within a population, or why in different social groups, there may be different 
solutions that evolve in each group (Brenner, 1997). 
 
2.2.2 Mathematical Developments in Modeling Opinions 
While laboratory experiments and empirical testing provided a good foundation for 
the issues surrounding opinion formation and propagation, it did not provide 
quantifiable evidence in recognizing patterns and interrelations between individuals.  
In furthering the understanding of the phenomenon of opinion formation and 
propagation, mathematical models were formulated in which an individual holds a 
specific opinion and decides whether to change opinion or keep the same one.  Each 
field has used different techniques – economics with information cascades, 
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psychology with Bayesian updating mechanisms for opinion revision, biology with 
evolutionary models, and applied physics with probabilistic or deterministic network 
structures, as well as kinetic theories and continuum models.  Within the applied 
physics models of opinion formation and propagation, the research has utilized agent-
based simulation to investigate the micro-level interactions between individuals.  
Many studies have used different forms of agent-based simulation including network 
graphs, cellular automata, opinion space, Brownian motion, and molecular dynamics. 
 
Schweitzer (2006) provides a review of collective decisions in multi-agent 
systems.  The review discusses how the classical approach of a rational agent that 
maximizes utility does not apply when there is incomplete information or ambiguous 
solutions or consequences of the outcome.  Social elements such as imitation 
strategies, information contagion, and herding behavior need to be account for in 
considering internal beliefs or opinions.  Suggested guidelines for a baseline model 
include having a decision between discrete alternatives, considering local 
neighborhoods modeled by a network or grid, calculating a utility that reflects 
maximizing consensus with neighborhood (i.e., adopt opinion of local majority), and 
considering scenarios where there is consensus versus coexistence of opinions.  An 
advance model would consider social relationships, a continuous spectrum of 
opinions, and a more complex utility function (Schweitzer, 2006). 
 
Several studies of opinion formation have utilized a network-graph 
representation for agent-based simulation models.  Network graphs have nodes 
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representing individuals and arcs connecting nodes denoting there is a relationship 
between the two individuals.  Boudourides (2003) presents a review of social and 
political network theory with collective action and with voting choices.  The work 
develops a model of public opinion formation that utilizes an adaptive culture model 
developed by Axelrod (1997) with rules of adaptation based on similarities of traits.  
Gil and Zanette (2006) developed a stochastic co-evolutionary process for opinion 
formation.  A pair of connected nodes was chosen at random and is subject to three 
outcomes that govern these interactions.  If the opinions of the two nodes were the 
same, nothing happened, but if they were different, either agent adopts the other 
agent’s opinion with probability p1, with a complementary probability of both not 
changing opinions (1 – p1).  At the same time, there is a probability p2 that the link 
connecting the nodes is broken, reducing the connectivity of the network (and the 
number of connected pairs left to randomly sample).  This continues until no further 
changes are possible (Gil and Zanette, 2006). 
 
Bartolozzi et al. (2006) investigates stochastic opinion formation in scale-free 
networks in which the dynamics of opinion formation in a group of agents is modeled 
by a stochastic response of each agent to the opinion of its neighbors and a feedback 
loop of the average opinion of the population.  Kuperman and Zanette (2002) 
examines stochastic resonance in a model of opinion formation on small-world 
networks that is subject to noise effects and external modulation which is interpreted 
as opinion formation by imitation under the effects of a fashion wave.  Gaston and 
desJardine (2005) look at the performance aspect of multi-agent social systems.  
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Gonzalez et al. (2004) model opinion formation on a deterministic pseudo-fractal 
network that utilizes the Sznajd rule, which states that only a group of people sharing 
the same opinion can convince their neighbors.  Analytical results for the Sznajd 
model are presented in Slavina and Lavicka (2003).   Sousa and Sanchez (2006) work 
on the outward-inward information flux in an opinion formation model of different 
network topologies explores the differences in network topologies specified by the 
Sznajd model and the Galam majority rule model.  Deffuant (2006) considers 
differing network topologies and uncertainty effects in modeling how extremist 
opinions propagate through a population.  Tessone and Toral (2004) incorporate 
mechanisms of imitation, influences of fashion, and randomness into a model of 
opinion formation and found that in the absence of fashion, the model behaves as bi-
stable system having random jumps between the two opinion states with a distribution 
of times following Kramer’s law. 
 
A number of studies utilized cellular automata (CA) to model opinion 
formation and propagation.  CA consists of an infinite number of cells, each with a 
finite number of states, and each cell can be in one state for a given time step.  
Updating rules are a function of a cell’s neighborhood states in the previous time step.  
Alves et al. (2002) used a CA model to examine the influence of electoral surveys on 
voting processes.  In the model, each voter updates his vote intention using political 
strategies which depend on political ideology and a social impact parameter (Alves et 
al., 2002).  Boccara and Fuks (2005) use a one-dimensional CA model to model the 
diffusion of an innovation using a number of deterministic rules and find that the 
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number of individuals who keep adopting the innovation depends strongly on the 
connectivity between the individuals.  Bagnoli et al. (2002) use a probabilistic CA 
model with two absorbing states to explore social pressure effects on opinion 
formation as well as the phase transitions between states.  Tessone et al. (2004) 
investigates how minority opinions spread in neighborhoods in a model that accounts 
for local spatial effects. 
 
Kacperski and Holyst (1999) used CA and a theory of social impact developed 
by Latane (1981) to formulate a model of opinion formation with a strong leader and 
external impact.  In this system there are two states: one where there is a cluster 
around a leader sharing the same opinion, and the other is where every agent has the 
same opinion.  Varying deterministic parameters like the strength of the leaders and 
strength of the external impact can change the cluster size or, once a certain threshold 
is reached, the system jumps to another phase (Kacperski and Holyst, 1999).  The 
work also considers effects of social temperature, modeled as noise effects.  
Bordogna and Albano (2006) investigated phase transitions and improved on 
Kacperski and Holyst’s model of opinion formation in social groups.  Results show 
that there are first-order transitions between two states of opinions when there is a 
strong leader and an external mass media effect that have opposing opinions 
(Bordogna and Albano, 2006). 
 
Another technique used to model opinion formation and propagation is the 
construction of opinion space.   In opinion space, agents are distributed across space 
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with finite boundaries according to their opinion value.   Distances between agents 
represent the difference in opinion.   Laguna et al. (2003) utilize opinion space in 
examining a model of social influence in which an agent’s opinion is represented by a 
binary vector.  Agents adjust their opinion values as a result of random interactions 
and exchange opinions whenever the difference in opinion is below a threshold.  
Evolution of opinions to a steady state relies on the threshold and a convergence 
parameter of the model (Laguna et al., 2003).  Lorenz (2006) explores consensus 
building in opinions through a model utilizing opinion space.  Simulation results 
showed that for consensus of opinions, one needs to bring more interrelated issues 
into discussion and initiate large group meetings, and for coexistence of opinions, 
bring more issues that are independent into discussion and prevent large group 
meetings (Lorenz, 2006).  Consensus is analogous to outcomes of the decision of a 
board of directors, while coexistence is analogous to gossip.  Lorenz (2006) further 
explores the phenomena of consensus in looking at a model of continuous opinion 
dynamics under bounded confidence. 
 
A major critique of these mathematical models is that they often fail to 
incorporate many of the social network and class structure aspects of real-world 
environments.  One of the seminal papers on the role social networks has on opinions 
is by Wu and Huberman.  Using a general network structure, they show that the 
expected weighted fraction of the population that holds an opinion is constant over 
time (Wu and Huberman, 2005).  The concept of weighted fraction interprets as the 
fraction of individuals holding a given opinion averaged over their social connectivity 
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(Wu and Huberman, 2005).  Findings show that a relatively small number of 
individuals with high social ranks (the number of social connections is denoted by the 
degree of a node on a network) have a larger impact on opinion formation than those 
with low ranks.  This finding helps to explain the fragility phenomenon, in which an 
opinion held by a large group of people can become nearly extinct in a short time 
(Wu and Huberman, 2005). 
 
A similar study on management fads, pedagogies, and other soft technologies 
by Bendor et al. (2006) looked at a model for the diffusion of management fads and 
technologies that lack clear objective evidence about their merits.  Here, agents do not 
adopt through a Bayesian mechanism, but instead the choice to adopt depends on 
personal evaluation and the social influence of their peers.  Simulated results show 
that choice dynamics lead to outcomes that appear deterministic even though the 
process is stochastic.  When objective evidence about a technology is weak, evolution 
of the process rapidly settles to a fraction of adopters not predetermined, and when 
objective evidence is strong, the proportion of adopters depends on the quality of 
evidence and the competence of the adopters (Bendor et al., 2006). 
 
2.3 Summary and Synthesis 
This chapter examined a number of previous research on discrete choice models and 
the implications on travel behavior processes.  In learning about the behavioral 
mechanisms behind decision making and choice, a two-stage choice paradigm was 
discussed, where individuals form a consideration set which is a subset of the 
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universal choice set.  Research on choice dynamics in marketing were discussed in an 
effort to understand the effect that marketing campaigns or marketing behavior such 
as brand loyalty have on consumer decision making.  Additionally, research on choice 
process considerations was evaluated, as were works that investigated the effects of 
attribute value distortion. 
 
This chapter has also investigated a number of works investigating the 
concepts of opinion leaders and seekers, social classes, and different mechanisms that 
govern opinion formation and propagation.  Characteristics of opinion leaders were 
discussed.  Three main social mechanisms were found in the literature: 
communication, mass media, and personal experience.  Additionally, social class and 
social group effects were explored.  The literature also implied that there were issues 
of the quality of information as well as the reputation and credibility of the 
information.  These are all elements to consider in a model of social opinion 
dynamics. 
 
Previous works revealed that a number of different techniques were utilized in 
models of opinions.  Information cascades, Bayesian learning, evolutionary models, 
and agent-based simulation models were prevalent in different fields of study.  A 
number of agent-based models used network graphs, CA, and opinion space.  Other 
techniques available but not yet widely used in the literature are Brownian motions 
and molecular dynamics.  Each method has its strengths and weaknesses in modeling 
opinion dynamics, and each captures a different aspect of social dynamics. 
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However, as mentioned previously, individuals do not update opinions 
through Bayes’ theorem, and thus Bayesian learning makes unrealistic assumptions.  
Information cascades, which utilizes Bayesian learning, predicts that given a set of 
initial opinions, one opinion will eventually dominate, which is counterintuitive to 
reality where opinions are fostered in groups (Wu and Huberman, 2005).  
Evolutionary models and epidemic models do not account for differences in social 
connectivity, social class, and personality type, and that not every individual has the 
same probability for infection or evolution.  Thus, this research will utilize agent-
based simulation to model opinion formation and propagation.  Modeling the 
dynamics will incorporate heuristics that reflect social class, social type, social 
mechanism, and social networks. 
 
To extend the modeling of opinion dynamics to a transportation choice 
context, this research will incorporate an opinion-choice dynamics framework that 
has as components the opinion formation and propagation model as well as a choice 
mechanism.  The specification of the choice mechanism will draw on the research 
investigating consideration set phenomenon, as well as research that explores how the 
choice process evolves over time.  Chapter 3 will detailed the development of the 
opinion formation and propagation model, while Chapter 6 will explain the extension 




Chapter 3: Modeling Framework 
Theoretical Development, Framework, and Methodology 
From the literature, the dynamics of opinion formation and propagation stem from 
variations in individual characteristics (e.g., social class, social types), social 
credibility (e.g., trust, quality of information, confidence), as well as in social 
mechanisms (e.g., word-of-mouth, mass media, belief learning, and direct 
experience).  These parameters, however, are loosely defined in scope and broadly 
interpreted by the literature.  Thus, this chapter sets the foundation for a modeling 
framework for the formation and propagation of opinions.  Preliminaries (i.e., 
definition and scope of parameters) are first specified, followed by the hypothesized 
social mechanism that most likely influences opinion revision and adoption for social 
class and social type parameters.  Next, the research develops a conceptual 
framework consisting of social mechanism components and an opinion revision 
model.  Finally, a theoretical exploration on the interaction model component and 
opinion revision model examines different modeling equations. 
 
3.1 Preliminaries 
A review of the literature on opinion formation and propagation gives an overview of 
elements that govern interactions.  Each study, however, includes only a partial 
number of these elements in the model.  This research intends to build on previous 
work to incorporate all identified social elements into the model of opinion formation 
and propagation.  First, however, groundwork is needed to define these elements to fit 
in the context of this model. 
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3.1.1 Social Mechanisms 
Consider a freshman in college who recently arrived in a town far from familiar 
surroundings and has until this point been oblivious to the community and campus’s 
opinions.  Suppose this individual does not own any mode of transportation (e.g., car, 
bike) and is faced with deciding how he will get from place to place during his tenure 
in this community.  Further suppose that this individual is not impulsive and instead 
of purchasing something outright, seeks other opinions and information before 
deciding to purchase.  What are the different ways this individual can exchange 
opinions? Perhaps he asks older students (e.g., residential assistant) their opinion 
about the best mode of transportation.  Perhaps during orientation week, marketing 
teams are advertising their products as the best mode of transportation around 
campus.  Or perhaps the individual carefully surveys the campus, the parking lots, the 
shuttle services, public transport, the accessibility to necessities like groceries and 
shopping malls before developing an opinion about the best mode of transportation.  
This research attempts to model these vehicles or mechanisms of interacting opinions. 
 
Social mechanisms of communications, external impact, and belief and 
hedonic learning found in the literature are redefined as a word of mouth mechanism, 
mass media mechanism, and personal experience learning mechanisms.  The word-of-
mouth mechanism is a subset of communication mechanisms and investigates the 
dynamics between individuals who physically interact with each other and 
communicate through dialogue each personal opinion.  A scenario explaining this 
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phenomenon would be if an individual were walking down the street, bumped into a 
friend, and began to discuss a topic for which both have an opinion on, such as the 
political elections.  An essential element of the word-of-mouth mechanism is that 
information is passed from an individual to a friend or to someone in an individual’s 
social network.  It is rare that an individual will communicate with a complete 
stranger.  Thus, this mechanism implies a certain threshold of selectivity.  An 
extension of the word-of-mouth mechanism is communication via the telephone, chat 
rooms, or e-mail.  However, conversations over the phone do not explicitly detail 
body language and facial expressions (one could presumably guess the expressions by 
tone of voice, however, this is perceived), and e-mail has little intonation or 
expression.  While chat rooms with video and audio capabilities do enable individuals 
to see and hear expressions, it is not clear they have the same effect as if meeting an 
individual in person.  Certain characteristics such as imitation or persuasiveness may 
not have the same impact over video and audio feeds as they would in face-to-face 
conversations.  For this research, only physical interpersonal interactions are 
considered to account for the full effects of social class, social types, and social 
credibility. 
 
Mass media mechanisms are a specific class of external impact mechanisms, 
which targets certain groups in populations and subject the group members to 
information flow.  Unlike other external impact effects like social temperature (see 
for example, Kacperski and Holyst, 1997), social pressure, and environmental 
characteristics that are constant with time, mass media mechanisms are time varying 
67 
 
and population varying.  Mass media exposure is periodic, and individuals have the 
ability to choose what media they give their attention.  It also inflicts different social 
groups in different ways to target individuals in those groups.  An example of this is 
by Geico Corporation, who has nearly a dozen different television commercials 
concepts advertising the same auto-insurance coverage in an attempt to reach out to 
all social demographics.  For some segments of the population, certain commercials 
are regarded as inane and have either no bearing on an individual’s opinion or a 
negative effect on the opinion.  However, other segments of the population may 
regard those commercials as captivating and attention grabbing, influencing a 
favorable shift in opinion.  In addition to television commercials, other traditional 
forms of mass media include radio, newspapers, and magazines.  As individuals have 
become impervious to these traditional forms of media, companies have turned to 
online viral marketing.  E-mail is also considered a form of mass media with the 
creation of large distribution lists for services.  This research will focus on a general 
form of mass media with attention to the effectiveness, reliability, and credibility of 
each individual form. 
 
In learning processes, individuals are assumed to work towards obtaining 
satisfaction through collective observation and direct experience.  In collective 
observation, an individual observes trends, fashion fads, and other individuals’ 
behavior in an attempt to form an opinion about a product or service.  Here, the 
individual may also perceive a social temperature or a social pressure to conform to 
the majority of the entire population or just a subset of the population.  With the 
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advent of the internet, individuals have greater access to information on what other 
people are thinking about a particular topic, which may increase the rate of imitation.  
As demonstrated in Bendor (2006) and Wu and Huberman (2005), the presence of 
instant gratification information conduits tend to make collective observation impacts 
ephemeral and dynamic, especially if the opinion lacks a clear objective or merit.  
Intuitively, collective observation is most persuasive when the majority of the 
population has adopted a different opinion than a single individual’s opinion.  In 
direct experience, an individual forms an opinion through experimentation and trial 
and error.  Often, an individual who is very unsatisfied with their current alternative 
(and thus have a low corresponding opinion towards that alternative) has a high 
propensity to try something else (Brenner, 1997).  However, there may be situations 
in which an individual may choose to, out of curiosity, try a new product or 
alternative.  The trial experience, good or bad, influences the opinion towards the 
product, and subsequent trials may reinforce or weaken the individual’s opinion.  
 
Collective observation, or belief learning, and direct experience have 
implications for other social mechanisms, as well as implications for risk 
personalities.  Belief learning and direct experience may draw from word-of-mouth 
conversations or mass-media outlets.  For example, two individuals or a group of 
individuals may engage in gossip, which is a form of word-of-mouth communication, 
but in which the information discussed is perceived, hypothetical, or exaggerated.  
Study statistics transmitted via mass media that are not sound research (e.g., 
propaganda) may lead to false pretenses.  Likewise another individual’s direct 
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experience with a product may be explicitly discussed in word-of-mouth 
conversations (e.g., it took 45 minutes to travel by train this morning, and there was a 
delay of 3 minutes at the transfer station).  Concerning risk characterizations, both the 
belief learning and direct experience components are mechanisms to gain additional 
information on the product or service, however risk-seeking individuals are more 
inclined to try something impulsively while risk-averse individuals tend to collect as 
much information as possible, perhaps from collective observation, before adopting 
an opinion.  While both belief learning and direct experience will be incorporated into 
the model, these elements will be modeled as distinct, mutually exclusive 
mechanisms.   
 
3.1.2 Social Parameters 
What makes an individual highly regarded or influential to someone else? Often 
times, influence is correlated with an individual’s social status.  People tend to respect 
the opinion of those who are more wealthy and powerful and have experienced many 
different facets of society due to their resources.  For example, when talk-show host 
Oprah Winfrey recommends or endorses a book during her book club segment, most 
people would take that recommendation seriously.  One can postulate that this 
effectiveness is due to her celebrity status and fan base.  However, most individuals 
who watch the show know that Oprah is one of the wealthiest women in the world 
and that she has the resources to be an authority on certain products.  Is it simply 
because Oprah is wealthy that millions of Americans regard her opinion highly, or is 
it her glamorous personality and charm that sells people her opinion? This research 
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considers both aspects as factors for opinion formation and propagation by 
investigating two components of social status in this research: social class and social 
type. 
 
Social class refers to different groups of individuals generally related by an 
index of wealth.  In this model, social class is not just an indication of how much 
assets and income an individual has, but also on the amount of resources available to 
that individual.   Resources in this research generally focus on the number of friends 
in an individual’s network.  Though an individual may not have much in terms of 
assets and income, he may have in his social network friends from whom he can draw 
resources.  Certainly one would consider the President of the United States in a higher 
social class than Oprah Winfrey or Bill Gates even though the latter two have a much 
higher income simply because the President has ample resources and power.  This, 
however, does not mean that the more friends one has, the higher one is in social 
class.  Additionally, the concept of prestige is highly correlated with social status and 
is considered in social class component of this model.  Occupational prestige may 
have an effect on social class, more so for men than do for women (Richardson and 
Mahoney, 2004).  The highest degree earned in education also factors into social 
class, as individuals with doctorates or medical degrees are well regarded in society.  
Ethnicity, gender, and religion also play a role in social class, albeit less significant 




Social type describes an individual’s personality and determines whether he is 
characterized as an opinion leader or an opinion follower or seeker.  Within the 
opinion leader category, there are connectors, mavens, and salesmen with the same 
traits defined in Gladwell (2002).  There are two distinguishing traits of an opinion 
leader.  First, though opinion leaders are present in each social class, these individuals 
tend to be outgoing and are insensitive to class restrictions.  Opinion leaders easily 
connect with individuals from different classes.  Second, opinion leaders are 
altruistic, and actively try to connect people, inform people, or persuade people.  Just 
knowing many people does not make one a connector.  To be a connector, an 
individual has in addition to a large social network the inclination to connect people 
within the network or to maintain contact with everyone in the network.  A maven is 
more than just an individual with a plethora of knowledge on a subject; he is 
passionate about the subject, is an authority on the subject, and actively elicits 
information from others to add to his collection of knowledge.  Salesmen are not 
individuals who manage to successfully sell their products; rather they are able to sell 
you their products because their personalities are so likeable and contagious, that 
others will emulate these opinion leaders.  Connectors, mavens, and salesmen are 
characteristics or personalities of an opinion leader and are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive.  For example, Oprah Winfrey would most likely be classified as a 
connector and a salesman since she has many people in her social network and 





There are also opinion followers to consider in this model of opinion 
formation and propagation.  Two types exist in the literature: opinion seekers and 
isolationists.  Opinion seekers actively look to opinion leaders to form their own 
opinions about an innovation, trend, or fashion fad.  They lack the personality traits 
and the social network resources of an opinion leader to be on the forefront of 
innovative development.  Additionally, these individuals will seek each other out to 
exchange information.  A hypothesis for the seeker’s motivation is that they try to 
collect as much information to form a strong opinion in an attempt to become a 
pseudo-opinion leader (by virtue of appearing to be a maven on the subject) (Rogers, 
2005).  These individuals are open to new ideas and concepts and willingly exchange 
information to form their opinions.  Isolationists on the other hand, tend to be narrow-
minded and skeptical of innovations, preferring the status quo to new ideas and 
concepts.  These individuals do not freely exchange information with others; rather, 
the opinion seekers and leaders are the ones who persuade these individuals to change 
their opinion.  Since they prefer the status quo, they have very strong opinions 
towards current conditions and are resistant to change and acceptance.  It may also be 
that these individuals are almost impervious to others’ opinions and form opinions 
only by their experiences. 
 
While Oprah Winfrey’s social status certainly contributes to the effectiveness 
of her opinion propagating through an audience, another component helps to maintain 
her recommendation success and longevity as the “queen” of talk shows.  The number 
of people who take Oprah’s opinion seriously is also a function of her credibility and 
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credentials in the product or service.  If Oprah recommends a book, and her fans find 
out that it was not very enjoyable, they may not regard Oprah’s opinion as seriously 
the next time she recommends a product.  Likewise, if Oprah does not have sound 
reasoning to support her book of the month, her recommendation effectiveness may 
decrease.  These factors constitute a social credibility parameter that this research 
intends to investigate.  Within social credibility are three factors: the quality of 
knowledge, trust, and confidence.  Quality of knowledge is the level to which an 
argument is supported by evidence or logical reasoning.  In gossip, the knowledge is 
based on hearsay and rumors; thus, the knowledge is of low quality and many people 
do not take this information seriously.  While the information may be exciting 
initially, it has little bearing on forming long-term opinions (see for example, Lorenz, 
2006; Bendor, 2006).  High quality (or certain) knowledge may be more persuasive 
and believable, and may be more effective at forming and revising opinions.  
Likewise, when an information source is trustworthy, an individual is more likely to 
form or revise an opinion. 
 
Confidence has two components, confidence in society and confidence in self, 
which have implications on learning mechanisms.  The more confident one is of his 
opinion, the less likely he is to revise his opinion during future interactions.  As 
confidence in society (a proxy would be the competence of or faith in society) 
increases, an individual is more likely to conform or adopt the opinion of society.  If 
self-confidence is low and social confidence is low, one’s opinion may oscillate over 
time.  Alternatively, if both self-confidence and social confidence are high, one’s 
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opinion will depend on his social personality (e.g., opinion seeker conforms to 
societal opinion). 
 
3.2 The Role of Mechanisms 
Having set the definitions of the social mechanisms and social parameters, it is time 
to address how these mechanisms affect different individuals varying by social class, 
social type, factoring in social credibility as well.  For this model, the research 
hypothesizes that the role of mechanisms vary primarily by social types and then by 
social class.  There are issues of social credibility for each mechanism, since if the 
quality of information is not high, it will have the same effect on opinions regardless 
of social class or social type.  Social class affects the role of mechanisms in that the 
higher one is in class, the more resources he is exposed to for gathering information 
and for opinion interaction.  Social type has the greatest impact since personalities 
have implications on adoption of an innovation (Rogers, 2003).  Figure 3-1 shows the 
hypothesized relationships between the individual personality type and the primary 
mechanism that will successful change his opinion. 
 
In general, most personality types are influenced by word of mouth, with the 
exception of the maven.  This is because the maven is what Rogers (2003) considers 
the innovative group, or the first 2.5% to adopt an innovation or opinion.  As they are 
the first to change their opinion, there is little chance for mavens to change their 
opinion because someone else had communicated via word of mouth their opinion.  
Thus, mavens are more likely to be influenced by mass media, belief learning, or 
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personal experience.  Since mavens have such high interest in their product class or 
service, they are more willing to pay attention to mass media campaigns for a product 
class than the majority of the population.  Likewise, they will actively search the 
news media for any information on innovations or modifications made in that product 
class.  Alternatively, the mavens are themselves the innovators of a new product or 
service and are convinced through personal experience to change their opinion. 
 
Figure 3-1.  Primary Mechanism Affecting Different Individual Type Opinion 
 
Connectors and salesmen are primarily influenced through word of mouth 
mechanisms since it is probable that within their social network, these opinion leaders 
know a maven.  These individuals are what Rogers (2003) term the early adopters, or 
the next 13.5% of the population to adopt an opinion.  Further, it is hypothesized that 
since these individuals are “trend setters”, they are not under the influences of mass 


















to advertising innovations, may also reflect the opinion of the population or current 
trends in the population. 
 
Opinion seekers are most likely to be influenced by word of mouth and mass 
media.  Since they seek information about a product or service to form their opinion, 
they will look to opinion leaders and the mass media as their information sources.  It 
is possible that since these individuals seek opinions, they rarely consider their own 
personal experiences or hedonic learning processes.  Direct experience on the other 
hand, will primarily influence isolationists.  Word of mouth and belief learning most 
likely play a role in opinion formation for isolationists, but only after much time has 
passed and a majority of the population has already adopted the opinion.  Isolationists 
are synonymous with the term laggards (Rogers, 2003) and are the last 16% of the 
population to adopt an opinion.  These individuals are stubborn and prefer the status 
quo, but once social pressure reaches a certain point, isolationists may observe the 
effect the opinion has on the population through internet blogs, recommendation web 
sites, and other media by which one does not physically interact nor does one receive 
the information.  An example is through an internet web search, where unlike 
television or mass media outlets, the individual initiates the information search.  
Thus, this research distinguishes between mass media, which is an inward 
information flow (receiving or exposure), and belief learning, which is an outward 




3.3 Conceptual Framework 
With knowledge of social mechanisms and social parameters governing opinion 
formation, and how these mechanisms play a role in the development and revision of 
opinions, this research develops a conceptual framework of opinion formation and 
propagation.  Within this framework are three components, the interaction model, the 
opinion revision model, and the consideration model.  This section explores 
mathematical functions and representations of the social mechanisms and opinion 
revision processes in the ideal scenario.  Some inspiration for these representations is 
drawn from traffic flow theory, which also has concepts of leader-follower situations, 
acceptance of gaps, social pressure, and learning. 
 
3.3.1 Lessons from Traffic Flow Theory 
Macroscopic and microscopic theories of traffic flow provide a mathematical 
representation of the physical properties of the real-world traffic state, much like fluid 
dynamics, thermodynamics, and kinematics equations attempt to model hydraulics, 
heat transfer, and bodies in motion.  What is particularly attractive about traffic flow 
theory is that it incorporates human behavior into mathematical equations, whereas 
the other theories do not explicitly.  Further, traffic flow theory has a mathematically 
derived relationship between the microscopic and macroscopic levels.  In modeling 
complex systems, Schweitzer (2006) asks how the properties of the elements and 
their interactions on a microscopic level related to the dynamics and properties of the 
whole system at the macroscopic level.  Much of the research thus far has made the 
claim that the collective decisions are the result of aggregating individual decisions 
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(Schweitzer, 2006).  Traffic flow theory has equations that represent behavioral 
interactions at the microscopic level, as well as a fundamental identity that represents 
the state of the aggregate system at the macroscopic level.  As an exploration, this 
research attempts to redefine the state variables of macroscopic traffic flow to fit the 
context of opinion formation and propagation.  This creates a basis for relating 
system-level states (i.e., general opinion trends in the population) to microscopic 
mechanisms that model the behavior of individuals as they form and transmit 
opinions.  It also affords the use of microscopic mechanisms of gap acceptance and 
car following in modeling micro-level behavior. 
 
Macroscopic traffic flow theory stems from the fundamental identity shown in 
equation 3.1
q = ku               (3.1) 
where q is the flow of vehicles per hour, k is the density of vehicles per mile per lane, 
and u is the velocity of the vehicle in miles per hour.  In the context of aggregate-
level opinion formation and propagation, q would be the propagation of opinion, k
would be the density of opinion, and u would be the speed at which the opinion 
travels.  Density of opinion would be the number of individuals holding an opinion in 
a unit of opinion space.  Speed of an opinion represents the propensity to travel from 
one individual to another.  In this framework, u is defined as a function of the opinion 
and the likelihood for an individual to adopt the opinion.  One could interpret this 
parameter as openness to different opinions.  If one assumes a logarithmic speed-
density relationship of the density of opinions and the propensity to adopt, as given 
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by the Greenberg (1959) model shown in equation 3.2, one can derive the 




kku lnλ= (3.2) 
where u is the speed of opinions, λ is a constant, k is the density of opinion, and kj is 
the jam density which could reflect the fragility phenomenon shown in Wu and 
Huberman (2005) in which an opinion held by large group of individuals can become 
extinct in a short time. 





where x&& is the rate of change in opinion, 1λ is a function of social status and social 
credibility, x& is the speed of opinion, and x is the position of the individual in opinion 
space.  A logarithmic opinion density to adoption propensity curve is a reasonable 
assumption if one were to consider an individual with no prior information or opinion 
on the product and is captive towards his current product (i.e., there is a possibility 
that the individual is unsatisfied with the current product but has little or no other 
choice).  Given this premise, an individual initially is open to a new opinion when 
there are few entities in his vicinity.  As the frequency of interactions with entities 
having the same opinion increases, the individual will likely change opinions, and the 
propensity to adopt begins to decrease since the individual shares the same opinion. 
 
Using this theoretical background, an aggregate model can investigate the 
wave propagation phenomenon of opinions in a population.  One can visualize at the 
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aggregate level how an opinion moves outward from initial information sources and 
see the retreat (or the fragility phenomenon) of opinions as a shockwave through the 
system.  At the microscopic level, car following encapsulates concepts of leaders and 
followers, and the stimulus response equation is appropriate for the opinion revision 
model.  The next three sections detail the components of the general conceptual 
framework for opinion formation and propagation model. 
 
3.3.2 Interaction Model 
This level of the framework investigates the interaction phenomenon that occurs 
when exchanging or conferring opinions.  There are four mechanisms considered: 
word of mouth, mass media, belief learning, and direct experience.  The interaction 
model governs the interface between two entities.  This could be an individual 
communicating with another individual, or an individual exposed to mass media, or 
an individual with his belief of the opinion of the majority, or an individual with his 
personal experiences.  For this model, it is assumed that individuals are subjected to 
one mechanism at any time (i.e., the effects of the mechanisms are mutually 
exclusive).  This allows the analyst to capture the direct effect of mechanisms without 
having to specify correlations between interacting mechanisms.  Group effects in the 
mechanisms (i.e., communication between more than two individuals for the word of 
mouth mechanism) could be incorporated with the addition of a group desirability 




Word-of-mouth communication is modeled as two agents meeting and 
discussing their opinion on a particular product or topic.  The model assumes that 
during the interaction, both individuals reveal their opinion (i.e., it is not implied).  
This mechanism only intends to capture physical, face-to-face interactions, as 
communication via e-mails, telephone conversations, and instant messaging 
applications do not explicitly convey an individual’s social characteristics.  Mass 
media is a periodic mechanism that targets certain groups of individuals at certain 
times with an opinion or information about an opinion.  For a given time of exposure 
to mass media, there is a function of information flow.  Here, the media element 
conveys an opinion, through some form of advertisement, to an individual.  Direct 
experiences reflect trial and error and satisfaction with the status quo.  This 
incorporates components of the satisfaction model used in Brenner (1997) where if 
individuals are unsatisfied with the status quo, they have a propensity to try a new 
product or service. 
 
Common to all four components is an acceptance or connectivity parameter 
by which an individual judges whether to pay attention to or ignore incoming 
information on an opinion.  Previous models have investigated systems where agents 
exchange information and opinions freely.  However, humans are inherently selective 
in who they choose to interact with, what media they will pay attention to, what social 
group to emulate, and what experiences to recall.  Thus, in this model, not every 
individual interacts with an entity that comes into contact.  Each individual has a 
connectivity threshold that indicates how far from personal identity (e.g., social class, 
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social type) he is willing to accept in order to engage in opinion exchange.  If the 
difference between the individual and the entity is below the internal connectivity 
threshold, the individual will choose to engage in interaction with the intent of 
revising his opinion.  If the difference is above the threshold, the individual will 
choose not to interact and stay with his current opinion.  Additionally, as time 
progresses, the individual threshold will decrease as confidence in the opinion 
increases, decreasing the number of accepted interactions over time.  This process 
intends to reflect the phenomenon that individuals tend to interact with similar 
individuals and that over time, individuals become less sensitive to differences in 
opinions (i.e., they become more confident in their own opinion). 
 
3.3.3 Opinion Revision Model 
Given that at least one individual (if there are two individuals interacting in the word 
of mouth mechanism) decides to revise an opinion, the individual choosing to revise 
his opinion will enter the opinion revision model which utilizes the non-linear 
stimulus-response mechanism for car following developed by Gazis (1959).  To 
utilize opinion space, the model assumes that each individual in the system can be 
mapped to a position in space based on his opinion value.  This model also postulates 
that the rate of change in opinion depends on how similar an individual is to the 
interacting entity.  For individuals who interacted through word of mouth or through 
belief learning, the similarity function most likely depends on social class and social 
type.  For those who interacted with mass media and direct experience, the similarity 
function would most likely depend on the difference in opinion (i.e., the marketing 
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perspective or the opinion formed by direct observation).  Knowing this, equation 3.3 
is rewritten as:  










,,, 21 (3.4) 
where ( )nsssg ,,, 21 K is the function of similarity that takes social parameters 
into account depending on the mechanism involved.  To further evolve this into the 
context of opinion revision, suppose that acceleration, or the rate of change in speed, 
is synonymous with the rate of change in propensity to adopt, which for 
implementation purposes within this framework, is equivalent to the incremental 
change in opinion.  Let the difference in opinion space also be a component of the 
general impedance function, λ, which either dampens or enhances the effect of the 
interaction.  Thus the car-following equation is transformed into an opinion-following 
mechanism shown in equation 3.5. 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tOptOpTtpO BAPBMCTB −=+ ,,,,λ& (3.5) 
where ( )TtpO B +& is the change in opinion for individual B for time Tt + ,
AOp  and BOp  are the current opinion of individuals A and B, respectively, and 
PBMCT ,,,,λ is an impedance function that is dependent on social type (T), social class 
(C), marketability (M), social behavior (B), and personality (P).  To find the new 
opinion of individual B, utilize the velocity-equivalent transformation, shown in 
equation 3.6. 
 ( ) ( ) ( )TtpOtOpTtOp BBB ++=+ & (3.6) 




3.3.4 Consideration Model 
In this framework, a post-interaction response occurs immediately following updates 
to the opinion speed and opinion position.  Since opinion position reflects a 
continuous value for an opinion, this research considers values between positive, 
negative, or indifferent opinions to be intermediate values.  Thus, an interaction may 
bring about a change in opinion value, but may not change it enough to form a 
confident opinion.  Individuals can adopt a certain opinion once an internal threshold 
is exceeded.  That is, once the individual is convinced of an opinion, he will adopt 
that opinion.  In terms of choice, the adoption of an opinion implies that the 
individual considers the product or alternative seriously enough to warrant 
consideration in the choice set.  Thus, this component of the opinion formation and 
propagation model is termed the consideration model. 
 
The structure of the consideration model is much like a gap-acceptance model 
in microscopic traffic flow theory where individuals accept a gap that exceeds the 
critical threshold.  In this situation, individuals choose to accept an opinion once the 
current opinion value exceeds an internal threshold.  By using the gap-acceptance 
model, one can calculate a probability of accepting an opinion given the current 
opinion value and internal threshold value.  Equation 3.7 shows the gap-acceptance 
model developed by Miller (1967) and interpreted in the context of opinion formation 
and propagation. 
( ) ( )icri ttAdopt ε+≥= PrPr
( )crii tt −≥= εPr  (3.7) 
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where ti is the opinion value for individual i, tcr is the internal threshold value 
averaged over time, and εi is an error term that has a distribution associated with it.  
The distribution assumption of the error term will yield different probability density 
functions; for this framework, the gap-acceptance equation is left in generic form. 
 
As a synthesis of the framework, Figure 3-2 depicts the conceptual framework 
for opinion formation and propagation.  An individual is initialized with an opinion 
value and “meets” another entity.  Judging by intuition, the individual determines if 
the difference between social identities or media is greater than or less than their 
internal threshold.  If the connectivity parameter is greater than the threshold, the 
individual moves on to the next entity.  Should the connectivity parameter fall below 
the threshold value, the individual will choose to interact with the entity with the 
intent to revise his opinion.  The rate of change in opinion will depend on a social 
parameter function as well as the distance between opinion positions and the opinion 
speeds.  Once the new rate of change is determined, the opinion speed and opinion 
position are updated to provide a new opinion value.  If this new opinion value is 
greater than an internal threshold, the individual will adopt a real, discrete opinion 
and will no longer seek a new opinion through word of mouth, mass media, or belief 
learning mechanisms.  Only direct experiences, specifically dissatisfaction with the 
status quo, can convince an individual to seek new opinions.  For an opinion value 
less than the internal threshold, the individual will continue to seek an opinion from 
other entities.  Individuals keep a record of what entities they have encountered, and 
for those they interacted with, record their opinions.  Over time, as the number of 
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interactions increase, an individual tends to become more confident of his opinion, 
and thus his propensity to continue to enter to revision model decreases. 
 
Figure 3-2.  Conceptual Framework of Opinion Formation and Propagation 
Word of Mouth Mass Media Belief Learning Direct Experience 
• Determine social value parameters 
• Determine marketability 
• Determine personal characteristics 
• Determine prior satisfaction 




























































• Determine impedance function, λ
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tOptOpTtpO BAPBMCTB −=+ ,,,,λ&





























3.4 Model Implementation 
To implement the conceptual framework of opinion formation and propagation, it is 
necessary to develop mathematical representations of the connectivity threshold, the 
impedance function, and the consideration threshold.  Further, this section discusses 
specific factors that affect the connectivity of an individual to the interacting entity.  
For word-of-mouth, it may be social class and social type influences, but for mass-
media, the connectivity criteria may be the product desirability and the exposure rate.  
The next four subsections discuss factors influencing the connectivity for each social 
mechanism, factors influencing the impedance function, as well as defining 
mathematical representations for interaction connectivity and opinion updating.  This 
section concludes with a general specification of the consideration model. 
 
3.4.1  Word-of-Mouth Mechanism 
As mentioned previously, the interaction model represents an information process 
that resembles a screening process.  An individual does not choose to communicate 
with everyone he meets; rather the individual is selective and bases his judgment on 
similarities in social class, social type, and perceived opinion.  Literature has 
postulated that opinions tend to harbor in social groups with similar social status (see 
for example, Wu and Huberman, 2005, Bendor et al., 2006, Brenner, 1997).  An 
opinion seeker does not always adopt an opinion of the individual with the highest 
social status; there are scenarios where he may take a relative’s opinion more 
seriously than Oprah Winfrey’s opinion.  This model accounts for the similarities 
concept by incorporating the connectivity parameter and an interaction threshold 
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parameter.  The word-of-mouth connectivity measure of an individual i is represented 
by equation 3.8. 
 ( ) ( ) ( )iiii OPSTSCConnect 321 βββ ++= (3.8) 
where SCi is the social class of individual i, STi is the social type of individual 
i, and OPi is the opinion value of individual i. Equation 3.8 implies that the more 
similar two individuals are in connectivity, the higher chance of deciding to interact 
and revise opinions. 
The interaction threshold incorporates a type-dependent component that 
follows the distribution of the diffusion of innovation theory for opinion seekers, and 
exaggerates the tolerance for opinion leaders.  A class-dependent component models 
the tendency for individuals to look to those with the highest social class in pursuit of 
achieving the American dream.  Part of Oprah’s appeal is that she embodies the 
American dream and thus people are willing to tolerate disproportionate differences 
in social classes in hopes of improving their status.  The lower the social class of an 
individual, the threshold parameter increases.  Finally, a declining parameter 
represents an individual’s confidence in their opinion.  As confidence increases, the 
threshold to interact with other in pursuit of revising an opinion decreases.  Equation 
3.9 gives the equation for the interaction threshold. 
 ( )( )iiii ConfCCTTTH −−= + 11max  (3.9) 
where THi is the interaction threshold for individual i, TTi is the type-dependent 
tolerance, Cmax+1 is the highest social class value plus one to represent admiration or 
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emulation of those with elite status, Ci is the social class of the individual, and Confi
is the confidence of the individual. 
 
For this research, confidence is a measure of the sum of number of 
interactions over the number of encounters (collisions) multiplied by a memory-effect 
parameter.  Formulating confidence in this manner in combination with the threshold 
parameter implies that the more interactions an individual has, the more likely he is to 
form a firm opinion.  The memory-effect parameter accounts for some of the 
psychological phenomenon such as the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974) where individuals tend to recall only recent events.  In some instances, 
recollection is limited, in which case the record of interactions is shortened or 
reduced.  Other times, the recollection may be exaggerated (e.g., an individual feels 
that he has interacted with hundreds of other individuals when in reality, the number 

















∑ =1 (3.10) 
where NumInteract is the number of interactions, J is the number of 
encounters (collisions), and METi is the type-dependent memory effect of individual 
i.
Governing the decision of whether to engage in conversation or ignore the 
individual is the model equation.  Currently, the formulation is deterministic; 
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however, it can be modified to reflect stochasticity and the probabilistic nature of 
behavior (e.g., preference reversals, intransitivity).  Equation 3.11, where the 
difference in connectivity is below the interaction threshold, is the case where the 
individual will engage with intent to revise opinion.  Equation 3.12, in which the 
difference in connectivity exceeds the interaction threshold, is the case where the 
individual will ignore the other individual and revert to the status quo (i.e., maintain 
the same opinion). 
 jiTHConnectConnect iji ≠<− , (3.11) 
 jiTHConnectConnect iji ≠>− , (3.12) 
 
For the impedance function, PBMCT ,,,,λ , the word-of-mouth opinion updating 
simplifies the function to CT ,λ , as social class and social type are the main influences 
in how an individual updates his opinion.  This is implemented as a combination of 
four trigger mechanisms with a binary variable: class-type similarity, opinion leader, 
opinion follower, and status quo. 
 
3.4.1.1 Class-Type Similarity 
For this trigger mechanism to be invoked, the two interacting individuals must be 
either similar in social class, or similar in social type.  This is expressed as a binary 












where CA and CB are the social class of individual A and B respectively, and TA
and TB are the social type of individual A and B. This mechanism implies that if two 
individuals are similar in social class or the same social type, they will simply 
average the difference in opinions between them.  Both individuals have similar 
resources and influences, so they can convince each other half of each individual’s 
opinion. 
 
3.4.1.2 Opinion Leader 
If one of the individuals is an opinion leader (e.g., connector, maven, salesmen), the 









As opinion leaders seem to be altruistic, for this model, they are considered to 
be impervious to the social class of the interacting individual.   In other words, the 
opinion exchanged between the opinion leader and the other individual does not 
depend on the other individual’s social class.  If the interacting individual is another 
opinion leader of a different type, however, the individual becomes aware of social 
class differences only.  The leader trigger mechanism is interacted with a function 














where CA is the social class of the opinion leader A, ρ is a user-specified 
constant, α is a user-specified parameter that is at least 1 if the interacting individual 




is an opinion follower, and less than 1 if the interacting individual is a different type 
of opinion leader, and Z is another user-specified parameter that takes the value of 
greater than 1 if the interacting opinion leader is of a lower social class, 1 otherwise.  
For this model, the research considers ρ = 2, α = 2 for opinion followers, 0.8 for 
connectors, 0.7 for mavens, and 0.6 for salesmen, and Z = 2 if interacting opinion 
leader has lower social class.  With this specification, the best revision that can occur 
for the opinion leader is a simple averaging of the two opinions.  The opinion revision 
depends on the opinion leader’s social class, as the more resources he has in terms of 
social connections, the smaller the effect of a single opinion.  Most of the time, the 
revision will be insignificant since opinion leaders have many social connections and 
a single individual has little effect on the opinion leader’s opinion. 
 
3.4.1.3 Opinion Follower 
To invoke this trigger mechanism, one of the two interacting individuals is an opinion 









Opinion followers, particularly opinion seekers, tend to be sensitive to the 
social class and social type of the interacting individual.   They also pay attention to 
similarities, in that if the difference in social class is minimal, they are more likely to 
take the opinion seriously.  Seekers, however, sometimes weigh the interacting 
individual’s opinion seriously if the latter is an opinion leader.  Additionally, opinion 
followers are less inclined to revise an opinion if the interacting individual has a 



















where BA CC − is the absolute value of the difference in social class between 
individual A and B, κ is a user-specified parameter that takes a value of greater than 1 
if the interacting individual is an opinion leader and the individual is an opinion 
seeker, 1 otherwise, γ is a user-specified constant, and β is a user-specified parameter 
that takes a value of greater than 1 if the interacting individual has a lower social 
class, 1 otherwise.  In this model, κ takes a value of 2 if the interacting individual is 
an opinion leader, γ is equal to 2, and β is 2 if the interacting individual has a lower 
social class.  Given this representation of a follower’s opinion revision process, the 
best revision possible is a full adoption of the interacting individual’s opinion.  This 
occurs for an opinion seeker when the difference between social class is slightly more 
than one, which implies that the individuals are from distinct classes, and when the 
interacting individual is an opinion leader with a higher social class.  For isolationists, 
the best revision possible is a simple averaging of opinions, which is the same as the 
class-type similarity mechanism. 
 
3.4.1.4 Status Quo 
For certain scenarios, the research seeks to find the effect that some opinion leaders, 
once they have formed their opinion, are impervious to other individuals’ opinions.  
Likewise, some isolationists may only prefer to revise their own opinion from the 
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opinions of individuals like them.  This status-quo mechanism allows for the 
possibility of interaction without taking anything away.  The interacting individual 
may revise his opinion based on the opinion of the individual.   Equation 3.18 shows 








For this research and this mechanism, we consider mavens and salesmen to 
have firm opinions once they have formed.  Mavens are the first 2.5% to adopt an 
opinion, and generally stay with that opinion since they are the experts on that 
product class.  Salesmen, due to their charismatic personality, generally are hard to 
convince otherwise once they have formed an opinion.  Once the trigger mechanism 
is invoked, the opinion revision equation reduces to zero. 
 
From the four general trigger mechanisms, there are eight parameters to 
consider in the model.  This yields 56 different combinations.  Equation 3.19 presents 
the generalized opinion revision model with the mechanisms discussed in the last four 
sections.  The equation takes the perspective of individual A.







































3.4.2  Mass-Media Mechanism 
With the internet, television, personal digital assistants (PDAs), and now even cell 
phones conveniently at their disposal, today’s generation is constantly exposed to 
media advertising and marketing.  Whereas earlier studies looked at the phenomenon 




of mass media through newspaper, radio, and television as a periodic source, perhaps 
today’s media more closely represents a constant source through multi-media outlets.  
Though the source of marketing and advertising may be constant, individuals only 
pay attention to a small fraction of this information.  This model of mass-media 
broadcasting is captured in this model by the assumption that media sources are 
constantly relaying information to individuals.  Individuals may choose to “listen” to 
the information based on their need for a specific product and their exposure to the 
advertisement campaign.  In this model, an individual’s propensity to listen to mass-
media is captured by how well the advertisement matches the individual’s need and 
desirability for a product.  The literature supports the notion that product 
differentiation and segmentation serve to disperse perceptions of brand utilities 
(Mitra, 1995) and offer more compelling information to switch products (Allenby and 
Ginter, 1995); thus, an individual’s receptiveness to mass media depends also on his 
social class characteristics.  On one hand, there is the mass media mechanism 
attempting to connect with individuals to advertise and sell a product (by convincing 
the individual to enter into the opinion revision model), while on the other hand, 
individuals are modeled as agents that give mass media attention only when there is a 
need for such a product, and even in such instances, will only want to pay attention 
(and thus revise his opinion) if there is a desire for that product. 
 
An individual’s mass-media connectivity (i.e., connectivity attributes from the 
perspective of the individual) is represented by equation 3.20. 








where Needi represents the individual’s need for a specific product and SCi
indicates the social class of individual i. Here, need for a product is represented 
stochastically; individuals are assumed to need some product 25% of the time.  In 
epochs where an individual needs a product, it may be for a specific product, not just 
a product class.  This is represented by adding a normally distributed product-class 
term with the product class designation as the mean.  The second component of the 
individual mass-media connectivity represents a diminishing social class effect on the 
individual connectivity with media.  Intuitively, given that everyone has the same 
needs for a specific product, those with more financial and social resources may be 
more likely to pay attention to mass-media campaigns since they are more capable of 
purchases. 
 
From the media’s perspective, connectivity depends on the product 
information advertised.  Equation 3.21 represents mass media connectivity. 
 ipp ProductMedia ε+= (3.21) 
 where Mediap is the media connectivity for product p, Product represents the 
product class advertised by the media, and ipε characterizes randomness or white 
noise that may occur during the transmission from the media to the individual.  The 
error could represent misconstrued or misinterpreted information on the behalf of the 
individual (i.e., the information might have been ambiguous).  A normally distributed 
random variable with a mean of 0 and a variance of 0.1 is used for this model.  In the 
experiments, Product is implemented as a product-class oriented variable for 
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simplicity; however, it is possible to incorporate a number of specific products within 
a product class into the model. 
 
Equation 3.21 intends to represent a one-message or one-product class 
marketing campaign in which the same media is transmitted to individuals 
repetitively.  This is equivalent to the reminder ads Mitra (1995) discusses.  As 
marketing has expanded to product differentiation (e.g., the different array of Geico 
insurance commercials discussed earlier in this chapter), this research also 
incorporates a media connectivity function that replicates this effort to appeal to 
different social classes.  Equation 3.22 represents mass media connectivity with 
product differentiation. 






The difference between equation 3.21 and equation 3.22 is the addition of a 
media class parameter, pMC , that represents the different array of media classes a 
marketing campaign utilizes to advertise a product.  The second term is constructed in 
the same manner as the individual media connectivity to allow diminishing 
sensitivities for higher social classes, but differs in that media classes are discrete 
(unlike social class which is continuous).  This representation allows a marketing 
campaign the ability to systematically target specific social classes to focus the 
product advertising.  For these experiments, if a marketing campaign decides to use 
product differentiation strategies, their product will be advertised using a random 




The media interaction threshold incorporates concepts of product desirability, 
media exposure, and exposure proportionate to the sample size.  Product desire stems 
from an individual’s need for that product, given that the product is available and is 
being advertised.  Individuals do not need something constantly; consequently, this 
research assumes individuals need one of the products 20% of the time.  With need 
for a specific product being a continuous variable, and the product advertisements 
being discrete classes, desire is modeled as the confluence of “supply and demand” 
within a certain threshold.  If an individual desires a product, the model assumes the 
individual will likely expose himself to media pertaining to that product.  As the 
number of exposures increases, an individual is less likely to revise his opinion.  
Thus, the model assumes that individuals are cognizant of the number of times he is 
exposed to a product advertisement, given a desire for that product.  These behaviors 
under the media connectivity threshold are captured in equation 3.23. 







− ×+−×= φξ 1.11 (3.23) 
 where MediaTH  is the media connectivity threshold, iDesire  is a binary 
variable that is 1 if the individual desires the product, 0 otherwise, ξ is a user-
specified constant that is greater than 1,  iExpose  is the number of times individual i
has been exposed to the product prior to this encounter, φ is a user-specified constant 
that is greater than 1, and pNumUsers  is the number of individuals within the target 
group of the product advertising.  For these experiments, ξ = 1.25, φ = 2, and the 
number of individuals within the target group is the number of agents.  This threshold 
was constructed with the intention that initially, individuals would have a low 
99 
 
threshold for product advertisements that they have never been exposed to.  Once the 
advertisement becomes more familiar, individuals have the highest propensity to 
revise their opinion towards that product.  However, if the number of exposure is too 
high, the individual begins to saturate on the product information and becomes less 
likely to revise an opinion.  The user-specified constants in this equation allow the 
analyst to modify the threshold curve to match this process.  Equation 3.24 shows the 
resulting media connectivity threshold criteria used to evaluate whether an individual 
will revise his opinion based on receiving information through product 
advertisements.  If equation 3.24 is satisfied, the individual will enter the opinion 
revision model. 
 Mediamp THConnectMedia <− (3.24) 
 
Once in the opinion revision model, the individual will revise his opinion 
based on the impedance function.  The framework assumes that the media advertises 
an opinion of 1 for that product to encourage consideration and choice.  The 
impedance function could involve the concept of the stickiness factor discussed in 
Gladwell (2002) in which minute details of an advertisement may cause the message 
to resonate stronger with certain individuals.  However, as it is difficult to quantify 
this in a manner that applies systematically to a population, for these experiments, the 
impedance function is assumed to be a constant, with a value of 0.5.  This implies that 
there is a simple averaging of opinions once the connectivity threshold has been met.  
Equation 3.25 shows the opinion revision equation for mass media. 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tOptOptOpTtOp iMediamiim −+=+ λ (3.25) 
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where ( )TtOpim + is the new opinion of individual i due to media m at time 
Tt + , ( )tOpi is the previous opinion towards that product, mλ = 0.5, and ( )tOpMedia  
is the advertisement opinion that usually takes a value of 1. 
 
3.4.3  Belief Learning Mechanism 
Under belief learning, individuals are improving their utility towards a product 
through the observation of the opinions of others.  The essential problem to examine 
in these experiments is determining who the other individuals are.  A general rule for 
these experiments is that the set of other individuals comprise a real, distinct subset of 
the population (whereas in reality, belief learning could occur under virtual conditions 
in which individuals observe other opinions through blogs or other information-based 
websites).  This subset of the population could be determined randomly, or it could be 
class-based or friends-based.  In belief learning, a representation of social temperature 
or social pressure needs to be accounted for to capture the behavior that, as an 
individual sees more people adopting an opinion, there is increasing pressure to 
change or mimic society.  Thus, the belief learning connectivity threshold criteria is 
constructed in a manner that allows for a low threshold initially, and once a 
proportion of the population subset chooses a different alternative, the threshold 
grows relatively quickly until reaching some level of saturation in which the marginal 
increase in social pressure (i.e., the connectivity criteria threshold) due to the 




From the individual’s perspective, connectivity is defined as how different the 
individual’s opinion is from the opinions of the observed population subset.  Thus the 
individual connectivity is simply the individual’s current opinion towards the product 
or alternative.  To model the connectivity of the perceive opinion of the subset, this 
framework takes the weighted average of opinions multiplied with a perception factor 
that could reflect information or product attribute distortion.  To determine the subset, 
an individual is assumed to have a list of friends that have similar interests.  This 
model uses social class as a proxy for individual with similar interests and resources.  
As an illustration, if the absolute difference between an individual A’s social class 
and individual B’s social class is less than some threshold, individual B is considered 
a friend of individual A.  For these experiments, this threshold is a user-specified 











 where jOp  is the opinion of individual j in the subset not equal to individual i,
nS is the number of individuals in the subset not including individual i, and η is the 
perception or belief factor.  In this model, the perception factor is defined as a 
uniform random variable with a range between 0.5 and 2.0. 
 
To capture the effects of social temperature and social pressure, the belief 
learning threshold criteria was specified using a logit function.  The logit function 
produces an S-shaped curve in which the “tail” ends change slowly, while near the 
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mean the function rapidly increases.  The axis of the function is defined as the 
difference of the number of individuals in the subset choosing a different alternative 
divided by the weighted number of other alternatives available and the number of 
individuals in the subset choosing the same alternative.  This follows intuition as the 
more people choosing the same alternative as the individual of interest, the less likely 
that individual is to believe he should revise his opinion based on other individuals’ 
opinions.  This formulation also specifies a penalty for scenarios with many different 
alternatives or products in that an individual is sensitive to only intensity in choosing 
an alternative, not diversity.  Thus, the implication is the more products of similar 
nature on the market, the less likely the individual is to revise the opinion even 
though the majority is not choosing the individual’s alternative.  The belief learning 






























 where µ is the absolute difference in the average social class of the subset 
and the individual’s social class, ND is the number of individuals in the subset 
choosing a different alternative than individual i, θ is a weighing parameter that is 
based on how similar the alternatives are to each other, Na is the number of 
alternatives or products available, and NS is the number of individuals in the subset 
choosing the same alternative as individual i. For these experiments, since the 
products or alternatives are assumed to be adequately different, θ = 1.  Equation 3.28 
presents the belief learning threshold criteria that, if satisfied, will induce opinion 
revision based on the belief learning mechanism. 
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( ) blbl THtOpConnect <− (3.28) 
Once in the opinion revision model, the individual revises his opinion by 
adjusting it to the perceived opinion of others.  While the impedance function could 
represent a weighing criteria that reflects influential individuals in both social class 
and social type, this model assumes simple averaging of the two opinion elements.  
This opinion revision process is shown in equation 3.29. 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tOptOptOpTtOp iblblii −+=+ λ (3.29) 
where blλ = 0.5, blOp  is the perceived opinion of individuals in the subset, 
and iOp  is individual i's previous opinion value. 
 
3.4.4  Direct Experience Mechanism 
In many instances, individuals will use trial and error to decide whether they like or 
dislike a product.  It is possible that driving mechanism behind this behavior is the 
individual’s satisfaction with the current and past experiences with the product.  The 
literature implies that if there is low satisfaction, an individual may be more likely to 
switch products or try a new alternative, while if the individual is highly satisfied 
with the current product or alternative he is more likely to continue choosing that 
product (see for example, Lapersonne et al., 1995; Brenner, 1997).  Trial and error 
behavior may also be attributed to an individual’s risk characteristics (see for example 
Chancelier et al., 2007) in that risk-seeking individuals are more inclined to try 
different products or alternatives than risk-averse individuals.  The combination of 
these mechanisms imply that risk-seeking individuals are more likely to switch (or, in 
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this case revise an opinion) alternatives for a given level of satisfaction than are risk-
averse individuals. 
 
To implement the direct experience mechanism, this research defines 
satisfaction as the deviation from an individual’s expectation.  If the difference 
between the expected value of an attribute (e.g., travel time, cost) and the experienced 
value is high, there is low satisfaction.  If the difference between expectation and 
experience is low, there is high satisfaction.  Reinforced satisfaction leads to product 
or brand loyalty, while reinforced dissatisfaction incurs a change in product choice.  
If an individual has tried a different alternative previously and that alternative appears 
better in hindsight, there is a prospective benefit in switching back to that alternative.  
Likewise, other new alternatives may appear better than the current alternative.  To 
characterize an individual’s expectation, this research looks at three different criteria: 
an individual’s historical average with the alternative, the last observed experience, 
and the mean of last observed experience amongst users of that alternative.  Equation 
3.30 presents a generalized representation of the direct experience connectivity that 
illustrates the different criteria of expectation. 
 ,,exp hlmid ExpectConnect = (3.30) 
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Here, inObserve  is the observed experiences of alternative n by individual i,
nusedN , is the number of experiences with that alternative, inLastObs  is the last 
observation of alternative n by individual i, and njN , is the number of individuals not 
including i that have experienced alternative n. For the individual direct experience 
element, this model uses the individual’s current experience.  This implies that the 
opinion revision takes place post-experience, not during the actual experience as with 
the other mechanisms.  To simply the model, this research assumes post-evaluation to 
be no different than live evaluation.   
 
The direct experience threshold is specified as the interaction between an 
individual’s risk characterization and his acceptable variance of the attributes.  It is 
slightly different than the other three mechanism thresholds in that if the threshold 
criterion is met, it represents a positive experience and thus has a positive effect on 
the opinion.  If the criterion is not met, and it is exceeded by a certain amount, it 
represents a negative experience, and thus has a negative effect on the opinion.  Thus, 
for these experiments risk-averse individuals will have a higher threshold value as 
they will be less inclined to revise their opinion even if they have had an 
unsatisfactory experience.  For a similar acceptable variance, risk-seekers will have a 
lower threshold value and are more likely to revise their opinion accordingly.  These 
concepts are illustrated in equation 3.31. 
 ( )ihiide VarExpectRiskTH +×= , (3.31) 
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where iRisk  is a uniform random variable that ranges from 0.0 to 0.74 for 
risk-seeking individuals, and from 0.75 to 1.5 for risk-averse individuals, hiExpect , is 
the expected value based on an individual’s historical experiences, and iVar  is a 
normally-distributed random variable.  For these experiments, the mean is specified at 
0, and the variance is 5.   
 
Equation 3.32 presents the direct experience connectivity threshold, which if 
satisfied, means the individual will enter the opinion revision model and revise his 
opinion through the direct experience mechanism. 
 ( ) ded THtObserveConnect <−exp  (3.32) 
 Once in the opinion revision model, the individual will revise his opinion 
based on the satisfaction with the experience.  It is difficult to quantify an opinion 
from the direct experience, unlike the mass media mechanism in which the media 
broadcasts a specific opinion through an advertisement, or belief learning in which 
the individual perceives a collective opinion value.  Thus, this research uses the proxy 
of satisfaction, or the deviation from expectation, to derive an opinion value by which 
an individual revises his opinion.  To ensure that the opinion value is between -1 and 
1, the satisfaction term is divided by the individual’s acceptable variance, which 
includes the historical average of experiences.  Equation 3.33 shows the opinion 
revision function for the direct experience mechanism. 























where deλ is the impedance function that determines how influential the direct 
experience is on the individual’s opinion.  Note that the change in opinion depends on 
whether the experience was satisfactory (i.e., met the threshold criterion), or 
unsatisfactory (i.e., exceeded the threshold by a user-specified amount).  For these 
experiments, the buffer amount is a uniform random variable that ranges from 0.05 to 
0.2 that represents a buffer of 5% to 20% of the historical average.  This threshold 
implementation implies that direct experience, depending on an individual’s risk 
characteristic, has the potential to move the individual directly into the opinion 
revision model. 
 
3.4.5  Consideration Mechanism 
Following the opinion revision process, post interaction, an individual instinctively 
decides whether the opinion towards a product or alternative is positive enough to 
warrant placing it in his consideration set.  For the opinion formation and propagation 
framework, this implies that if the opinion does exceed some opinion threshold, the 
individual will consider the opinion to be final and will not continue to revise it, 
unless he has an unsatisfactory experience (i.e., direct experience mechanism yields 
negative effect).  To implement this, the model assumes each individual to have a 
latent threshold for each alternative, represented by a uniform random variable with a 
range between 0.5 and 1.0.  If the opinion towards a specific alternative exceeds the 
threshold plus some random error, the individual places the alternative into his 
consideration set and no longer revises his opinion in subsequent interactions with the 
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exception of direct experiences.  Equation 3.34 shows the consideration mechanism 
criterion that if met, the individual’s opinion remains constant. 
 iini OpthresOp ε+> (3.34) 
 where inOpthres  is the opinion threshold for alternative n and individual i, and 
iε is a normally-distributed variable that for these experiments, has a mean of 0 and 
variance of 0.07. 
 
3.5 Synthesis of Model Development 
Using qualitative and quantitative observations from the literature on opinion 
dynamics, this chapter formulated a conceptual framework for opinion formation and 
propagation, and then developed mathematical relationships to implement the 
different elements of the framework in a simulation program.  Much of the early 
discussion focused on clearly defining concepts of opinion leaders and followers, 
social class, and the hypothesized influences that social personality and social class 
has on interaction and opinion revision.  Drawing from concepts of leader-follower 
and gap-acceptance equations in traffic flow theory, Section 3.3 developed a general 
conceptual framework of opinion formation and propagation that has three 
components: an interaction model, an opinion revision model, and a consideration 
model.  To make the framework operational in a simulation environment, the next 
section develops mathematical functions that attempt to mimic the effects of the 
social mechanisms in real-world scenarios, taking into account hypothesized 




While not the overall goal of this research, it is important to implement the 
opinion formation and propagation model to be able to draw insights on whether the 
mathematical relationships developed in this chapter produce “behaviors” similar to 
what is observed in the real world.  It would be difficult to identify the effect of the 
social mechanisms had the opinion formation and propagation model been expanded 
to include choice dynamics.  Thus Chapter 4 develops several classes of scenarios to 
be tested, and Chapter 5 presents the results of these simulation experiments. 
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Chapter 4: Simulation Framework 
Description of Simulation Experiments 
Having conceptualized the theoretical relationships between individuals 
communicating via word of mouth and opinion revision, this section describes the 
simulation experiments used to test variations of parameters and different scenarios. 
System features of the simulation program are first described, followed by the 
identification of the principal factors tested. Finally, this chapter presents an 
explanation of the performance measures used to evaluate the experiments. 
 
4.1 System Features 
This research utilizes a hard-sphere particle molecular dynamics simulation program 
developed by Chen (working paper). Molecular dynamics offers good insight 
between the microscopic and macroscopic properties (e.g., molecules in a liquid) and 
utilizes concepts of acceleration, velocity, and position much like car-following 
theories. Under this program, individuals or agents are modeled as atoms or 
molecules and allowed to interact for a period under the laws of physics. Since the 
agents are hard spheres, the conservation of momentum includes only mass and 
velocity parameters. One of the advantages of the molecular dynamics program is the 
ability to change the mass of certain agents to reflect social mobility (e.g., larger 
masses indicate higher inertia and propensity to stay with the status quo). For 
simplicity though, this research assumes that all agents have the same mass, so that 
only the velocities vary. Through kinematics, one can solve for the magnitude and 
direction of the velocities of the agents. 
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In the initial stage, the program evenly distributes the agents according to the 
cell structure face-centered-cubit (fcc). As such, the number of agents needs to follow 
the equation below. 
 0,22 2 >ℜ∈+= SSSN A (4.1) 
where NA is the number of agents in the simulation, and S is a user-specified 
number in the set of real numbers greater than zero. Thus, for S = 5, NA = 60 agents. 
The system is bounded by a periodic boundary which allows the agents to move 
freely in the system (i.e., there are no collisions with the boundary). Bounded space 
has no implications for opinion; it only concerns the distances between agents. 
 
Initialization of the program assigns random velocities, including magnitude 
and direction, to each agent. Each agent, given this velocity magnitude and direction 
calculates the distance and time to the nearest agent. The program searches for the 
closest pair of agents and updates collision time and the overall time to the time of 
that collision. If the interaction model is satisfied (i.e., connectivity is below the 
threshold), the program modifies the opinions according to the heuristics designed in 
the previous chapter. This process iterates until the number of collisions specified by 
the user occurs, at which the program terminates.  More formally, the steps in the 




Initialization: Establish the thermodynamic state and assign initial positions 
and velocity to the hard spheres.  Using these initial conditions, the analyst 
can then build a table of collision times. 
Step 1: Specify a number of spheres N and a packing fraction η.
Step 2: Calculate the area of the boundary space and adopt the length of one 
edge of the square as the unit of distance (i.e., set L = 1).  Having established 
this unit distance, compute the sphere diameter σ.
Step 3: Assign initial positions ri(0), i = 1,…,N, at the sites on a face-
centered-cubic lattice, or utilize positions taken from the end of an earlier 
simulation run. 
Step 4: Assign initial velocities vi(0), i = 1,…,N from a distribution (here the 
velocities are randomly assigned from a uniform distribution). 




of spheres using the following equation: 
 











+= ttc (4.2) 
Step 6: Using the constructed collision time table, determine the duration ∆t
until the next collision and identify the colliding spheres i and j. This is 
equivalent to finding the nearest pair of spheres and calculating the time until 
collision. 
Step 7: From the current positions, advance all spheres by ∆t to the nearest 
collision, 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) Nkttttt kkk ,...,1000 =∆+=∆+ vrr (4.3) 
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Step 8: Apply periodic boundary conditions to any sphere leaving the 
boundary space during ∆t.
Step 9: Use the following equations to determine the postcollision velocities 
of i and j.
For sphere 1,  ( )[ ] 12122111 ˆˆ rrvvv ⋅−−=v (4.4) 
For sphere 2, ( )[ ] 12122122 ˆˆ rrvvv ⋅−+=v (4.5) 
Step 10: Calculate the new entries for the table of collision times by apply 
equation 4.2 to i, to j, and to any other sphere that would have collided with i
or j had those sphere not collided. 
Step 11: Repeat steps 6-10 until the desired number of collisions have 
occurred. 
The next section explains the factors that were varied in the experiments. 
4.2 Experimental Factors 
For this model, the research considers three different levels of modeling.  Models can 
be classified as the i) system properties, ii) basic, and iii) complex.  The system 
properties models investigate the simulation system effects of varying initial opinion 
values and agent density, while the basic model investigates threshold variation, 
confidence variation, interaction requirements, and consensus versus coexistence. 
 
4.2.1 System Properties 
In the system properties model, the program assigns each agent an initial opinion 
value and the agents revise their opinion by a simple averaging of the opinions of the 
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two agents in an interaction. Sixteen percent of the population, consistent with early 
adopters in a population, is initialized with a value of one. There are two factors 
evaluated in this model: the effect of initial opinion values and the density of agents. 
 
Initial Opinion Values.  Per the literature on opinion formation and propagation, there 
are two scenarios in initializing opinion values. One is for a fraction of agents to have 
a positive opinion value and the rest of the population to be indifferent at zero. The 
other is for a fraction of agents to have a positive opinion, with the rest of the 
population holding a negative opinion, denoted as –1. To evaluate the effect of 
different initial opinion values, this research tested a model initialized with [0,1] and 
[-1,1] opinion values. In both cases, 16% of the population held the positive opinion, 
and the number of collisions for both cases was set to 1,000. 
 
Density of Agents.  From the literature, it is hypothesized that the higher the density 
of agents in an area, the quicker the opinions will propagate. At lower densities, it 
will take longer for the agents to interact and for opinions to propagate. To investigate 
this hypothesis, this research considers different numbers of agents in the system. For 
this program, the higher the number of agents, the higher the density since all agents 
are initialized within the periodic boundary. A case where NA = 144 and a case where 
NA = 12 was tested and compared to the base case of NA = 40. The number of 
collisions specified for each case depended on the time for opinion values to 
converge; for NA = 144, the number of collisions was set to 3,000, for NA = 12, there 




4.2.2 Basic Models 
For the basic models, the 16% of the population with a positive opinion were also 
initialized as opinion leaders. Each type of opinion leader was specified and 
represented in the model (~ 5% of the population, or two agents with NA = 40). Only 
the indifference-positive model of opinions was considered in the basic model. 
Opinion leaders are assumed to maintain their opinion throughout the simulation (i.e., 
their opinion values were constant). Other agents updated their opinions through a 
simple averaging of the two opinions in an interaction. Within this model, the 
research investigated the variation of the threshold specification, memory effects on 
confidence, the interaction requirements, and consensus versus coexistence of opinion 
leaders. 
 
Threshold Specification.  In the model development, the interaction threshold has a 
constant component, the social class and social type parameters, and a dynamic 
component consisting of the confidence parameter that varies as the number of 
interactions increase. To test this specification of the interaction threshold, the 
research considers two cases, one where the threshold depends only on the constant 
component, and the other including the dynamic component. Results should show 
that with the dynamic component, as the number of interactions increase, agents’ 
threshold decreases so that they become less willing to interact with other agents to 
revise their opinion. One would expect the number of interactions over the specified 




Memory Effects on Confidence.  Within the confidence specification, there is a 
memory-type parameter representing an individual’s memory of past interactions. For 
some individuals, the ability to recall all interactions is not possible; there is literature 
that supports the notion that individuals may recall a limited amount of recent 
interactions (see for example, Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, Lorenz, 2006). In some 
cases, individuals keep an accurate record of the interactions they have experienced; 
perhaps these are connectors or other opinion leaders. Other times, individuals may 
recall a recent number of interactions, but exaggerate those interactions, or, 
individuals may exaggerate interactions beyond their capacity to remember 
accurately. For this case, the memory-type parameter is varied to reflect pure 
interaction, where individuals remember all interactions, as well as exaggerated 
interactions, when history is dramatized or heightened. One would expect that both 
pure interaction and exaggerated interaction would make an individual more 
confident of their opinion, and thus reduce the number of interactions until their 
opinion value converges or stabilizes. 
 
Interaction Requirements.  In the opinion revision model, one of the requirements is 
that at least one of the two individuals in an encounter must meet the required 
connectivity constraint in the social mechanism level of the conceptual framework. 
This variation investigates the effect of both individuals must agree to interact on 
opinion values and their convergence. Results should show that imposing this 
restriction would further reduce the number of interactions in the system as well as 
reduce the convergence rate. 
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Consensus versus Coexistence of Opinion Leaders.  This factor investigates the effect 
of having opinion leaders divided over different opinion values.  For this case, the 
research tests two scenarios: one where half the opinion leaders (3) have an opinion 
value of 1, and the other half (3) have an opinion value of –1, and the other, where 
half the opinion leaders have an opinion value of 1, and the other half have an opinion 
value of 0.  One would expect there to be little convergence in opinions; perhaps there 
may be some stratification effects, but that would depend on which agents interact 
with opinion leaders.  There may also be huge variations in opinion values as one 
opinion seeker may interact with an opinion leader with a value of 1, and immediately 
thereafter interact with an opinion leader with a value of 0. 
 
4.2.3 Complex Models 
In the complex models, the research implements the interaction model and opinion 
revision model of the conceptual framework as discussed in the last chapter.  
Utilizing the word-of mouth mechanisms, mass media mechanism, belief learning 
mechanisms and direct experience mechanisms, these experiments intend to explore 
the effect of the opinion dynamics in the simulation environment.  Additionally, these 
complex models allow for scenario design in which the analyst can compare and 
evaluate different policy implications.  These scenarios are described in the following 
subsections.  For models involving social type characteristics, it is important to note 
that mavens and salesmen do not update their opinion values (i.e., they remain 
constant), while connectors are allowed to revise their opinions. 
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4.2.3.1 Word-of-Mouth Scenarios 
In the word-of-mouth scenarios, 16% of the agents are initialized as opinion leaders 
with opinion values of 1.  Opinion leaders who were mavens and salesmen did not 
revise their opinions, while connectors were able to revise if the connectivity 
threshold was satisfied.  These scenarios employed the characteristics explored in 
basic models (e.g., dynamic threshold, memory-type characteristics, at least one agent 
agrees to interact).  The main purpose of these scenarios is to determine the effect of 
accounting for influential opinion leaders in opinion formation and propagation.  
Additionally, this research is interested in evaluating the number of individuals who 
have placed the alternative into their consideration set.  By accounting for these 
mechanisms, these experiments can offer insight as to whether certain policies or 
scenarios can influence additional individuals to consider the alternative. 
 
Simple Averaging versus Incorporating Trigger Mechanisms.  This scenario intends 
to determine whether incorporating the social type and social class trigger 
mechanisms and corresponding opinion revision functions reflect the intuition that 
influential individuals have a larger magnitude on an individual’s opinion, and that 
these individuals gravitate towards the opinion of the leaders.  The expectation is that 
the model that accounts for the trigger mechanisms will converge more quickly than 
the simple averaging model.  In addition, incorporating the trigger mechanisms is 
expected to increase the number of individuals that consider the alternative when 
compared to the simple averaging model.  For this case, the research considers the 




4.2.3.2 Mass Media Scenarios 
For mass media scenarios, agents are assumed to be equally receptive to marketing 
and advertising regardless of their social type.  Thus, all agents are initialized with an 
indifferent opinion (i.e., an opinion of 0).  In addition to exploring the effect of 
different mass media strategies (e.g., constant or reminder ads, product 
differentiation), these scenarios also intend to offer insight to competing products and 
their marketing strategies.  This model assumes that in a competing product scenario, 
one product “advertises” an opinion of 1, while the other product “advertises” an 
opinion of -1. 
 
Reminder Ads versus Product Differentiation.  In this scenario, this research 
compares the simulated results from employing a constant reminder ad strategy and a 
differentiation strategy based on media class, which is highly correlated with social 
class and intends to replicate marketing segmentation and targeting strategies.  The 
expectation is that differentiation strategies (i.e., advertisements that appeal to 
different social classes) will increase the number of agents considering that product 
when compared to the reminder ads. 
 
Two Competing Products Using Reminder Ads.  Here, agents are exposed to two 
competing products, one at an opinion value of 1, the other at opinion value of -1.  
Both employ the reminder ads strategy.  The intent of this scenario is to evaluate the 
direct effects of competing products on opinion dynamics.  One would intuitively 
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expect that both marketing campaigns should get an equal number of agents to 
consider their products. 
 
One Product Uses Segmentation versus Other Product Uses Reminder Ads.  Building 
on the competing product scenario, this research is interested in exploring the effect 
of employing different strategies to influence more agents to consider one alternative 
or product.  The product with an opinion of 1 utilizes a product differentiation 
strategy while the product with an opinion of -1 uses reminder ads.  One would 
expect that the product using segmentation and targeting strategies would appeal to 
more agents, and would thus garner a higher number of agents considering the 
product. 
 
Best Case Segmentation for Competing Products.  Even though product 
differentiation and segmentation strategies attempt to appeal to different segments of 
the population, these strategies can only advertise through a discrete class.  In other 
words, there are not enough resources to create a marketing campaign that closely 
matches an individual’s social class and preferences.  While not a realistic scenario, it 
is of interest to examine what the effect on an ideal segmentation strategy (i.e., one 
that can match individual preferences through matching his social class) is on opinion 
formation and propagation.  Here, the two competing products advertise with full 
knowledge of an agent’s social class and subsequently tailor the ad to the agent.  The 
expectation is that agents will quickly respond to such campaigns, but then become 
saturated by the exposure and will no longer respond to the ads (i.e., consideration 
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phase).  While not a real occurrence in today’s marketing strategies, internet websites 
like Amazon.com are utilizing individual preferences to customize an advertisement 
(e.g., product recommendations), so this scenario may not be too far-fetched even in 
the near future. 
 
4.2.3.3 Belief Learning Scenarios 
By the design of the belief learning mechanism, belief learning does not have a 
pronounced effect unless there are an adequate number of individuals holding a 
different opinion, or if they perceive a distorted opinion amongst other individuals.  
Thus, for these experiments to reveal the effects of the belief learning mechanism, the 
research initializes opinion leaders with an opinion of 1 or -1.  There are essentially 
three effects this research would like to explore: acquiring insight on how different 
opinion distributions affect the belief learning of agents, how different constructs of 
the observation group affects belief learning, and the role of opinion or attribute 
distortion. 
 
One Opinion versus Two Opinions.  This scenario is structured similarly to the 
consensus versus coexistence basic model in that for one case, the opinion leaders 
have an opinion of 1, with the rest of the agents initially having an indifferent 
opinion, while in the second case, half of the opinion leaders have an opinion of 1 
while the other half has an opinion of -1.  One would expect that given a higher 
concentration of leaders advocating a certain opinion (and thus a higher chance that 
the leader is in an agent’s circle of friends) would yield a greater effect than having an 
equal number of leaders supporting two opinions. 
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Random Group Construct versus Similarity Group Construct.  For this scenario, the 
intent is to explore the effect that different heuristics for constructing the observation 
group has on the opinion revision process.  In the random case, agents choose at 
random a number of other agents to observe.  This behavior is similar to observing 
celebrities or a group of individuals at an attraction (e.g., at a shopping mall).  For the 
similarity case, agents search amongst the population to find individuals with similar 
social class and determine these individuals to be “friends.”  This is similar to online 
shopping website or utilizing social networking sites.  Modeling these cases may also 
offer perspective on a combination of strategies, since there may be times when an 
individual’s friend may be from a different social class, but intrinsically has some 
connection to that individual. 
 
Opinion or Attribute Distortion.  This scenario intends to offer insight to how the 
belief or perception of the group may distort an opinion of a product.  To explore 
these effects, the model incorporates systematic biases in judgment by inflating or 
deflating an agent’s opinion.  The expectation is that the opinion distortion will 
exacerbate the opinion revision process, or cause an agent to prematurely consider the 
alternative (prematurely is defined as earlier product consideration than in the case 
where there is no distortion). 
 
4.2.3.4 Direct Experience Scenarios 
For direct experience scenarios, agents’ opinions are altered according to their 
experiences with the product.  The model initializes the agents to have an indifferent 
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opinion towards the alternative.  Here, the research is interested in investigating the 
different ways in which individuals may define or establish their performance 
expectations.  Three scenarios are generated to evaluate the effect on opinion 
revision: historical average expectation, last observation expectation, and the mean of 
the users.  Implementation details for these three scenarios are explained in Chapter 3.  
The expected results are that expectation based over an increasing number of 
observations may temper a bad experience.  In other words, one would expect that 
expectation based on the last observation would have the most volatile effect on 
opinion revision. 
 
4.2.3.5 Interactive Mechanisms Scenarios 
As an objective of this research is to explore the interactive effect that word-of-
mouth, mass-media, belief learning, and direct experience mechanisms have on 
opinion formation and propagation, these scenarios are designed to employ varying 
frequencies and combinations of these mechanisms in opinion revision.  As a general 
rule, no agent can interact with more than one mechanism at a given epoch.  This 
includes multiple agents interacting through word of mouth, or simultaneously being 
exposed to mass media while communicating via word of mouth to another agent.  
Through this rule, all mechanisms are considered independent entities; considering 
correlations between mechanisms is beyond the scope of this research.   
 
As direct experience and word of mouth are considered to be the stronger 
mechanisms, this research models three scenarios: 1) each mechanism has an equal 
share or frequency of interacting with an agent (i.e., 25% of the interactions to each 
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mechanism); 2) direct experience accounts for 60% of the interactions, belief learning 
accounts for 20% of the interactions, mass media and word of mouth each account for 
10% of the interactions, and; 3) word of mouth accounts for 50% of the interactions, 
belief learning accounts for 20% of the interactions, mass media accounts for 20%, 
and direct experience accounts for 10% of the interactions.  One would expect that 
the revision process of the dominant mechanism will prevail.  Much of the opinion 
revision process will depend on the initial conditions; for all of these scenarios the 
research initializes agents to have indifferent opinions.  Thus, the process most likely 
to occur in any scenario is that direct experiences or mass media will first affect an 
agent’s opinion in the “formation phase”, and then word of mouth and belief learning 
mechanisms will begin to have a measurable effect and continue to propagate 
opinions in the “propagation phase”. 
 
4.3 Performance Measures and Properties 
Three principal performance criteria are evaluated for each scenario tested in the 
simulation experiments: 1) the time for opinion values to converge, 2) the value to 
which the opinions converge, and 3) the number of interactions until convergence. 
 
1) Time for Opinion Values to Converge. It is important to investigate how long it 
takes the population to converge to an opinion, or if the opinion converges at all. 
Convergence is met when each agent’s opinion value remains within a ± 0.001 range 
of opinion values. Although system time is in generic units, there are numerical 
values for comparison. 
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2) Value of Convergence. The value of convergence is the opinion value that is 
reached when the system reaches convergence, or when the program terminates. 
 
3) Number of Interactions until Convergence. It is equally important to measure the 
number of interactions until convergence as an evaluation tool. As previously 
mentioned, an interaction occurs when the opinion revision model is invoked (i.e., the 
difference in connectivity is less than the interaction threshold). For different cases, 
this research interprets fewer interactions as an increase in confidence or a developing 
resistance to social temperature (i.e., the opinions of other individuals). 
 
4.4 Summary of Simulation Design 
This chapter has set the foundation for the implementation of the opinion formation 
and propagation conceptual framework using an agent-based simulation framework.  
After reviewing the literature on agent-based applications, a system featuring agents 
that behave according to the laws of kinematics (i.e., agents follow molecular 
dynamics) was utilized for this research.  The basic algorithm derived from Haile 
(1992) was presented, along with a description of the simulation program features.   
 
Several classes of scenarios were developed to test different aspects of the 
simulation program and the rules governing agents’ interactions.  The system 
properties class intends to look at how different initial states affect the opinion 
outcomes.  Basic models investigate how rules governing an agent’s behavior (e.g., 
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varying connectivity criterion, different levels of confidence) may affect interactions 
and the opinion revision process.  Finally, the complex models intend to focus on the 
four interaction mechanisms (word of mouth, mass media, belief learning, and direct 
experience) and examine their effects on opinions.  A variety of scenarios were 
developed for each interaction mechanism to highlight some of the simulation 
program capabilities as well as incorporate real-world situations (e.g., media 
segmentation).  Implementing these scenarios in Chapter 5 will offer insight to 
strategies or policies to follow in order to achieve a desired aggregate opinion value. 
 
A brief discussion on the performance measures of the simulation program 
followed the scenario design to offer some evaluation basis for determining the state 
of the system.  It is hypothesized that these measures will play a large role in 
evaluating and interpreting results from the system properties models as those models 
reflect system characteristics.  More complex models (basic and complex scenarios) 
will probably not achieve system stability during the simulation period in that there 
are many mechanisms in place that prevent opinion convergence. 
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Chapter 5:  Simulation Experiments 
An Exploration of the Framework for Opinion Dynamics 
In this chapter, results from the simulation experiments, each corresponding to a 
different factor as discussed in the last chapter, are presented and discussed. First, the 
research investigates the base case and the effect of varying factors of the initial 
opinion values and the density of agents. Next, the basic model is considered, 
discussing the effect of varying factors of threshold specification, memory-effect on 
confidence, interaction requirements, and coexistence of opinion leaders. Finally, the 
last section considers the set of complex models, specifically the effects of word-of-
mouth, mass-media, belief learning, and direct experience mechanisms.  These 
complex models may also offer insight to the effect of different policies or strategies 
in the opinion revision process. 
 
5.1 Base Case Results 
Figures 5-1 through 5-4 display results from simulation experiments varying the 
initial opinion values.  In the experiment where initial opinion values were set to 0 
and 1, with 16% of the population harboring the opinion value 1, the opinion value 
converged to 0.1574, a value that one would expect given the a priori distribution of 
opinion values.  However, when considering the case of initializing opinion values to 
–1 and 1, where 16% of the population harbored a positive opinion, the opinion value 
converged to -0.6852, which is not a reflexive result shown in Figure 5-3 (i.e., the 
opinion value did not converge to -0.84). This suggests that the convergence of 
opinion value depends on whom the positive individual first encountered. If these 
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positive individuals encountered other positive individuals, or perhaps clustered 
together, the final opinion value would have been different. This is an interesting 
result because it suggests that the convergence of the base case is not pre-determined 
by the proportion of the population harboring a certain opinion. 
 
Comparing the two experiments in terms of convergence time, the initial case 
of 0 and 1 values generally converged faster than did the case of –1 and 1 values. 
Specifically, a selected trajectory in the [0,-1] case reached convergence at a time of 
6.438, while the same trajectory in the [-1,-1] case reached convergence at a time of 
8.174. This confirms the hypothesis that the farther the population is divided in 
opinion values, the longer it takes the population to come to a consensus. An 
implication of this result is that to reach consensus in a short period, it is desirable to 
have individuals with diverse opinion values within the opinion range. 
Figure 5-1.  Base Case, Initial Opinion Values [0, 1] 
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Figure 5-2.  Selected Trajectories of Initial Opinion Values [0, 1] 
 
Figure 5-3.  Base Case, Initial Opinion Value [-1, 1] 
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Figure 5-4.  Selected Trajectories of Initial Opinion Value [-1, 1] 
 
Figures 5-5 through 5-8 show the results for the experiments varying the 
density of agents (approximated by the number of agents within the system 
boundary). As expected, for an area with lower density (N = 12), the time until 
convergence is longer than for an area with higher density (N = 144). For the low-
density case, a particular trajectory converges at a time of 13.84, but it is interesting 
to note that at time 6.601, the opinion value of that individual was 0.1159, a 
difference of only 0.0015. This supports previous literature that convergence of an 
individual’s opinion takes a very long time, even under simple conditions. In the 
high-density case, the opinions converged at a time of 4.431. To ensure that there was 
ample time allowed for the agents to reach consensus, the number of collisions were 




Another interesting result from these experiments is the different opinion 
values that the agents converged (reached consensus) upon. Both cases had 16% of 
the population with positive opinions, yet the value converged to in the low-density 
was 0.1174, while in the high-density case the converged value was much higher, at 
0.2376. Such results imply that convergence values also depend on the number of 
individuals in the system. 
Figure 5-5.  Base Case, Density of Agents, N = 12
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Figure 5-6.  Selected Trajectories for Density of Agents, N = 12
Figure 5-7.  Base Case, Density of Agents, N = 144
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Figure 5-8.  Selected Trajectories, Density of Agents, N = 144
5.2 Basic Model Results 
In the basic model, all opinion leaders were initialized with a positive opinion (value 
of 1) that they maintained throughout the simulation. Opinion leaders consisted of 
16% of the population; thus, the distribution of opinions remains the same as in the 
base case. The remaining agents were initialized with an indifferent opinion (value of 
0) and were allowed to update their opinions by averaging the opinions of the two 
agents interacting. 
 
Results from considering different threshold specifications are shown in 
figures 5-9 and 5-10.  Figure 5-9 shows results from the case where the threshold 
remained constant (i.e., it depended only on class-threshold and type-threshold 
parameters, which remain constant throughout the simulation), while Figure 5-10 
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shows results from the case where the confidence parameter is included, making the 
threshold time-dependent. In both cases, the system does not reach convergence in 
1,000 collisions, again supporting the idea that opinion convergence is a long process. 
Results show that under a constant threshold, agents trended towards a higher opinion 
value (0.963 for a particular trajectory) than under a dynamic threshold (0.9096 for 
the same trajectory). Results also show that under constant threshold, agents are 
closer to consensus (measured by the variance in the opinion values) than in the case 
of dynamic threshold. For the dynamic threshold case, the lower values and the 
greater dispersion of opinion values signify that it takes longer for an individual to 
encounter another individual that meets the interaction threshold requirement. 
 
Figure 5-9.  Basic Model, Constant Threshold 
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Figure 5-10.  Basic Model, Dynamic Threshold 
 
One of the components in the confidence equation is a memory-type 
parameter that is to reflect cognitive capacities. In the basic model, this research 
assumes that opinion seekers recall half of the number of interactions due to memory 
capacity or limitations, and assigns a value of 0.5 for the memory-type parameter. 
Connectors, on the other hand, remember all their interactions because they are 
individuals who make a record of these events and constantly refer back to them. 
These connectors were assigned a memory-type of 1, indicating what this research 
terms pure-memory effects. 
 
Consider on the other hand, that individuals have large cognitive capacities 
and do remember the interactions, perhaps because there were not many interactions 
in the first place. Each agent thus is assigned a memory-type value of one. This is 
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represented in the case where there are pure memory effects on individuals’ 
confidence. Figures 5-11 and 5-12 display the simulation results from these 
experiments. Results show that there is a large dispersion of opinion values, and that 
the system does not converge. However, on an individual scale, opinions seem to 
stabilize for many individuals, suggesting that there is individual opinion 
convergence. There are still individuals that continue to seek opinions and revise their 
opinion values. 
 
There may be instances where individuals may recall portions of the 
interaction list, but do so in an exaggerated manner. This may occur when recalling 
distant events (i.e., events that happened long ago), and may be made more 
compelling and convincing than the actual opinions exchanged. Thus, for this case of 
exaggeration, a value of 2 is assigned as the memory-type parameter.  Figures 5-13 
and 5-14 show the simulation results from these experiments. There is a large 
dispersion of opinion values, and the system does not converge, much like the pure 
memory case. Unlike the pure memory case, there is a much more pronounced effect 
on individual convergence of opinions. A good majority of the population reached a 
stabilized opinion value approximately halfway through the simulation.  Figure 5-14 
shows that three out of the four varying trajectories (the fifth is an opinion leader who 
remains constant at 1) have stabilized and perhaps reached an individual convergence. 
The dynamics of this memory effect on confidence, coupled with the threshold 
specification, offers interesting insights on how the model captures reality. More 
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work is needed to find out whether confidence and the interaction threshold are 
correctly specified. 
Figure 5-11.  Basic Model, Pure Memory Effect on Confidence 
 
Figure 5-12.  Selected Trajectories of Pure Memory Effect on Confidence 
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Figure 5-13.  Basic Model, Exaggerated Memory Effect on Confidence 
 
Figure 5-14.  Select Trajectories for Exaggerated Memory Effect on Confidence 
 
Results from considering scenarios where both agents need to meet the 
interaction threshold criteria are shown in Figure 5-15. In all other cases, at least one 
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agent needed to “agree” to interact with the other and subsequently revise his opinion. 
These results can be compared to the results shown in Figure 5-10. Imposing this 
requirement of both agents meeting the criteria is much more restrictive, and has a 
pronounced effect on individual opinion convergence and overall convergence. There 
is greater dispersion of opinion values and no overall convergence on an opinion. 
However, it is interesting to note that several individuals may have reached an 
individual convergence on an opinion value, since the requirement is so restrictive 
that they will not meet another individual who satisfies the interaction criteria along 
with these individuals. Others seem not to be affected in terms of individual 
convergence, as they continue to seek and revise opinions, but perhaps not as 
dramatically as in earlier experiments. 




Also considered in the basic model is the effect of coexisting opinions of 
polarized opinion leaders. Here, half of the opinion leaders have a positive opinion, 
and half the opinion leaders have a negative opinion (case 1) or are indifferent (case 
2) and remain at those opinions throughout the simulation. Figures 5-16 and 5-17 
show results of an experiment considering a negative-positive coexistence of opinion 
leaders, while Figures 5-18 and 5-19 show results of an experiment considering an 
indifferent-positive coexistence of opinion leaders. In both cases, the system fails to 
converge. A number of individuals seem to build confidence, and consequentially 
reduce their inclination to interact with others. In the negative-positive case, the final 
opinion values seem to be evenly distributed about the mean (0). However, in the 
indifferent-positive case, more agents have a final opinion value below the mean of 
0.5. This is an interesting result that may suggest that having opinion leaders with an 
indifferent opinion may dampen the positive opinions more than if the opinion leaders 
were polarized (i.e., negative opinion leaders versus positive opinion leaders). 
Figure 5-16.  Basic Model, Coexistence of Opinion Leaders at [-1, 1] 
141 
 
Figure 5-17.  Selected Trajectories of Coexistence of Opinion Leaders [-1, 1] 
 
Figure 5-18.  Basic Model, Coexistence of Opinion Leaders at [0, 1] 
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Figure 5-19.  Selected Trajectories of Coexistence of Opinion Leaders [0, 1] 
 
5.3 Complex Model Results 
For these models, the research looks at two main elements: opinion values of the 
individual agents as they evolve over time, and the evolution of the number of agents 
considering the alternative.  As mentioned previously, consideration means that an 
individual has adopted the opinion value and does not revise it unless a direct 
experience convinces the individual to think otherwise (i.e., the individual has a 
significant unsatisfactory experience).  These models also shed insight on the effects 
of incorporating mathematical representations of word-of-mouth, mass-media, belief 




5.3.1 Word of Mouth Model Results 
Figure 5-20 through Figure 5-27 depict the simulation results employing the word-of-
mouth mechanisms.  One hypothesis concerning these mechanisms is that when 
compared to a base model (i.e., simple averaging, ignoring social class and social 
type effects), the social and personality trigger mechanisms will account for a “social 
gravitation” effect in which opinion followers are sensitive to influential individuals 
and will adopt more of the leaders’ opinion than a simple averaging function.  This 
research evaluates the gravitation effect by how effectively (i.e., time to convergence, 
value of convergence) the trigger mechanisms incorporate these social interaction 
characteristics. 
 
The baseline case of simple averaging is illustrated in Figure 5-20, while 
Figure 5-21 shows the opinion trajectories for a model implementing the social and 
personality trigger mechanisms, with opinion leaders harboring an opinion value of 1, 
and all other agents have an opinion value of 0.  While neither case reaches 
convergence (a recurring theme throughout these models), agents in the trigger 
mechanism model have a noticeable increase in the rate of increase of the opinion 
value, as it takes less simulation time for the aggregate average to reach an opinion of 
0.5.  Further, the attractiveness of the opinion leaders based on their social class and 
personality seem to draw agents’ opinions increasingly towards a value of 1.  The 
average opinion of agents in the trigger mechanism model is greater than the average 
opinion of the agents in the baseline model. 
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Figure 5-20.  Word of Mouth with Simple Averaging Opinion Revision 
 




Another evaluation of the mechanism performance is its effectiveness in 
convincing individuals to consider the alternative.  As mentioned earlier, an 
individual considers an alternative if his opinion on that alternative exceeds some 
internal threshold.  In the opinion formation and propagation model, considering an 
alternative is equivalent to choosing an alternative in a choice framework, in that 
agents considering the alternative no longer revise their opinion unless a direct 
experience convinces them to do otherwise.  The hypothesis then, for the word-of-
mouth mechanism is that when compared to the baseline, the social and personality 
trigger mechanisms should increase the number of individuals considering the 
alternative, since the weighted attractiveness of the opinion leaders should draw more 
individuals towards an opinion of 1, and thus increasing the likelihood of exceeding 
the individual internal threshold. 
 
Figure 5-22 looks at the consideration set for the simple averaging word-of-
mouth model, while Figure 5-23 looks at the consideration set for the social and 
personality trigger mechanism model.  At its peak, the simple averaging model has 
convinced 33 out of 40 agents to consider the alternative, and at the end of the 
simulation period, 29 agents considered the alternative.  In the trigger mechanism 
model, a maximum of 36 agents considered the alternative, and 34 agents consider 
the alternative at the end of the simulation period.  This suggests that incorporating 
the social and personality trigger mechanisms increases the number of agents 
considering the alternative when compared to the baseline model. 
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Figure 5-22.  Consideration Number for Word of Mouth Simple Averaging 
 





As an opinion of 0 represents indifference, another scenario to test was the 
effect of the mechanisms on a system with initial opinions at -1 and 1 (with opinion 
leaders having the opinion of 1).  Figure 5-24 shows the simulation results from this 
scenario.  The opinion trajectories appear very similar to the trigger mechanism 
model with initial opinions at 0 and 1, but due to the larger spectrum of opinion 
values, take slightly longer for the aggregate opinion value to reach 0.5.  However, it 
achieves a very similar range of opinions as the trigger mechanism 0 and 1 scenario at 
the end of the simulation.  This may suggest that the opinion separation between the 
opinion leaders and opinion followers only affect the convergence rate, and that if the 
simulation period is long enough, the opinions may converge to the same value 
regardless of the initial opinions of the followers. 
Figure 5-24.  Word of Mouth with Trigger Mechanisms Opinion Revision, 




Another scenario of interest is where agents’ opinions are initialized to some 
random value between -1 and 1.  Opinion leaders are also included in this random 
opinion assignment.  The simulation result is shown in Figure 5-25.  It is interesting 
to note the linear trend in the opinion trajectories, and that the dispersion decreases as 
simulation time elapses.   
 
Figure 5-26 and Figure 5-27 display the consideration sets for the opinions at  
-1 and 1 scenario and the random opinion scenario, respectively.  In comparing the 
consideration set of the opinions at -1 and 1 scenario to the consideration set of the 
opinions at 0 and 1 scenario, the results show that it takes longer for the -1 and 1 case 
to convince a majority of agents to consider the alternative.  However, at the end of 
the simulation period, the number of agents considering the alternative is 33, a 
number that is only a few less agents than in the opinions at 0 and 1 scenario. 




Figure 5-26.  Consideration Number for Word of Mouth with Mechanisms, 
Opinions at -1 and 1 
 




For the random opinions scenario, the consideration set evolution shown in 
Figure 5-27 shows a sudden increase, as it is probable that many agents reach their 
internal opinion threshold at the same time.  This sudden shift pattern may replicate 
the social phenomenon termed as the “tipping point” when a small change or a piece 
of new information may cause a large proportion of the population to consider 
something. 
 
5.3.2 Mass Media Model Results 
Figure 5-28 through Figure 5-35 depict simulation results for models incorporating 
mass media mechanisms.  Here, agents are assumed to be captive to a product or 
alternative once the media has met the threshold criteria.  Thus, it is important that the 
media mechanism reaches an agent early in the simulation period to capture the 
attention and eventually get the agent to consider the product.  This specification 
allows for the evaluation of the exposure of agents to media, and the frequency that 
agents pay attention to media. 
 
Figure 5-28 shows the results for a scenario with reminder ads for one 
product.  The opinion trajectories of these agents give insight to the exposure rate of 
the agent to the media, and to how receptive that agent is to the media being 
broadcast.  Individuals who have an exact need for the product advertised have a 
higher rate of increase in opinions.  Notice also that the agents affected by the media 
mechanism (i.e., agents with a positive opinion) were convinced to revise their 
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opinion early on.  Yet, only 6 agents out of 40 consider the alternative, as shown in 
Figure 5-29. 
Figure 5-28.  Mass Media Mechanism, One Alternative, Reminder Ads 
 


























Figure 5-30 and Figure 5-31 show the opinion trajectories resulting from the 
simulation runs for scenarios where there are competing alternatives.  In Figure 5-30, 
there are two competing alternatives using reminder ads to capture a share of the 
agents.  Agents are assumed to have equal need for both alternatives, and so it 
becomes a competition of which media can reach out and draw the attention of the 
agent first.  Results of the competing reminder ads strategy show few agents actually 
paying attention to the media advertisement.  Contrast this result with the results 
obtained in Figure 5-31, where one alternative utilizes a product differentiation or 
segmentation strategy in which the media is diversified to take into account different 
social classes.  Those results show that there is a significant increase in the number of 
agents holding a favorable opinion (i.e., positive opinion) towards the alternative 
using the segmentation strategy, while the number of agents holding an opinion 
towards the alternative using reminder ads remains approximately the same.  This 
may suggest that segmentation strategies may help an alternative to “win over” more 
individuals. 
 
Consideration sets of the scenarios of competing alternatives with reminder 
ads and competing alternatives with one alternative using segmentation strategies are 
shown in Figure 5-32 and Figure 5-33, respectively.  The consideration set is taken 
with respect to the alternative advocating an opinion value of 1.  It is interesting to 
note that there are fewer agents considering the alternative than in the scenario with 
one alternative using reminder ads.  This may be due to the competition for attention 
from the other alternative.  Although it appears from Figure 5-31 that many agents 
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have formed a positive opinion towards the positive opinion alternative, only 7 agents 
actually consider the alternative.  This might suggest that the mass media mechanism 
with segmentation strategies is effective for capturing the attention of individuals, but 
may need help (either through more time, or through another mechanism) to persuade 
agents to consider the alternative. 





Figure 5-31.  Mass Media Mechanism, Competing Alternatives, One Uses 
Segmentation Strategy 
 


























Figure 5-33.  Consideration Number for Mass Media, Competing Products, One 
Uses Product Segmentation 
 
To test the ideal mass media scenario where the segmentation strategies meet 
users’ needs perfectly, the model assumes that the agents’ needs are revealed as 
preferences to the media campaign, and that the media mechanism is capable of 
matching agent classes.  The result of this scenario is shown in Figure 5-34 and 
Figure 5-35.  As one would expect, the effectiveness of this strategy is significant, as 
agents are quickly captured by the alternative they need, and quickly revise their 
opinion.  The consideration set evolution shown in Figure 5-35 shows the number of 
agents considering the positive opinion alternative increases quickly, and then tapers 
off as agents may have reached a point of saturation.  The much higher proportion of 
agents considering the alternative suggests that best-case segmentation is the most 

























Figure 5-34.  Mass Media Mechanism, Competing Products, Best Case 
Segmentation 
 





5.3.3 Belief Learning Model Results 
Figure 5-36 through Figure 5-42 display the simulation results obtained with the 
belief learning mechanism.  As the mechanism entails observing “friends” and their 
opinions, all of these scenarios involve opinion leaders with some initial opinion 
value.  Figure 5-36 shows the results from the scenario where agents construct their 
friends by social class similarity, with opinion leaders at 1.  The opinion trajectories 
suggest that the belief mechanism effect is dynamic and ephemeral, a pattern that is 
supposed to mimic real-world social fads.  It is interesting to note that no agent 
considers the alternative in this scenario, suggesting that the belief mechanism may 
be more effective given a population with a range of opinions.  Figure 5-37 shows 
results from the scenario where opinion leaders have opinions of -1 and 1.  Again, the 
opinion trajectories show that the process is dynamic, but does not leave a lasting 
impression, as no agent considers the alternative. 




Figure 5-37.  Belief Learning Mechanism, Similar Social Class, Opinion Leaders 
at -1 and 1 
 
The previous two scenarios considered constructed social networks based on 
the similarity between agents’ classes.  Figure 5-38 and Figure 5-39 show results for 
scenarios where social networks are created at random, with opinion leaders at 1, and 
opinion leaders at -1 and 1, respectively.  Since agents no longer need to meet a class 
similarity criterion, there are social class differences that play a role in the opinion 
revision.  As shown in Figure 5-38, the opinion trajectories follow a logarithmic 
curve, in that opinions revise quickly at first, then taper to an opinion value of 
approximately 0.65 as the simulation time progressed.  In the case where opinion 
leaders are at -1 and 1, as Figure 5-39 shows, the absolute impact is not as 
pronounced, most likely due to conflicting opinion values of the opinion leaders.  
Figure 5-40 shows the consideration set evolution for belief learning with random 
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friends with opinion leaders at 1.  It seems as though influential individuals play a 
more significant role in the belief learning mechanism with random friends as a 
construct for social networks than they do in the similar friends construct. 
Figure 5-38.  Belief Learning Mechanism, Random Friends, Leaders at 1 
 
Figure 5-39.  Belief Learning Mechanism, Random Friends, Leaders at -1 and 1 
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Figure 5-40.  Consideration Number for Belief Learning, Random Friends, 
Opinion Leaders at 1 
 
As a first step to investigating the effect of attribute distortion on opinion, 
Figure 5-41 and Figure 5-42 explore the scenario where agents have a perception 
factor on what they believe the opinions are of the agents that belong in their social 
network.  This is implemented with a simple uniformly distributed random factor 
ranging between 0.5, which may represent agents who do not totally believe or trust 
the opinions of their network, and 1.5 which intends to replicate agents who 
exaggerate opinions.  Opinion trajectories shown in Figure 5-41 suggest that this 
distortion effect heightens the opinion revision process (i.e., opinion values are 
higher), and disperses the range of opinions for higher values of simulation time.  The 
dispersion at the end is most likely due to agents reaching their internal thresholds.   
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Figure 5-41.  Belief Learning Mechanism, Distorted Perception, Opinion 
Leaders at 1 
 
Figure 5-42.  Consideration Number for Belief Learning, Distorted Perception, 




As shown in Figure 5-42, 37 of 40 agents are considering the alternative, which 
suggests that distortions with a positive net effect may actually help increase the 
number of individuals considering an alternative. 
5.3.4 Direct Experience Model Results 
For the direct experience mechanism, the research intent was to explore the different 
methods of constructing experiences on which agents compare their current 
observation to some expected value.  Figure 5-43 through Figure 5-46 show the 
results of modeling expectation as a historical average, a sample average, and a last 
observation.  In the historical average scenario, depicted in Figure 5-43, the 
dispersion of opinions is greater towards the end of the simulation period.  This may 
be attributed to more observations concatenated to an agent’s history.  Thus, as time 
goes on, a large deviation from the history may have a larger impact. 
Figure 5-43.  Direct Experience Mechanism, Expect Historical Average 
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When considering the sample average scenario, it is important to note that the 
model assumes that the agent is able to obtain the sample average information.  This 
is not unreasonable, as websites and other information sources often publish average 
travel times across users.  If agents should expect this value, the resulting effect is 
approximated by the model results in Figure 5-44.  There is a much larger variance in 
opinion values than in the historical average since the sample average takes into 
account agents who may not have the same opinion patterns as the agent considering 
the direct experience.  Thus, agents who have, for example a shorter travel time 
because they travel a short distance, may skew the information for the decision 
making agent. 




Figure 5-45 illustrates the simulation results from modeling the last 
observation scenario.  It was hypothesized that this would be the scenario with the 
highest impact in terms of opinion revision, but the results show that the impacts are 
relatively mild.  This is inherently a characteristic of the experiences generated by the 
model.  This scenario is relevant to real-world situations in that individuals often do 
not remember their historical observations with high accuracy, and rather consider the 
last observation.  Given that the individual is entrenched in a pattern (e.g., traveling 
the same route every day), a deviation from the last observation may not have much 
of an impact on the opinion of the agent. 
 
Figure 5-46 depicts the consideration set evolution for the scenario of the 
historical average.  Very few agents consider the alternative, even though the variance 
is very high towards the end of the simulation period.  This also supports the notion 
that to encourage consideration of an alternative, that alternative must consistently 
provide good experiences (i.e., low deviations to produce high satisfaction).  
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Figure 5-45.  Direct Experience Mechanism, Expect Last Observation 
 




5.3.5 Interactive Mechanism Model Results 
The interactive mechanism models shown in Figure 5-47 through Figure 5.52 allow 
for a combination of the mechanisms to interact with each other.  These experiments 
also allow the analyst to explore how these mechanisms work together, which 
mechanisms may be most effective at encouraging individuals to consider an 
alternative, and which mechanisms serve as opinion formation mechanisms and 
which serve as opinion propagation mechanisms.  To do this, the opinion of every 
agent is initialized to 0. 
 
Figure 5-47 looks at the scenario where the agents have an equal probability 
of interacting with one of the four mechanisms: word-of-mouth, mass media, belief 
learning, or direct experience.  In this scenario, the opinion trajectories are dispersed 
and follow a variety of updating patterns (e.g., some may be through word of mouth 
processes while others may be through mass media or direct experience).  Figure 5-48 
shows the consideration set evolution over the simulation period.  At the end of the 
simulation, only 4 agents are considering the alternative, which suggests that the 
process of convincing an agent to consider an alternative takes much longer than the 
simulation period specified by these experiments. 
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Figure 5-47.  Interactive Mechanisms, Equal Frequencies 
 





A scenario where 60% of interactions are through direct experience, 20% of 
the interactions are through belief learning, and both mass media and word of mouth 
account for 10% of the interactions each is shown in Figure 5-49 and Figure 5-50.  
Here, direct experience receives a majority of the interactions as a test to determine 
whether it plays a role in the formation phase of the opinion process.  It is surmised 
that since agents do not have an initial opinion, the only mechanisms that can help 
form opinions are the direct experience and mass media mechanisms.  Figure 5-49 
shows the resulting opinion trajectories for this scenario.  It would appear that a 
majority of the agents have revised their opinion, making a strong case that the direct 
experience mechanism is one that forms opinions.  However, judging from the 
consideration set evolution in Figure 5-50 it seems that it is not a very effective 
mechanism for convincing agents to consider the alternative. 
Figure 5-49.  Interactive Mechanisms, 60% Direct Experience, 20% Belief 




Figure 5-50.  Consideration Number for Interactive Mechanisms, 60% DE, 20% 
BL, 10% WoM, 10% MM 
 
To complete the hypothesis that direct experience and mass media are the two 
primary mechanisms for the formation phase in the opinion process, the research 
considered a scenario where word-of-mouth consisted of 50% of the interactions, 
mass media and belief learning each consisted of 20% of the interactions, and direct 
experience comprising the remaining 10% of the interactions.  Results are shown in 
Figure 5-51.  The opinion trajectories suggest that the opinion revisions stem largely 
from mass media, belief learning, or direct experience, and that word of mouth does 
not play a major role in the early phase of the simulation period.  In looking at the 
consideration set evolution in Figure 5-52, it is interesting to note that there are more 
agents considering the alternative than in the previous scenario (2 versus 1).  These 
results might suggest that direct experience and mass media mechanisms affect the 
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formation phase of the opinion process, while word of mouth and belief learning 
serve as mechanisms to propagate the opinion. 
 
Figure 5-51.  Interactive Mechanisms, 50% Word of Mouth, 20% Mass Media, 




Figure 5-52.  Consideration Number for Interactive Mechanisms, 50% WoM, 
20% MM, 20% BL, 10% DE 
 
5.4 Summary of Experimental Results 
This chapter implemented the scenarios designed in Chapter 4 and made operational 
the opinion formation and propagation conceptual framework defined in Chapter 3.  
System properties scenarios revealed insight to how the simulation program 
environment governs the rate of interaction and showed that opinion value 
convergence varies depending on the initial distribution of opinions and the density of 
agents.  Results from the basic model showed the effect of different connectivity 
criteria, confidence and memory, and coexistence of opinions.  In general, imposing a 
more restrictive connectivity criterion resulted in a lowered rate of opinion revision.  
Increasing confidence or exaggerating past interactions tended to disperse opinions as 
some agents had very low connectivity thresholds due to the confidence or 
exaggeration and subsequently refused to exchange opinions in future interactions.  
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Coexisting opinion leaders served to disperse opinions as agents oscillated between 
the opposing views.  
 
Overall results from the complex model results were that accounting for 
opinion leaders introduced a “gravitational pull” effect towards the leaders when 
compared with the baseline of a simple-averaging impedance function.  This impact 
is measured by a combination of the difference in opinion trajectories and more 
distinctly, the difference in the number of agents considering the new service.  
Leaders have a high effectiveness through word of mouth mechanisms when 
harboring an opinion of 1.  The only real-world scenario this case would apply to is 
when leaders have been previously informed through some mechanism, and at the 
start of the simulation, is convinced and an advocate of that opinion.  This suggests 
that it would be to one’s advantage to first build a coalition of opinion leaders and 
convince them of an opinion.  Results from the mass media simulation experiments 
suggest that if media campaigns utilize product differentiation and segmentation 
strategies to diversify their message to reach different social class or classes in 
general, the advertisement may have a greater chance at reaching an individual and a 
greater impact on the opinion revision.  Belief learning results suggests that a variety 
of opinions have a more significant effect than when only a few opinion leaders have 
an opinion of 1, while everyone else is indifferent.  Finally, direct experience results 
suggest that as a general rule to convincing an individual to consider the alternative, 




These results will be utilized in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 as a basis for 
comparing trends in the evolution of opinions and the number of individuals 
considering the new service.  As these are controlled experiments (i.e., all data and 
parameters are user-specified), variations are pronounced and directly interpretable, 
and they offer direct insight to the measurable effects of the mathematical functions 
on the interaction dynamics.  In the application of the opinion formation and 
propagation framework to a real choice problem, the data and the aggregate 
sensitivities come from exogenous sources, which could be a source of error.  Thus, 
these experiments are needed as a reference to ensure that results obtained in the 
application models reflect the simulation results from this chapter. 
174 
 
Chapter 6:  Mode Choice Application 
An Application to Market Adoption of Freight Transport Services 
To apply the opinion formation and propagation model in the context of decision 
making in transportation, this research utilizes a freight mode choice problem 
developed for rail-based intermodal services in a trans-European corridor.  This 
application will offer insight into the interrelationship between information and 
opinion dynamics and choice processes in situations where there is a new policy 
change or a new alternative.  As the opinion formation and propagation framework 
does not make explicit assumptions about the connections between information, 
opinions, and choice, a first step in this development is to extend the opinion 
formation and propagation framework to that of an opinion-choice dynamics 
framework.  This expanded framework will incorporate the entire process of market 
adoption of a new service.  As the mode choice estimation results are an important 
part of the opinion-choice dynamics framework, the next section of this chapter 
discusses the choice problem, estimation methodology, and describes the variable 
statistics.  Finally, the last section is devoted to detailing the assumptions of the 
opinion-choice dynamics models and outlining the scenarios tested. 
 
6.1 Extension of Opinion Formation and Propagation Framework 
As there is no direct connection between how information about a new alternative 
spreads through a population, how opinions form and propagate, and how 
individuals’ choice sets and ultimately, choices are formed, it is necessary to extend 
the opinion formation and propagation framework beyond the discussion in chapter 3 
175 
 
to apply to a transportation choice context.  This expanded framework, the opinion-
choice dynamics framework, intends to bridge the gap between opinions and choice 
in situations where there is a new service introduced to the market.  Several of the 
additional components of this framework are derived from Lerman and Manski 
(1982) in which they describe and model the effect of information diffusion on travel 
behavior. 
 
6.1.1 Initial Conditions 
One of the key assumptions in Lerman and Manski (1982) is that at t = 0, the market 
shares are at steady state.  This means that those alternatives or policies have been 
present long enough for the market shares to equilibrate through a choice process and 
remain stable for some time.  In this state, individuals are assumed to have perfect 
information on the existing alternatives.  From a different standpoint, if an individual 
was sampled from the population, and was given multiple decision making scenarios, 
he would consistently choose the same alternative under repeated sampling.  The 
opinion-choice dynamics framework incorporates this initial condition of steady-state 
market shares as this assumption allows the formulation of models that focus only on 
the new information stemming from the policy change or new alternative.  
Additionally, the steady-state market share assumption implies that the analyst can 
capture individual preferences through observations, and can introduce static 
sensitivities to attributes (i.e., coefficients of travel time, cost) for known alternatives 
to calculate the corresponding utilities.  Since the focus of this research is on the 
choice evolution process, not on the estimation of choice sensitivities, another 
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assumption is that attribute sensitivities (i.e., coefficients) are exogenously estimated 
using a discrete choice model (e.g., in this research, a binary logit model is utilized) 
and are used throughout the simulation as static coefficients. 
 
6.1.2 Policy Change, Introduction of Alternative 
Once the steady-state market shares are obtained for t = 0, a new policy or new 
alternative is introduced at t = 1.  There are some important notes to observe for the 
introduction of new information.  First, it is assumed that individuals have no a priori 
knowledge of this new policy or alternative, thus all individuals’ opinions would be 
initialized to 0.  While it is possible to model a scenario where there is prior 
knowledge of the new policy or alternative (e.g. initial public offers, insider 
information), this would require gathering observed information on opinions towards 
the current chosen alternative, which this research does not have, nor is it in the scope 
of this research.  Rather, it is more interesting to focus on the true effect of opinion 
formation and propagation from a baseline of indifference or lack of knowledge.  
Second, it is assumed that the introduction of the policy or alternative is a once-and-
for-all change, which means that once introduced, the change affects all individuals, 
and the change exists until the demand equilibrates.  This research assumes that all 
individuals in these experiments are affected in some way by the introduction of a 




6.1.3 Consideration Set Implications 
In the opinion formation and propagation framework, each individual is assumed to 
have some internal threshold that when exceeded, results in the individual considering 
the alternative.  To extend this to a choice context, the opinion threshold is equated to 
a consideration set formation mechanism similar to those defined by the literature (for 
example, see Manski, 1977; Basar and Bhat, 2003; Swait and Ben-Akiva, 1987a, 
Swait and Ben-Akiva, 1987b).  Thus, if the opinion threshold is exceeded, the 
alternative is placed in the individual’s consideration set for further contemplation 
and is a potential choice outcome. 
 
6.1.4 Choice Mechanism 
For the opinion-choice dynamics framework, this research utilizes a generalized 
random utility approach in which the alternative with the highest utility is chosen.  
This imposes no distributional assumptions about the error structure (e.g., Gumbel 
distributed for logit, normal for probit).  The choice process is thus determined by the 
specification of the error term, as all other variables are features of the service 
performance and shipment attributes.  Drawing from Lerman and Manski (1982), an 
individual utilizes the last new piece of information when making a choice.  Thus, if 
new information on an alternative was received in the epoch, there is a possible 
change in preference towards that alternative.  To calculate the resulting utility, the 
analyst needs to determine the error term.  Within the random utility framework, it is 
specified that the alternative specific constant is the mean of the error term.  This 
research uses Monte Carlo simulation to draw a number of times from a distribution 
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to calculate the alternative specific constant.  As this occurs only when new 
information on an alternative is transferred to an individual, this flexible specification 
allows for the introduction of serial correlation and panel effects. 
 
As this research seeks to establish some insight into opinion dynamics and 
their effect on choice, it is assumed that opinions are captured in the error term, as the 
error term is the residual effect of individual preferences not explicitly specified in 
the utility equation.  It is also assumed that positive opinions have a positive impact 
on choice, and likewise, negative opinions have a negative impact on choice.  To 
incorporate this into the framework, if an individual has a positive opinion towards 
that alternative, the draw for the error term is positive, and if an individual has a 
negative opinion towards the alternative, the draw is negative.  The direct effect of 
this specification is that positive opinions will generate a positive alternative specific 
constant, increasing the likelihood that the alternative will be chosen, and vice versa 
for the negative opinions. 
 
Once the alternative specific constants are determined, the framework 
evaluates the alternatives if they are in the individual’s consideration set, and then 
chooses the alternative with the highest utility given the observed or experienced 
attribute values.  The new aggregate market shares are determined, and these shares 




6.1.5 Opinion-Choice Dynamics Framework 
Figure 6-1 shows the opinion-choice dynamics framework.  The system is initialized 
with steady-state market shares, and individuals having no a priori knowledge of the 
new service alternative.  At t = 1, the new service is introduced into the market, and 
affects all individuals.  Individuals are allowed to interact with one another via the 
opinion formation and propagation model.  If an individual’s opinion threshold 
towards an alternative is exceeded, that alternative is placed in the consideration set.  
If new information on an alternative is received, a number of draws from a 
distribution given that individual’s opinion towards the alternative will determine the 
new alternative-specific constant.  Evaluating the alternatives in the consideration set, 
a choice is made by choosing the alternative with the highest utility.  The choice 
outcomes are then aggregated over the population, and the new aggregate market 
shares are utilized as input for the next iteration. 
 




















6.2 Mode Choice Problem Description 
As one of the initial assumptions of the opinion-choice dynamics framework is that 
individuals’ sensitivities to level of service parameters are exogenously estimated, 
this section is devoted to describing the mode choice problem used to calibrate 
coefficient estimates for the utility specification.  The research utilizes data from the 
REORIENT – Implementation of Change in the European Railway Area project 
performed for the European Commission (REORIENT Consortium, 2007).  As one of 
the main goals of this related study was to investigate the potential customer base new 
rail-based intermodal services could attract, a disaggregate discrete choice model was 
developed to determine shippers’ sensitivities to rail quality indicators (e.g., level of 
service indicators).  This problem offered an interesting opportunity to implement the 
opinion-choice dynamics framework as it is interested in demand dynamics following 
the introduction of a new service.  A more thorough description of the problem 
follows in the subsequent subsections, along with the model estimation methodology, 
and qualitative discussion on the descriptive statistics of the dataset. 
 
6.2.1 Problem Description 
REORIENT is a Coordination Action funded by the European Commission within the 
Sixth Framework Programme that addresses Strategic Objective 3.3.1 “Research to 
Support the European Transport Policy, Research Domain 3.1, Implementation of 
Change in the European Railway Area".  The REORIENT project is examining the 
effects of the EU’s legislation on rail interoperability, which is transforming the 
European rail freight industry from closed, monopolistic, nationally-oriented 
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businesses insulated from market realities into market players where newcomers both 
from the rail and logistics industry can find new opportunities, and from non-
interoperable nationally-fragmented railway subsystems into an internationally 
integrated pan-European system (REORIENT Consortium, 2007).  
 
From a research perspective, these massive changes pose a host of challenges 
in monitoring and understanding how common legislation is transposed under diverse 
national political and economic conditions, industry changes, and social support and 
opposition to the changes.  From a global perspective, these changes are taking place 
in the midst of a serious transformation of the transport industry as a whole, and 
where old solutions rapidly are becoming obsolete (REORIENT Consortium, 2007). 
 
The project focuses on a trans-European transport corridor through eleven 
countries (called the REORIENT Corridor) stretching from Scandinavia in the north 
to Greece in the south, and works toward three main objectives (REORIENT 
Consortium, 2007): 
 
1. Assessing and monitoring the progress toward the development of an 
integrated freight railway system in the countries located along the 
REORIENT Corridor, explaining the variation in the status of interoperability 
across these countries, assessing the degree of political and social support for 
improving interoperability in these countries, identifying barriers to seamless 
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rail freight transport through these countries, and recommending ways to 
overcome the barriers. 
2. Identifying and assessing the market potential for new international rail freight 
transport services through these countries. 
3. Evaluating the relevant internal and external effects that will result from 
implementing the new services, including the effects on rail companies and 
shippers, and the effects that bear on the whole society and the environment. 
 
The mode choice work satisfies the second and third objectives of the 
REORIENT project, mainly to understand shippers’ quality factors to assist in the 
identification of market potential for new international rail-based intermodal freight 
services, and to comprehend the subsequent market shift in demand following the 
introduction of the new services.  Estimating shippers’ sensitivities to the quality 
indicators offers insight to European policymakers of different policies to construct 
that will attract freight shipments to rail-based transport solution away from truck-
based transport solution. 
 
Thus, the focus of developing a mode choice model for policy scenario 
development involved land-based alternatives, a truck-only mode and a rail-based 
intermodal mode.  While there was information on sea-based or other modes of 
transport, the simulation platform used to evaluate the policy scenarios focused on 
land-based strategies to shift freight demand from truck-based solutions to rail-based.  
It was assumed that among land-based alternatives, the discrete alternatives had error 
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terms that were independently, identically distributed (IID).  Consequently, a binary 
logit mode choice model was specified and estimated.   
 
The REORIENT project considered developing a mode choice model for only 
one type of commodity which is characteristic for the market for intermodal transport 
solutions.  General cargo is the dominant ETIS manifestation type of the shipper 
survey typical shipments which are representative for this market.  However, because 
general cargo is a diverse commodity type, because there are small shares of other 
commodity groups within the segment and because of consistency with the network 
models we decided to estimate a mode choice model that takes into account the type 
of commodity by NST/R 11 classification. 
 
6.2.2 Estimation Methodology 
The shippers’ mode choice problem is formulated as a discrete choice model, where a 
shipper n, chooses amongst discrete service alternatives i, to transport his shipment.  
The discrete choice framework assumes that the decision maker (e.g., the shipper) is 
choosing an alternative (e.g., a mode of transport) that maximizes his utility.  By 
assuming the attributes are commensurate, the attractiveness of an alternative 
expressed by a vector of attributes values is reducible to a scalar.  From this, one can 
define a single objective function describing the attraction of an alternative in terms 
of its attributes.  The objective function is founded on the notion of trade-offs, or 
compensatory offsets, that a decision maker uses to compare different attributes, a 
characteristic of utility that distinguishes it from the other decision rules.   
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Choice models utilize a random utility maximization approach, in which 
observed behavioral inconsistencies in choice are taken to be a result of observational 
deficiencies on part of the analyst.  In the random utility framework, individuals are 
assumed to choose the alternative with the highest utility.  However, these utilities are 
latent (i.e., they are not known to the analyst with certainty) and are treated as random 
variables.  In general, random utility is expressed as an additive function of an 
observable or systematic component and an unobservable component as shown in 
equation 6.5.  Following this specification, the choice probability is rewritten as 
equation 6.6. 
 ( ) ( ) ininninninin VSzSzVU εε +=+= ,, (6.5)  
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Equation 6.6 has two implications.  First, the derivation of specific random 
utility models stem from the assumption of a joint probability distribution for the 
error term.  Second, if the assumption of the error term distribution is IID, the choice 
probability of alternative i is only a function of the differences in the systematic 
component of the utilities.  As mentioned previously, a key assumption is that land-
based alternatives (i.e., truck-only and rail-based modes) have errors that are IID.  To 
derive the logit model, assume that the error term of the utility function is IID 
extreme value, also known as the Gumbel distribution or the Type I extreme value 
distribution.  Following the random utility approach argument that individuals are 
assumed to maximize utility, the objective function to maximize an individual’s 
















where µ is a scale parameter that for the logit model, is set to 1.  The 
probability of an individual n choosing alternative i then becomes the formula written 
in equation 6.8.  In evaluating equation 6.8, one needs to take the cumulative 
distribution of all alternatives not equal to i. Given the IID assumption, this J-
dimensional integral (J being the number of alternatives) reduces to the closed-
formed expression shown in equation 6.9. 
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eiP 1,10, (6.9) 




'VVVV ++= (6.10) 
where Vn is the portion of the utility associated with characteristics of the 
shipment, Vni is the portion of the utility associated with alternative i, V’ni is the 
portion of the utility which results from the interaction between alternative i and 
shipment n. As mentioned earlier, by assuming the errors are IID only the differences 
in the systematic component of the utility are relevant in the logit model.  To specify 
the systematic component, it is common to use a functional relationship that is linear 
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where k represent the dimension of transport quality, i denote the transport 
solution, l characterises the shipments (i.e., size variables). The interaction term g
scales selected variables for transport quality k,nix with factors characterizing the 
commodity (e.g., the unit value of the commodity).  This alleviates the drawback that 
the same parameter estimates are used for several commodity groups.  Still, common 
parameters estimates are more representative for the commodities that are well 
represented in the data set.  Weighing of data is an option to correct for this, but 
reduces the representativeness of the model for those commodity groups that are most 
important within the market for intermodal transport solutions.  
 
Due to scarcity of data for some of the commodity groups, the model structure 
was formulated such that parameter estimates for some dimensions of transport 
quality were common for several modes and commodities.  It was also decided to 
merge variables characterizing the shipment, variables for quality factors and 
interaction terms between shipment characteristics and transport quality into a single 
nest for the REORIENT network platform that considers a choice between two 
alternatives – truck-based and rail-based or intermodal. 
 
Ideally the freight mode choice model for the REORIENT network model 
should take into account the causal decision process behind freight mode choices, 
where a mode is not an option if certain transport quality requirements are not 
satisfied.  There may be instances where, if the quality requirements are not satisfied, 
then the mode is not chosen regardless of the price.  As an example, for fresh 
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perishable food, a minimum commercial speed and a minimum temperature are 
required.  It is possible to take this into account by simply using an infinitely low 
utility for routes of transport solutions that doesn’t satisfy the minimum requirements 
on the specific lanes.  On the other hand, as long as the model uses aggregate 
commodity groups that consists of commodities with different minimum 
requirements, the result is either a biased model (if the minimum is set to the least 
demanding commodity within the group) or a model where the mode is unavailable to 
a part of the commodities despite the minimum requirement is satisfied (e.g., if the 
average minimum requirement for the commodity group is chosen).  Consequently, 
for the REORIENT work it was decided not to make explicit representation of 
minimum requirements.  It was assumed that each decision maker is fully informed 
about the alternatives (i.e., informed about the attribute values and the alternatives) 
and is a rational decision maker (i.e., preferences are transitive). 
 
6.2.2.1 Method for Imputing Missing Values 
To implement a mode choice model within the REORIENT network model it was 
important to retain the logit structure, which makes it possible to predict mode shifts 
with respect to possible changes in the level of quality factors for several modes 
simultaneously at a disaggregate level.  In order to estimate a disaggregate mode 
choice model based on the logit structure, it was necessary to establish data for cases 
of observed mode choice and data for corresponding variables for antecedent and 
independent variables in the utility function for all available transport solutions with 




From a total of 425 typical shipments in the shipper survey, a data set was 
prepared in which 27 typical shipments from Lithuania, 3 truck-only shipments to 
distant destinations across Ural Mountains in Russia, and 1 airborne transport 
observation were excluded.  The transport solution used for the typical shipments 
were classified as truck-only, rail-based or other, where truck-only transport 
comprised shipments defined as single modal truck-shipments, rail-based transport 
was used for those shipments where rail transport was part of the transport chain and 
other transport for the remaining observations (i.e., shipments with no rail, but 
designed as ship as part of the transport chain).   
 
The shipper survey data contains observations of mode choice and antecedent 
variables that describe the shipment, but only data for elements of the observed 
transport quality of the chosen transport solution.  In some cases there are also 
missing data for elements of quality for the chosen transport solution.  For the 
estimation of the logit model, however, data for the variables representing quality 
factors in the utility functions is needed for both the chosen and the un-chosen modes.  
To complete the shipper survey data, an instrument was developed to replace the 
missing data for quality factors for the un-chosen mode. Only quantitative service 
quality factors were considered, as there were no variables in the network model 
corresponding to shipper survey data for qualitative factors.  The instrument was 
developed in terms of one prediction models for each type of transport quality 
dimension k and mode i:




~ are data from the shipper survey for the levels of transport quality 
of typical shipment n with chosen mode i and ki,γ is a vector of parameters for 
corresponding predictor variables.  Candidates of predictor variables may represent 
characteristics of the shipments n. Distance is a characteristic that is correlated with 
several quality factors of the shipment lanes.  GIS tools established in the 
REORIENT project were used to determine distances by road between Nuts zones of 
origin and destination of all shipments n. Also included were variables for the shares 
of truck-only, rail-based and other transport solutions of the flows between origins 
and destinations of the shipment lanes ( )T(P , )R(P and )O(P ).  Data for these 
variables were obtained from the ETIS Base.  The typical shipments were classified 
by NST/R 11 commodity groups.  Functional forms of the instruments that 
represented the extracted ETIS probabilities and distance by road between 
geographical zones were formulated as independent variables.  One function per 
quality dimension and mode were required, and to ensure that there were non-
negative values throughout the imputed data set, the log was taken of all values in the 
following functional forms of instruments for truck-only, rail-based and other 
transport solutions: 
 
( ) ( )
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where T denotes truck-only, R denotes rail-based and O denotes other 
transport solutions.  It was assumed that regression of these instruments follows 
general ordinary least squares principles, mainly: (1) the specification is linear and 
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the functional form is correct; (2) the error term has a mean of zero; (3) errors for 
different observations have the same variance; (4) the errors for different observations 
are not correlated; and (5) the probability parameters/ variables remain fixed in 
repeated sampling. In the literature the instrument variables 
),distP,P,,Pβ̂(fx̂ ORTjk,n j kj,= are commonly referred to as 2SLS estimates which are 
statistically consistent. The instrument was estimated for the following dimensions of 
transport quality:  
 1) Travel Time (hr) (TT) 
 2) Cost (€) (TC) 
 3) Booking Time (hr) (BK) 
 4) Probability of Delay (% of shipments) (DL) 
 5) Probability of Damage (% of shipments) (DM) 
 6) Number of Tracking and Tracing Facilities (FC) 
 7) Transport price per Ton (€ /ton) (CPT) 
 8) Harbor Time (hr) (HT) 
 9) Border Time (hr) (BT) 
10) Storage Time (hr) (ST) 
11) Terminal Time (hr) (TM) 
 
There were 117 observations with either an ETIS probability of 1.0 in one 
mode (probability of 0 for the other two modes) or ETIS probabilities of 0.5 and 0.5 
in two modes (and 0 in the third).  These observations were not included in the 
instrument regression, but when re-introducing those observations for the imputation, 
the imputed values were frequently negative and inconsistent with chosen alternative 
attributes, most likely due to the multicollinearity of the alternatives.  For cases with 
ETIS probabilities of 1.0, we removed them from the data set, as this implies that the 
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shipper would always choose the current alternative.  For cases where including two 
probabilities lead to multicollinearity (i.e., the sum of the two probabilities is 1.0), the 
regression includes only one probability. 
 
6.2.3 Survey Data Description 
Following the removal of cases where the ETIS probabilities were 1.0 for the chosen 
mode, there were 318 cases remaining.  Table 6-1 displays summary statistics for the 
level-of-service variables of interest, and Table 6-2 shows statistics for transformed 
level-of-service variables that were used in the model. 
Table 6-1.  Descriptive Statistics for Level of Service Variables 
It is important to note that Table 6-2 and Table 6-3 present summary statistics 
for both real survey responses and imputed values.  Table 6-4 presents summary 
statistics on indicator variables, and Table 6.5 contains statistics on the shipment-
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specific variables.  Both indicator and shipment-characteristic variables were real 
survey values. 
Table 6-2.  Descriptive Statistics for Transformed Level-of-service Variables 
Table 6-3.  Descriptive Statistics for Indicator Variables 
Table 6-4.  Descriptive Statistics for Shipment Characteristics 
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Considering the statistics presented in Table 6-3, 63.52% of the shippers 
chose to ship using a truck-based transport service, 24.53% chose to ship using a rail-
based service, and 11.95% chose to ship using either a ship-based or an air-based 
service.  Approximately half of the shippers (48.28%) utilize truck for shipments 
travelling greater than 2,000 kilometers.  Conforming to expectation, a large majority 
of shippers (78.79%) ship using a truck-based service for high valued goods 
(shipments having a value per ton of greater than €20,000.  No hazardous shipments 
utilize an others-based service; this supports the hypothesis that truck and rail 
alternatives are correlated (by certain “land” characteristics) and are perceived 
differently than the others alternatives. 
 
Examining the summary shown in Table 6-1 for the level-of-service variables, 
travel time is lowest for the truck mode and highest for the others mode.  Likewise, 
the corresponding speed is highest for truck and lowest for others.  Total door-to-door 
transport price is much lower for truck than is the price for rail-based transport 
services and others-based services; it is interesting to note that the average price of 
rail-based services is similar to the prices of others-based services.  Price differentials 
are also reflected in the parameter price per ton / value per ton, since the weight and 
value are attributes of the shipment and are the same across all alternatives.  Statistics 
for the booking time, border time, and terminal time have similar values for truck and 
rail, but significantly different values for the others alternative, supporting the 
argument that there is a perceived difference between shipping by land and by sea. 
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Of particular interest are the values in Table 6-2 for low travel time (below 70 
hours) interacted with the value per ton and high travel time (70 hours or greater) 
interacted with value per ton.  Since the shipper may be faced with a choice set 
consisting of both low and high travel times, one cannot directly infer that the value 
per ton is the same across all alternatives and that the effect is due purely to variations 
in travel time.  Instead, the variable values are evaluated across the time threshold 
(i.e., compare the low travel time with the high travel time for one mode).  Summary 
statistics are evaluated for value per ton within low and high travel time categories.  
For the truck alternative, it is interesting to note the high value per ton for the high 
travel times.  It may be that these high-value shipments need to travel long distances 
and that shippers choose truck as it may be the quickest or best quality service.  
Despite the high value per ton, the average high travel time by value per ton is similar 
to the low travel time category, which means that most of these observations have 
travel times just above 70 hours. 
 
It is also interesting to note that for rail, the low travel time by value per ton is 
much greater than the high travel time by value per ton (339,503 hr-€/ton vs. 119,430 
hr-€/ton, respectively).  When looking at the value per ton of the shipments 
segmented by low and high travel time, the average value per ton for travel times less 
than 70 hours is greater than the value per ton for truck.  The rail shipments in the 
high travel time category are of low value.  For the others alternative, the low travel 
time by value per ton is similar to truck, but high travel time by value per ton is much 
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greater.  However, from the value per ton for low travel times for others, it is apparent 
that very high value goods take other modes (e.g., air-based) that have shorter travel 
time. 
 
6.2.4 Utility Specification 
The utility specification for the binary logit model is shown in Table 6.5 and only 
considers differences between truck-based and rail-based alternatives (i.e., the others-
based alternative is dropped).  This model was specified in conjunction with the 
REORIENT network platform development (i.e., the specification utilized attributes 
that could be modeled in the network).  The main considerations for mode choice in 
the network platform are travel times, price per ton, and value per ton.  Since travel 
times were found to be non-linear, it was chosen to specify a piecewise linear travel 
time by value per ton parameter that would have a parameter for observations below a 
time threshold and another parameter for observations above that threshold.  By 
inspection of the travel times in accumulating order, it was determined that a 
threshold of 70 hours was appropriate. 
Table 6-5.  Utility Specification for Binary Freight Mode Choice 
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6.3 Description of Model Scenarios 
In implementing the opinion-choice dynamics framework, these experiments intends 
to address the original research objectives of investigating information propagation 
dynamics, opinion formation and propagation, and interactive opinion-choice 
dynamics with the inclusion of attribute distortion effects.  To satisfy each of these 
objectives, this research develops three models: 1) an Information Propagation model; 
2) an Opinion Formation-Choice model; and 3) an Interactive Opinion-Choice model.  
Each model builds upon the preceding model, growing in complexity and 
incorporating more of the opinion-choice dynamics framework components.  In this 
section, each model is described in detail, with the objective each model intends to 
accomplish, an outline of the model assumptions, and the description of the scenarios 
to be tested.  This research implements the information propagation model and the 
opinion formation-choice model; the interactive opinion-choice model is described, 
but the complex formulation and data requirements are beyond the scope of this 
research and may be considered a future research development. 
 
6.3.1 Information Propagation Model 
The first component of the objective of this research is to investigate how opinion 
formation and propagation affects individuals’ consideration sets.  Thus, the 
information propagation model looks at how information passes through a population 
and how agents utilize this information in constructing consideration sets.  For this 
model, the analyst does not make any assumptions about inter-period choice.  This 
model focuses on investigating how agents become aware of the introduction of a 
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new alternative and whether they place the new alternative into their consideration 
set. 
 
In keeping with the initial condition assumptions prescribed by the opinion-
choice dynamics framework, it is assumed that agents’ choice sets are stable and 
well-defined prior to the introduction of REORIENT services (i.e., the agents have 
perfect information on the truck-only and rail-based alternatives).  Agents are also 
assumed to have no a priori information about the new REORIENT services and thus 
know nothing of the proposed level of service, history of the service or any other 
performance or evaluation criteria.  As such, the agents have an initial opinion of 0.  
Additionally, as this model is interested in how agents receive new information and 
consider a new alternative, it does not track the opinions towards other alternatives as 
it assumes that those opinions are well-formed given that they are in the consideration 
set.  As there is presently no information on the company name, size, and industry 
presence, this model formulation makes no assumptions on opinion leaders and 
instead randomly assign the leader designation to 16% of the observations.  To 
determine shipper agents’ social class, the model utilizes survey information on the 
frequency of shipments as a proxy of company size.  It is reasonable to believe that 
larger companies or companies with more resources ship more often.  Finally, it is 
assumed that the new REORIENT service is introduced to the system at t = 1. 
 
Following the introduction of the REORIENT service, it is assumed that all 
agents are affected by this system change, and will interact with other agents with the 
198 
 
instinctive intent to restore demand equilibrium.  That is, agents are assumed to be 
open to hearing or exchanging information about the new service.  As the opinions 
are initialized to 0, it is presumed that the initial phase of opinion formation will 
occur through mass media and direct experience.  For mass media, it is assumed that 
the mechanism positively affects agents’ opinions as there are no competing ads for 
the other alternatives.  As there are no new experiences in this experiment, an agent’s 
satisfaction is assumed to be based on the last observation experienced and the mean 
experience of the users interacted with.  This implies that agents, in addition, to 
communicating their opinions, are also exchanging information.  Thus satisfaction is 
derived by the travel time and price attributes in the utility function.  An agent’s 
expected value (for the direct experience mechanism) is drawn from word of mouth 
interactions and belief learning, where both opinion and information are now 
exchanged by word-of-mouth, and belief learning entails the perceived opinion and 
perceived level of service experiences.  This experiment also implements a switching 
mechanism for low levels of satisfaction.  In the opinion formation and propagation 
model, if satisfaction is low, an agent would negatively revise his opinion.  This 
makes no implication on choosing a different alternative.  Thus, for this model, if 
satisfaction is low (judging from current experience and the experiences of others), a 
simple threshold is implemented to characterize a switching behavior, in addition to 





Three scenarios are constructed within the information propagation model.  
The first is a baseline scenario, with no mass media and word-of-mouth mechanisms 
involved, and only belief learning as a proxy for the direct experience mechanism 
(since there are no new experiences).  The second is the implementation of word-of-
mouth, belief learning, and direct experience mechanisms to evaluate the effect of 
peer-to-peer interactions relative to the base line.  Finally, the third scenario is the 
implementation of all four mechanisms with equal frequencies (i.e., at each epoch, 
there is equal likelihood of interacting with one of the four mechanisms) to determine 
the mass media effects relative to the second scenario. 
 
6.3.2 Opinion Formation-Choice Model 
The next two components of the research objective are to explore the effect of 
opinions on attribute perception and distortion, as well to explore the effect opinions 
have on the market adoption of a new service.  Building upon the development of the 
information propagation model, for this model, inter-period choices are permitted 
using a generalized random utility choice framework described in the opinion-choice 
dynamics framework.  Incorporating the choice mechanism allows for the evaluation 
of the effects opinion dynamics, as governed by the opinion formation and 
propagation model, affect choice outcomes.  This model also considers a simple 
implementation that correlates opinions with attribute information distortion. 
 
As this is an extension of the information propagation model, all assumptions 
from that model apply for the opinion formation-choice model.  Coefficients from the 
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mode choice model estimation are utilized to construct utility functions for each 
alternative and for each agent.  Since REORIENT services are rail services, it is 
assumed that the parameter coefficients from the rail-based intermodal utility 
equation is applicable to the new service.  The model assumes that agents have ten 
experiences over the course of the simulation, and that all agents are forced to choose 
an alternative at the same time.  In generating experiences for agents to choose an 
alternative, truck and rail alternative attributes are generated from the descriptive 
statistics of those observations (mean and variance) using a normal distribution.  For 
the new REORIENT service, the alternative attributes utilize the proposed level of 
service criteria outlined in the network platform simulation scenarios.  Shipment 
specific characteristics (e.g., shipment tonnage, value of shipment) are generated from 
the descriptive statistics using a normal distribution. 
 
An important distinction (and limitation) of this model is that it is concerned 
only about the effects of opinion dynamics on choice of the new alternative.  The 
implication of this statement is that the problem scope is simplified to the generation 
of the error term for the new REORIENT service only, as the opinion effect is 
postulated to be contained in the error term.  Thus, for this model, the alternative 
specific constant for the truck-only and rail-based alternatives remain constant 
throughout the simulation.  To generate an alternative specific constant for the 
REORIENT service, at each choice, agents will instinctively look to see whether they 
have received new information on the REORIENT service through an interaction 
with a mechanism.  If the agent has received new information during the inter-choice 
201 
 
period and the REORIENT service is in the agent’s consideration set, the model 
draws from a normal distribution a user-specified number of times (for these 
experiments, the number is 100) to construct the error term for the alternative.  By 
taking the mean of the draws, the result is the alternative specific constant.  It is 
important to emphasize that the distributional assumption for the error term draws is 
not restricted to one distribution as it is not necessary to preserve the IIA assumption 
as one does for the logit model. 
 
To incorporate the opinion impacts, the model assumes that if the agent has a 
positive opinion towards the new service, the mean of the error distribution will be 
positive; likewise, if the agent has a negative opinion towards the new service, the 
mean of the error distribution is negative.  Here, the model sets the mean of the error 
distribution directly to the opinion of the agent.  Once the alternative specific constant 
is determined from the draws, the model calculates the utilities of each alternative and 
a choice is made on the utility with the highest alternative.  In specifying this, one 
does not need to impose the logit expression for discrete choice, and one can 
introduce serial correlation and panel effects to account for the interaction dynamics 
commonly observed in real populations.  To account for the effect opinions may have 
on attribute distortion, the model imposes an assumption that if an agent’s opinion is 
highly positive or highly negative (10% greater than the agent threshold for 
consideration), the attribute values will be distorted by some factor (20% 




For this model, three scenarios are constructed.  The first investigates opinion 
dynamic effects on choices by incorporating the choice mechanism, but allowing 
agents to interact with the direct experience mechanism only.  This scenario reflects 
many real-world situations in which agents in a competitive business environment 
may not be willing to share information.  The second scenario implements the choice 
mechanism with all four mechanisms equally likely to occur in any interaction.  A 
second consideration is to proportion the distribution of interactions to reflect a 25% 
chance of interacting through word-of-mouth, a 10% chance of interacting with mass 
media, a 25% chance of encountering belief learning, and a 40% chance of interacting 
with direct experiences.  Finally, the third scenario models the effects of correlating 
opinions with attribute values in the attempt to explore how extreme opinions may 
distort attribute perceptions. 
 
6.3.3 Interactive Opinion-Choice Model 
As mentioned in the development of the opinion formation-choice model, the main 
limitation is that opinion dynamics evolve only for the new alternative, restricting the 
model to use estimated results for the alternative specific constants of the existing 
alternatives.  The interactive opinion-choice model builds upon the previous two 
models and relaxes this assumption by allowing opinions towards all alternatives to 
evolve throughout the simulation.  Although very flexible in terms of specification, 
this model is conceptually very complex and difficult to implement; hence, only a 
discussion on the theoretical implementation is given here.  Making this model 
operational is a future research avenue. 
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As in the previous model, all assumptions from the information propagation 
model hold for the interactive opinion-choice model.  Likewise, all assumptions of 
the opinion formation-choice model except the assumption that the alternative 
specific constants of the existing alternatives remain constant are maintained in this 
model.  By allowing for the flexible specification of opinions for each alternative, and 
thus inherently allowing for a flexible specification of the error term, there must be 
some a priori knowledge of the opinion values of the existing alternatives.  One could 
make a general assumption that the existing alternatives garner enough of a favorable 
opinion to be considered in the choice set, and that the alternative chosen has a higher 
opinion. 
 
Allowing opinions to vary for each alternative introduces additional 
dimensions to the social and learning mechanisms employed in the opinion formation 
and propagation model.  The flexibility of specifying opinions transfers to the 
specification of the mechanisms.  For example, one scenario could be to have mass 
media of the existing rail-based services compete with the mass media of the new 
REORIENT service, while another scenario could compare a non-competing mass 
media strategy where each has a separate, positive-only campaign. 
 
Agent interactions via word of mouth become very complex when introducing 
the exchange of opinions of more than one alternative.  There are several possible 
scenarios for capturing these interactions.  One way is that each agent advocates his 
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chosen alternative, and the interacting agent adjusts the opinion for that alternative 
accordingly.  Another way is to allow the agents to exchange opinions on all three 
alternatives.  The latter method is easier to implement, and does not require 
commensurate adjustments to the opinions of the other alternatives as does the first 
method.  When faced with a choice, the agent examines whether he has received new 
information on all alternatives in the consideration set.  For alternatives which the 
agent has received new information through interaction, the model draws from a 
uniform distribution and the mean of those draws is taken to determine the alternative 
specific constant.  Once all alternative specific constants are determined, the utility 
equations are evaluated using the latest observed experience (i.e., last observed travel 
time, price, shipment characteristics), and the alternative with the highest utility is 
then chosen. 
 
6.4 Summary of Framework Extension and Scenarios 
To apply the context of opinion formation and propagation to a choice framework, 
this chapter expanded the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3 by 
incorporating additional components.  This chapter attempts to build the connection 
between opinion dynamics and choice applications found in transportation studies.  
The first section discusses the implications of the additional components and presents 
a generalized opinion-choice dynamics framework that postulates the opinion 
formation and propagation model as a screening mechanism for the choice set.  As 
one of the main assumptions of the generalized framework is that initial market 
shares and choice sensitivities are estimated exogenously, the second section 
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discussed the mode choice problem and described the dataset used in this application.  
Special attention was given to transforming the original data, which contained only 
observed choices, into a dataset containing information on the non-chosen 
alternatives.  This transformation was necessary to be able to use the utility 
maximizing decision rule commonly found in transportation choice problems. 
 
The final section discussed varying levels of complexity for implementing the 
generalized opinion-choice dynamics framework.  These levels are parallel to the 
different classes of model defined in Chapter 4 as a basis for comparison.  The 
information-propagation model scenarios intend to examine how information flows 
through the system as governed by the mechanisms and interactions.  Incorporating 
repeated choices, the opinion formation-choice model intends to examine whether the 
mechanisms exhibit the same patterns as do the experimental complex models in 
Chapter 5.  Finally, the interactive opinion-choice model intends to capture the 
correlated effects between opinions and choice.  Chapter 7 will implement the 
scenarios for the information-propagation and opinion formation-choice models only, 
as the level of complexity of the interactive opinion-choice model is beyond the scope 
of this research. 
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Chapter 7:  Estimation and Simulation Results 
Discrete Choice Model Results and Simulation Output 
In this chapter, results from the mode choice model estimation as well as the results 
from simulating the complex opinion-choice models outlined in the previous chapter 
are presented and discussed.  Mode choice estimation results are presented first, as 
the parameter estimates are used in implementing the opinion-choice dynamics 
framework.  Next, the simulation results of the two models, the information 
propagation model and the opinion formation-choice model, are presented and 
discussed.  Finally, a synopsis of the findings and comments on their implications 
complete this chapter. 
 
7.1 Mode Choice Estimation Results 
With missing levels of transport quality as replaced by imputed values ( inkx~ ), we 
used the Newton-Raphson algorithm for maximum likelihood in LIMDEP 
econometric software to simultaneously estimate the linear-in-parameters utility 
function for each mode.  Some trial and error was required to find suitable level of 
aggregation to obtain significant estimates and to include variation in types of 
shipments (e.g., commodities) and transport quality.  Table 7-1 shows the parameter 
estimates for the binary logit model obtained at the maximum of the log-likelihood 
function of the utility. 
 
For the binary logit model considering only truck and rail alternatives, the 
model rejects 38 cases where the shippers chose the others alternative, resulting in 
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280 remaining observations.  The resulting model produced a log-likelihood for 
constants only of -165.648 and a log-likelihood at convergence of   -136.683.  ρ2, an 
indicator of how well the model fits, higher being better, was 0.2803.  The 
alternative-specific constant for rail is negative, which implies that holding all other 
attributes constant (e.g., travel time, price), shippers prefer truck-based alternative 
over rail-based alternatives. 
 
Table 7-1.  Estimation Results for the Binary Logit Model of Mode Choice 
From the parameter estimates shown, an increase in travel time up to 70 hours 
decreases the likelihood of shipping by a mode.  The interaction with the value per 
ton attribute implies that the higher the value per ton of the shipment, the more 
sensitive the shipper is to travel time.  It is noteworthy that below 70 hours of travel 
time, rail is more negatively affected by an increase in travel time than truck.  Rail’s 
increased sensitivity to increases in travel time may be attributed to high-value 
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shipments that have a high priority, but are taking longer on average than truck.  
Above 70 hours, truck and rail alternatives are equally, negatively affected by 
increases in travel time; however, it is not significant at the 80% level.  The 
magnitude of the parameter is more than 10 times smaller than the low travel time 
estimate for truck, and over 20 times smaller than the low travel time estimate for rail.  
It is reasonable to believe that, due to the combination of a significantly smaller 
parameter estimate and that it is not significant, shippers perceive long periods 
indifferently since it will take a long time no matter what service they choose. 
 
As expected, price over value is negative and a generic coefficient (i.e., it is 
the same for both truck and rail alternatives), meaning the higher the price, the less 
likely the shipper will choose to ship by a mode.  Since shippers pay upfront out-of-
pocket costs for transport services regardless of mode, it is reasonable to assume that 
an increase in unit price will be perceived equally onerous across alternatives.  We 
divide price per ton by value per ton (thus cancelling the tons) to again account for 
commodity effects.  This formulation implies that as the value of the shipment 
increases, the shipper will be less sensitive to the price of shipping the good.  It is 
synonymous with cost divided by income formulations seen in the literature regarding 
urban mode choice models.   
 
Finally, an indicator for hazardous shipments in the utility for rail has a 
positive coefficient, which is interpreted as if a shipment is hazardous, it will increase 
the likelihood of a shipper choosing rail when compared to truck.  This is reasonable 
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since rail has fewer accidents (i.e., derailments) than trucks; shippers may perceive 
rail to be a safe mode for hazardous material transport. 
 
7.2 Information Propagation Model Simulation Results 
The information propagation model serves two main purposes; one is from the system 
perspective in that it allows the analyst to see how the agents are interacting using 
real data, and two stems from the data input in that the analyst can gain insight to the 
system performance of the current alternatives.  As the computation complexity 
increases non-linearly as the number of agents in the system increases, it was decided 
for time efficiency to take a random subset of the original mode choice data and have 
that subset evolve within the model framework.  As mentioned in Chapter 4, the 
simulation program has a limitation in that to guarantee that agents are evenly 
distributed across the interaction space, the number of agents needs to follow a face-
centered cubic rule.  It was decided that 84 out of 280, or 30% of the data was to be 
randomly sampled.  This subset has approximately 70% of the agents choosing the 
truck alternative, and 30% of the agents choosing the rail-based alternative, which is 
not too different from the original market shares. 
 
Figure 7-1 shows the results of investigating the model where only belief 
learning, considered a proxy for the direct experience mechanism since there are no 
new experiences generated for the simulation period, affects the opinion formation 
and propagation process.  Judging from the opinion trajectories, it seems that the 
initial opinion revisions occur with the switching from the current alternatives to the 
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new service (in that the information received or perceived on travel time and price 
may be similar to or significantly different than the best of the current alternatives).  
Belief learning appears to occur once some opinions have formed, an occurrence that 
was reflected in the simulation experiments in Chapter 5.  While it may seem that 
belief learning mechanism is effective at persuading agents to revise their opinions 
away from the baseline value of 0, it is not very effective in intensifying the revision 
to a point of consideration.  The consideration set evolution shown in Figure 7-2 
illustrates this claim, with only 4 out of 84 agents considering the alternative at the 
end of the simulation period.  This also however, could reflect that there is an 
inequality in level-of-service factors between truck and rail-based (including the new 
service) alternatives.  It is noticeable that a majority of agents harbor a negative 
opinion towards the new service, which may stem from the fact that it just does not 
perform as well as their last (and only) observation, which for the large proportion of 
agents is a truck alternative experience. 
 
In the second scenario, this research examines the effect of implementing 
peer-to-peer interaction mechanism, where information is relayed between agents 
instead of being relayed from a source.  Thus the mass media mechanism is left out in 
this scenario, and direct experience, belief learning, and word-of-mouth mechanisms 
are employed with equal frequencies.  Figure 7-3 depicts the opinion trajectories 
resulting from the simulation of this scenario.  Here, if the agent switches from the 
current experiences, and is an opinion leader, it is assumed that there will be some 
positive opinion value at which they will communicate via word of mouth. 
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Figure 7-1.  Information Propagation Model, Direct Experience and Belief 
Learning 
 
Figure 7-2.  Consideration Number for Information Propagation Model, Direct 




Figure 7-3.  Information Propagation Model, with Word of Mouth, Belief 
Learning, and Direct Experience 
Figure 7-4.  Consideration Number for Information Propagation Model, WofM, 




The opinion trajectories in Figure 7-3 suggest that the word-of-mouth 
mechanism is responsible for creating a dynamic opinion revision process once an 
opinion has been formed.  Most of the initial opinions seem to form through direct 
experience as the opinion value initially moves to a target value governed by the 
mechanism, but then does not change for some time.  The interaction of these three 
mechanisms seems to elevate the opinion revision rate, and increase the overall 
opinion value towards the new service.  Figure 7-4 shows the consideration set 
evolution for this scenario.  More than double the number of agents now considers the 
alternative.  Accounting for influential individuals (i.e., opinion leaders) is important 
to galvanizing the population towards consideration (or non-consideration) of the 
alternative. 
 
Simulation results from the scenario where all four mechanisms are employed 
and have an equal share in the interaction frequency is shown in Figure 7-5 and 
Figure 7-6.  Opinion trajectories shown in Figure 7-5 show less dynamic opinion 
revisions when compared to the previous scenario, but interestingly, fewer agents 
harbor a negative opinion.  Since mass media is included as a vehicle of information 
exchange, the corresponding share of word-of-mouth interactions (and other 
mechanism interactions) drops.  Perhaps the inclusion of the mass media mechanism 
is helping to persuade agents to form a favorable opinion towards the new service, but 
does not form a convinced or strong opinion.  Figure 7-6 shows that there are slightly 
fewer agents considering the alternative than in the previous scenario. 
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Figure 7-5.  Information Propagation Model, Equal Mechanisms 
 





7.3 Opinion Formation-Choice Model Simulation Results 
For scenarios utilizing the opinion formation-choice model, there are three criteria by 
which to examine how the mechanisms affect agents’ information, opinion, and 
choice.  The first is the opinion value trajectories for the new service.  Since this 
model is only concerned with the opinion towards the new service, the revision 
process is driven by experience and satisfaction with the new service only, and 
interaction with other mechanisms that allow for an exchange of opinions.  This is 
slightly different from the information propagation model in which agents’ opinion 
revision was based on their last observation, which is from a current alternative and 
not the new service.  Second, the number of individuals considering the alternative is 
evaluated as a precursor to investigating the choice dynamics.  As the literature 
suggests (see for example, Ben-Akiva and Swait, 1987a, Ben-Akiva and Boccara, 
1995), if an alternative is not in the consideration set, it does not appear in the choice 
set.  Thus, the number of individuals considering the new service is an upper bound 
on the number of individuals that can choose to utilize the new service.  Finally, the 
choice dynamics as seen through the market shares of agents taking each alternative 
is observed over time to see if market shares reach convergence or equilibrium, and to 
see how the choice sets evolve over time. 
 
The first scenario modeled under the opinion formation-choice framework is 
one where agents revise opinions toward the new service only through direct 
experiences.  Figure 7-7 shows the opinion trajectories resulting from this simulation.  
A general inference from the trajectories suggests that the design of the new service is 
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within the agents’ acceptable level-of-service parameter variance.  This is due to the 
majority of agents having a favorable opinion towards the new service, which 
indicates that the performance over time has deviated little from the agents’ 
expectation of that alternative.  In evaluating the consideration set evolution shown in 
Figure 7-8, there is double the number of agents considering the service than in the 
information propagation model scenario where agents interacted exclusively through 
a direct experience proxy.  This may suggest that real observations may be more 
influential than hearsay (i.e., information exchanged through word of mouth, mass 
media, or belief learning). 
 




Figure 7-8.  Consideration Number for Opinion Formation-Choice, DE Only 
 





Market share dynamics are shown in Figure 7-9.  It is interesting to note that 
even though at most 8 agents consider the new service, only 2 agents actually choose 
to utilize the new service.  This may suggest that even though agents may consider 
the service, often times the new service is not as attractive (i.e., has a lower utility 
value) as an existing mode, particularly truck.  Another noteworthy observation is that 
immediately after initializing shares to the data, the mode shares become a reflection 
of the generated experience.  While the mode shares are significantly different at first, 
towards the end of the simulation period, it appears as though the simulated shares are 
approaching the initial shares. 
 
It is important to note that by retaining the alternative specific constants for 
existing alternatives (i.e., truck-only and rail-based alternatives) in the utility 
equations used in the simulation, only improvements in travel time, costs, and opinion 
towards the new service will give the new service an edge over the existing 
alternatives.  While this is practical (e.g., opinions of the truck-only and rail-based 
alternatives are inherently captured in the alternative specific constant), it is limiting 
in that the model cannot make any distinction on whether there is a compensatory or 
non-compensatory effect on the opinion values towards the existing alternatives (e.g., 
if an agent’s opinion towards the new service goes up, what happens to the opinion 
towards the current chosen solution?).  Variations in the opinions towards existing 
alternatives may increase the propensity to switch from existing services to the new 




The next scenario considers agents’ interacting with all four mechanisms with 
equal frequencies.  Figure 7-10 shows the resulting opinion trajectories.  Again, the 
trajectories suggest that the initial opinions are formed through direct experience or 
mass media, and then the opinion values propagated by the belief learning and word-
of-mouth mechanisms.  Again, fewer agents harbor a negative opinion, which may 
suggest that a power of persuasion exists through word of mouth, mass media, and 
belief learning.  The persuasion or convincing done by the inclusion of peer-to-peer 
mechanisms seems to have increased the number of agents considering the new 
service, as shown by the resulting consideration set evolution plot in Figure 7-11.  A 
maximum of 14 agents consider the service, and at the end of the simulation period, 
there are 12 agents considering the service.  Of these 12 agents, 6 actually choose the 
new service, as shown by the market share dynamics plot in Figure 7-12. 




Figure 7-11.  Consideration Number for Opinion Formation-Choice Model with 
Equal Mechanisms 
 





The final scenario modeled using the opinion formation-choice framework is 
one where agents with a highly positive or highly negative opinion may distort or bias 
attribute values to conform to their opinions.  Thus, an agent with a high positive 
opinion is expected to bias the attributes of the new service by improving the level-of-
service parameters.  It is also assumed that this bias in attributes will bias the agents’ 
opinion as well.  Figure 7-13 shows the opinion trajectories resulting from this 
simulation.  Opinion values are very similar to the scenario where there is no attribute 
distortion; this is as expected since it is the attribute values that are distorted by 30%, 
while opinion values are only slightly biased more positive.  The effect of the slight 
bias in opinion value on consideration, however, is not insignificant as shown in 
Figure 7-14.  There are 15 agents considering the service, which are three more than 
in the scenario without attribute distortion. 
Figure 7-13.  Opinion Formation-Choice Model, Attribute Distortion, Improve 




Figure 7-14.  Consideration Number for Opinion Formation-Choice Model with 
Attribute Distortion 
 





The market share evolution of the scenario with attribute distortion illustrated 
in Figure 7-15 shows that there is a marginal improvement in the share of agents 
choosing the new service.  These results suggest that by incorporating attribute 
distortion into the simulation model, one may increase the likelihood of an agent 
choosing the new service through the perception of improving the attribute values.  
Through distortion of opinions given a high positive opinion, the agent is more likely 
to consider the alternative, while through distortion of the new service’s attributes 
given a high positive opinion, the agent is more likely to choose the alternative. 
 
7.4 Synopsis of Results 
This chapter implemented different aspects of the opinion-choice dynamics 
framework outlined in Chapter 6.  It also presents estimation results for the freight 
mode choice problem for the REORIENT corridor in Eastern Europe.  Overall, the 
mode choice estimation results conformed to expectations.  Travel time parameters 
were negative, and the travel time parameter for times under 70 hours was more 
negative for the rail-based alternative than truck.  Travel times over 70 hours had a 
generic parameter estimate and was not significant, suggesting that at high travel 
times, the marginal disutility of another hour is imperceptible (i.e., the experience is 
unsatisfactory to the point where additional time does not make it worse).  Price 
sensitivities were also negative.  Commodity effects were incorporated to show that 
for shipments of higher value per ton, the more sensitive the shipment was to travel 




The first model, the information propagation model, considered how agents 
relayed information about their last experience with their current alternative.  Several 
scenarios explored different combinations of the interacting mechanisms by which 
these agents exchanged opinions and information.  Results show that including peer-
to-peer mechanisms (e.g., word of mouth, mass media, belief learning) in the 
interactions tends to have a greater impact on opinion revision than does direct 
experience.  Results also suggest that direct experience is an opinion formation 
mechanism in that it is effective at convincing agents to revise their opinion away 
from 0.  Depending on the exposure rate and connectivity, mass media may also be an 
opinion formation mechanism.  Word of mouth and belief learning on the other hand, 
may tend to propagate opinions and intensify them towards the consideration 
threshold. 
 
In the opinion formation-choice model, agents who considered the new 
service were assumed to be able to construct a choice set including the service.  
Utilizing random draws to construct an error distribution, an alternative specific 
constant was determined as the mean of the error and added to the utility of the new 
service.  A new draw for the alternative specific constant occurred only if the 
individual received new information on the service in the inter-choice period.  Results 
suggested that real observations may be more influential than secondhand 
information, and that the incorporation of all four mechanisms garner a higher 
number of agents considering the service than by the incorporation of direct 
experience alone.  Of those that considered the new service, a fraction actually chose 
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to utilize the new service.  This suggests that even though an agent may have reached 
his opinion threshold and considers the new service, it may have been that the new 
service was outperformed by an existing service.  It also reveals an underlying 
limitation in assuming alternative specific constants of the existing alternatives to be 
fixed.  In each scenario, the market shares did not converge to a specific value which 
suggests that had the simulation time continued, more revisions might continue to 
alter the market shares until at some point, the shares reach equilibrium.  The relation 
between the number of agents considering the new service and the market share 
dynamics shed insight on consideration sets and choice set stability.  Intuitively, once 
the number of agents considering the new service stabilizes or reaches some 




Chapter 8:  Conclusions 
Evaluation of Findings, Future Research Avenues 
This chapter presents concluding remarks on the research findings and discusses 
future direction for further research on the topics covered.  General conclusions 
drawn from the various components of this research are summarized in the first 
section.  Section 8.2 presents the author’s perspective on the research contributions of 
the study of opinion formation and propagation and opinion-choice dynamics.  
Finally, the last section discusses some of the limitations of this research, as well as 
potential avenues for future research and development in this research area. 
 
8.1 General Conclusions 
This section first presents the state-of-art of utility models, decision making in 
transportation, and the role of opinions in choice.  It then focuses on the major finds 
of this research. 
 
Much of the research to date on the random utility model development has 
focused on the estimation procedure and the accuracy of the parameter estimates.  
Driving this research is the argument that accurate parameter estimates will yield the 
correct sensitivities to changes in the attributes due to policy changes or the 
introduction of a new service.  While unbiased parameters are quintessential to 
provide policy-makers with an accurate decision-making tool, little has been done to 
explore the dynamics of the process by which the market share adjusts to the changes 
in the environment stemming from such policy decisions (e.g., decrease in travel 
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time, increases in parking costs).  It is important to evaluate the process of these 
market shifts since it is not realistic to expect the entire population to become aware 
of changes in the attributes instantaneously.  Rather, individuals may learn about 
these changes through various social and interpersonal mechanisms over time, such as 
word-of-mouth, mass-media, direct experience, and belief learning.  It is also 
important to consider whether the information diffusion is ultimately affecting an 
individual’s choice, especially when considering market adoption of a new service, 
and to what extent attribute distortion plays a role in choice mechanisms. 
 
Within the context of travel demand, to the author’s knowledge, there has 
been no known research that explicitly accounts for the role of opinions in a choice 
framework.  The literature on opinions has shed some insight that a favorable opinion 
does not necessarily result in an observed choice; rather, a favorable opinion towards 
an alternative may encourage an individual to try the alternative for a trial period.  
The connection in these findings form the basis for constructing opinions to have a 
role in screening relevant alternatives for consideration in the final choice set.  If an 
individual has a significantly positive opinion (i.e., significantly different from 
neutral or some internal threshold) towards an alternative, the alternative is placed in 
the choice set for final consideration according to some decision rule.  If the opinion 





Investigating opinion dynamics in the context of a choice framework also 
offers insight to how information about the attributes, and more importantly the 
changes in the attributes, spreads amongst a population.  Since opinions are social and 
environmentally contextual the mechanisms behind their formation may correlate 
with information exchange.  Exploring these mechanisms of information exchange 
offers insight to how individuals may react to changes in the level of service of a 
particular alternative, and more importantly, how over time the information about a 
new alternative or service may propagate through a population.  This research 
intended to construct mathematical representations of these social and learning 
interactions to approximate opinion formation and propagation and information 
exchange within a population.  As an extension to a choice framework, this research 
explored the relationships between opinions formation and information propagation 
to choice set generation, perceptions of attribute information, and the market adoption 
of a new service. 
 
To accomplish the research objectives, this research compiled qualitative and 
quantitative pieces of studies that helped define elements of the opinion formation 
and propagation process seen in real-world situations.  The goal was to develop 
mechanisms that would reflect real-world phenomenon such as social gravitation 
effects due to influential individuals, marketing and advertising behaviors, collective 
opinion effects due to social networks, and satisfaction and learning.  Mathematical 
relationships were introduced in an attempt to model these situations.  A general 
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conceptual framework of the opinion formation and propagation process was then 
developed and implemented in an agent-based simulation program. 
 
Overall results from these experimental results were that accounting for 
opinion leaders introduced an effective “gravitational pull” towards the leaders.  
Leaders have a high effectiveness through word of mouth mechanisms when 
harboring an opinion of 1, which may suggest that it would be to one’s advantage to 
first build a coalition of opinion leaders and convince them of an opinion.  Mass 
media experiments suggests that if media campaigns diversify their message among 
different social class or classes in general, the advertisement may have a greater 
chance at reaching an individual and a greater impact on the opinion revision.  Belief 
learning results suggests that a variety of opinions have a more significant effect than 
when only a few opinion leaders have an opinion of 1, while everyone else is 
indifferent.  Finally, direct experience results suggest that as a general rule to 
convincing an individual to consider the alternative, one should keep the variance of 
the attributes low. 
 
To apply this opinion formation and propagation framework to a choice 
context, the next phase of this research focused on extending it to an opinion-choice 
dynamics framework.  Here, the opinion formation and propagation model serves as a 
screening mechanism for the choice set.  Opinions are correlated with choices in that 
the alternative specific constant of the alternatives are computed from an error 
distribution constructed only when the individual has received some new information 
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about that alternative.  This allows the analyst to incorporate serial correlation and 
panel effects without needing to specify the error term for specific interactions.  As an 
application, a mode choice problem was described and the research utilized a real 
dataset on freight mode choice to estimate attribute sensitivities (i.e., parameter 
coefficients). Findings from the mode choice estimation results conformed to 
expectations.  Travel time parameters were negative, and the travel time parameter for 
times under 70 hours was more negative for the rail-based alternative than truck.  
Travel times over 70 hours had a generic parameter estimate and was not significant, 
suggesting that at high travel times, the marginal disutility of another hour is 
imperceptible (i.e., the experience is unsatisfactory to the point where additional time 
does not make it worse).  Price sensitivities were also negative.  Commodity effects 
were incorporated to show that for shipments of higher value per ton, the more 
sensitive the shipment was to travel time variations, and the less sensitive it was to 
price variations.  The estimated coefficients were then used in the utility equations for 
the model implementation of the opinion-choice dynamics framework. 
 
In the implementation of the opinion-choice dynamics framework, this 
research investigated two models that incorporated different aspects of the 
framework.  The first model, the information propagation model, considered how 
agents relayed information about their last experience with their current alternative.  
Several scenarios explored different combinations of the interacting mechanisms by 
which these agents exchanged opinions and information.  Results show that including 
peer-to-peer mechanisms (e.g., word of mouth, mass media, belief learning) in the 
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interactions tends to have a greater impact on opinion revision than does direct 
experience.  Results also suggest that direct experience is an opinion formation 
mechanism in that it is effective at convincing agents to revise their opinion away 
from 0.  Depending on the exposure rate and connectivity, mass media may also be an 
opinion formation mechanism.  Word of mouth and belief learning on the other hand, 
may tend to propagate opinions and intensify them towards the consideration 
threshold. 
 
In the opinion formation-choice model, agents who considered the new 
service were assumed to be able to construct a choice set including the service.  
Utilizing random draws to construct an error distribution, an alternative specific 
constant was determined as the mean of the error and added to the utility of the new 
service.  A new draw for the alternative specific constant occurred only if the 
individual received new information on the service in the inter-choice period.  Results 
suggested that real observations may be more influential than secondhand 
information, and that the incorporation of all four mechanisms garner a higher 
number of agents considering the service than by the incorporation of direct 
experience alone.  Of those that considered the new service, a fraction actually chose 
to utilize the new service.  In each scenario, the market shares did not converge to a 
specific value which suggests that had the simulation time continued, more revisions 





8.2 Research Contributions 
The primary contributions of this research are the explicit modeling of social and 
learning mechanisms and their effects on opinion formation and propagation, the 
evolution of these opinions over time, and an exploration of the role that opinion 
dynamics have in choice processes.  This research offers insight to the process of 
evolving attitudes, perceptions, and opinions and the effects on individuals’ judgment 
and decision making.  It also offers insight to the effects of attribute distortion on 
decision making.  The added value of this research will hopefully compel policy 
makers to consider social and environmental contexts into account when modeling 
individual choice. 
 
Concerning the word-of-mouth mechanism, results from the scenario testing 
could encourage public agencies into adopting strategies of spreading information 
about a new policy change or an innovation to a select target group of individuals 
who are influential in forming a favorable opinion towards the innovation and in 
propagating their opinion to others.  Results from the mass-media mechanism 
scenarios offers insights to the effectiveness of segmentation versus reminder ads 
strategies to better match the consumers’ needs in order to evoke a response.  With 
the internet becoming a more prevalent marketplace for idea and opinion exchange, 
the belief learning mechanism results support the notion that it is important to be 
sensitive to the information published on the services of interest.  Finally, the direct 
experience mechanism results reflect users’ sensitivity to the variability in level-of-
service attributes and could emphasize to policy makers the need to reduce 
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uncertainties and variances in the experience of the service.  Interaction of the 
different mechanisms offers insight to developing strategies to form opinions (i.e., 
employ mass media and direct experience mechanisms initially) and other strategies 
to propagation and intensify opinions (i.e., employ word-of-mouth and belief learning 
mechanisms). 
 
A secondary contribution of this research is the development of the freight 
mode choice model for a freight corridor in Eastern Europe.  Combined with data on 
the evaluation of the system, this research offers insight to shippers’ sensitivities to 
current level-of-service attributes and projected future services through the mode 
choice model and the simulation experiment. 
 
8.3 Limitations, Future Research Directions 
While this research sheds many insights to opinion formation and propagation and 
opinion-choice dynamics, as well as freight mode choice estimation results, there are 
several limitations to the findings of this largely exploratory research.  One of the 
major limitations is the absence of empirically validated results.  There is limited 
effort in collecting data on actual opinions towards alternatives in transportation 
decision making applications, such as mode choice; as such, opinions are largely 
latent in transport choices.  This research has assumed random distributions in 
assigning opinion values and attributes of social class and more importantly social 
types.  Another limitation is that social networks and opinions constitute a rapidly 
growing field; since the beginning of this study, several new works have surfaced that 
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have looked at additional aspects of opinion formation and propagation.  In real-
world situations, there may be other mechanisms to consider when forming or 
propagating opinions.  Yet another limitation of this research is that the simulation 
program used to evolve opinion and choices did not incorporate group meetings or 
instances where more than one molecule collide.  Further, the simulation results did 
not explicitly consider inter-collision evolution of opinions.  Finally, this research has 
not implemented the full opinion-choice dynamics framework discussed in 
conceptual form.  The latter would allow the flexibility of specifying opinions of all 
alternatives, and constructing error terms for the calculation of the alternative specific 
constant to account for inconsistent behaviors (i.e., individual would pick an 
alternative despite having a lower level of service due to harboring a positive opinion 
towards that alternative). 
 
Many possibilities exist to further expand and develop the ideas articulated in 
this research.  On the opinion formation and propagation side, one future avenue 
would be to investigate real opinion evolution over social networks.  Another avenue 
would be to collect data to empirically validate the mathematical functions 
representing the interaction mechanisms.  Concerning mode choice and opinions, one 
possible avenue would be to investigate opinions (through some data collection 
effort) and the direct correlations they have with choice.  Yet another research avenue 
would be the implementation of the fully-flexible opinion-choice dynamics 
framework model, where there is an opinion on all alternatives and there are rules 
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